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Preface
The last decades have seen an immense amount of research on the algo-
rithmic content of game theory. On the one hand, a new subject called
algorithmic game theory has emerged that is concernedwith the study of the
algorithmic theory of finite games with multiple players. On the other hand,
infinite and, in particular, stochastic two-player zero-sum games have become
an important tool for the verification of open systems,which interact with
their environment.
The aim of this work is to bring together algorithmic game theory with
the games that are used in verification by extending the algorithmic the-
ory of stochastic two-player zero-sum games to incorporatemultiple play-
ers, whose objectives are not necessarily conflicting. In particular, this
work contains a comprehensive study of the complexity of themost promi-
nent solution concepts that are applicable in this setting, namely Nash and
subgame-perfect equilibria.
This book is the result of my doctoral studies at RWTH Aachen Univer-
sity. I am indebted to my primary supervisor Erich Grädel for giving me the
opportunity to pursue these studies, for introducingme to the scientific com-
munity and for giving me advice just when I needed it. I am equally grateful
to my secondary supervisor Wolfgang Thomas for his constant support and
encouragement.
Marcin Jurdziński did not hesitate to act as an external reviewer for this
thesis. I thank him not only for his careful reading and numerous remarks,
but also for giving an inspiring talk on branching vector addition systems,
which indirectly led to the resolution of a problem that was left open in the
original version of this thesis.
A substantial part of this book is based on joint workwith DominikWojt-
czak. I am indebted to him for our numerous illuminating discussions,
for his insights and ideas, and—last but not least—for hosting me in Edin-
burgh, Amsterdam and Oxford.
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Among the various other peoplewho contributed to this work, Iwould
like to thank in particular Łukasz Kaiser for many enlightening discussions
and for discovering Proposition 3.18. Special thanks also go to Florian Horn
for many interesting discussions, to János Flesch for pointing out Proposi-
tion 3.13, and to Peter BroMiltersen for drawingmy attention to Corollary 4.4.
Moreover, I am grateful to Hugo Gimbert and Eilon Solan for answering my
questions and to Rohit Chadha, Tobias Ganzow, JörgOlschewski and Edeline
Wong for their comments on preliminary drafts of this work.
Finally, Iwould like to thank Sam Ross-Gower for designing the cover of
this book, and Donald Knuth and Leslie Lamport for creating (LA)TEX.
Paris, November 2010
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1
Introduction
In this first chapter,we introduce games and equilibria, present themain
contributions of this work and discuss relatedwork. Finally, the end of this
chapter contains an outline of the rest of this book.
1.1 Games and equilibria
Generally speaking, game theory is occupiedwith understanding the phe-
nomena that occur when rational entities interact. As a distinct field of
study, game theory came into being in 1944, when von Neumann & Mor-
genstern published their seminal monograph, although it can be traced
back to 1838when Cournot published his work on duopolies; other early con-
tributors were Zermelo (1913) and Borel (1921). Since then, game theory has
found applications in fields as diverse as economics, sociology, biology, logic
and—last but not least—computer science.
Matrix games
According to von Neumann &Morgenstern, a game is described by a k-di-
mensional matrix that consists of the payoffs (one for each player) for each
possible combination of strategies. Consider, for example, the following situ-
ation (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994; Luce & Raiffa 1957). A couplewishes to
attend a concert of classical music. Their main goal is to go out together, but
15
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Table 1.1. Bach or Stravinsky.
Bach Stravinsky
Bach 2,1 0,0
Stravinsky 0,0 1,2
one of them prefers Bach,whereas the other person prefers Stravinsky. The
payoffmatrix for this gamewould then look like the one shown in Table 1.1.
Von Neumann & Morgenstern dealt primarily with two-player games
that are completely antagonistic; what one player gains is the other player’s
loss. Formally, they require that for every pair of strategies, the payoffs of
the two players sum up to 0 (or to any other constant value); this is why such
games are called two-player zero-sum games.
The game of Bach or Stravinsky is obviously not zero-sum. What is a solu-
tion of such a game? Intuitively, there are two possible rational outcomes, in
which bothpersons attend together a concertwithmusic composed by either
Bach or Stravinsky. If they go to different concerts, then each of them has
an incentive to go to the respective other concert since their main concern
is to enjoy a concert together. In general, a profile of strategies, one for each
player, is a Nash equilibrium (Nash 1950) if no player can increase her payoff by
unilaterally switching to a different strategy. Hence, the game of Bach or
Stravinsky has two Nash equilibria: (Bach,Bach) and (Stravinsky,Stravinsky).
Note that a Nash equilibriummakes no statement on how the players
arrive at the equilibrium. Moreover, a serious problemwith Nash equilibria
is that they are not orthogonal; if, for instance, one player arrives at the con-
clusion that (Bach,Bach) is the preferred equilibrium and therefore picks the
strategy Bach,while the other player picks Stravinsky because she thinks
that (Stravinsky,Stravinsky) is the preferred equilibrium, then the resulting
pair of strategies is not an equilibrium. Hence, in general, the players have
to coordinate their strategies in order to arrive at a Nash equilibrium.
Now consider a different situation, where two players have to choose
either Head or Tail; if the choices are the same, the first player has to pay 1€
to the second player; if the choices differ, the second player has to pay 1€
to the first player. The payoff matrix of this game is depicted in Table 1.2:
the rows of thematrix correspond to strategies of the first player. At first
glance, it seems that this game does not have a Nash equilibrium; if the
16
1.1 Games and equilibria
Table 1.2. Matching pennies.
Head Tail
Head 1,−1 −1, 1
Tail −1, 1 1,−1
choices are the same, then the second player will change her strategy, and if
the choices differ, then the first player will change her strategy. However,
there is an equilibriumin a different kind of strategy; If both players randomise
their strategies and play Head or Tail with probability 12 each, then each
player receives an expected payoff of 12 against every strategy of the other
player, andwe have a Nash equilibrium.
Formally, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the basic, so-
called pure, strategies, and a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies is a profile of
mixed strategies such that no player can increase her expected payoff by
unilaterally switching to another (mixed) strategy; in fact, it is easy to see
that, in order to have a Nash equilibrium, it suffices that no player can gain
from switching to a different pure strategy. Nash’s theorem (1950) states that
every game with finitely many players and finitely many pure strategies
for each player has a Nash equilibrium inmixed strategies; for two-player
zero-sumgames, the existence of an equilibrium inmixed strategies already
follows from the minimax theorem (von Neumann 1928).
Games in extensive form
Games in matrix form model one-shot events; both players choose their
strategies at once and independently of each other, and the game is over.
In practice, interaction occurs usually over time in a sequential fashion.
This aspect is taken into account by games in extensive form. Consider, for ex-
ample, the sequential version of matching pennies where the second player
makes her decision only after the first player has made hers and announced
it to the second player. Such a game is naturally represented by a tree such
as the one in Figure 1.1.
A pure strategy in a game in extensive form selects, for each node in the
tree that is labelled by the respective player, a possible action. If the tree
is finite, then there is only a finite number of such strategies, and Nash’s
theoremguarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium inmixed strategies.
17
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1
2
1,−1
Head
−1,1
Tail
Head
2
−1,1
Head
1,−1
Tail
Tail
Figure 1.1. Matching pennies as a game in extensive form.
In fact, Kuhn (1950) showed that every finite game (of perfect information) in
extensive formhas an equilibrium in pure strategies,which can be found
by a simple backward induction. Intuitively, this result relies on the fact that
games in extensive form are turn-based: at every node of the tree there is a
unique player who makes a decision,whereas in amatrix game the players
make their decisions simultaneously. We will present several variants of
Kuhn’s theorem for stochastic games in Chapter 3.
In our example of matching pennies in extensive form, the second player
can always make her choice dependent on the first player’s choice; if the
first player selects Head, she will select Tail, and if the first player selects
Tail, shewill select Head. If pairedwith any of the two pure strategies of the
first player,we have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
For games in extensive form, it turned out that Nash equilibriamay lack
credibility because players are able to change their strategy during the course
of the game.¹ Hence, researchers have come up withmore restricted solution
concepts for games in extensive form. In particular, the notion of a subgame-
perfect equilibrium, introduced by Selten (1965), addresses this deficiency and
plays a central role in this work.
Stochastic games
Arguably,most—if not all—real-world systems are influenced by events of a
probabilistic nature. Shapley (1953) was the first to define a gamemodel that
incorporates probabilistic choices: Shapley games are played by afinitenumber
of players on a finite state space, and in each state, each player chooses
one of finitely many actions; the resulting profile of actions determines
a reward for each player and a probability distribution on successor states.
¹ Wewill see an example of such a game in Chapter 3.
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In principle, a stochastic game proceeds ad infinitum. The payoff that each
player receives is given by a function of the infinite stream of rewards for
this player: Shapley considered games where payoffs are discounted sums of
rewards; other popular payoff functions are the limit average of the rewards
or the total sum of the rewards (see Filar & Vrieze 1997).
A pure strategy in a stochastic game assigns an action to each possible
sequence of states visited so far,whereas a randomised strategy (the analogue
of amixed strategy for stochastic games) assigns a probability distribution
on actions to each such sequence. Hence, every player has at her command
an, in general, infinite number of pure strategies, and Nash’s theorem is
not applicable. Nevertheless, in the case of discounted payoffs, there always
exists a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies (Fink 1964). There is even
a Nash equilibriumwhere the strategies only depend on the current state
and not on the full history of visited states; we call such strategies stationary.
For games with limit-average payoffs, Nash equilibria do, in general, not
exist. However, Vielle (2000a,b) proved that every two-player stochastic
gamewith limit-average payoffs has an ε-equilibrium, i.e. a profile of strategies
where each player can gain at most ε from deviating, for all ε > 0. Whether
ε-equilibria exist in stochastic games with more than two players and limit-
average payoffs is an open question (Neyman & Sorin 2003).
Games in computer science
The first time that games were used as a tool to solve a (theoretical) problem
in computer sciencewas in 1969,when Büchi & Landweber solved Church’s
problem (Church 1957, 1963). Church asked whether it is possible, given a
circuit or a logical formula that describes a binary relation on infinite se-
quences, to synthesise a circuit that computes for every input sequence
an output sequence such that the output is in relation to the input (or to
determine that such a circuit does not exist). Here, the circuit should com-
pute the output on the fly, i.e. the ith letter of the output may only depend
on the first i letters of the input. This scenario can naturally bemodelled
by a two-player game of infinite duration, where the players alternate in
choosing letters from the two sequences. Büchi and Landweber showed
that these games are determined, i.e. that either one of the two players has a
winning strategy, and that one can compute awinning strategy that can be
realised by a finite-state transducer.
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The games that arise from Church’s problem are games in extensive form,
played on the (infinite) unravelling of a finite graph; each vertex carries the
informationwhich player has to output a letter andwhich letter has been
output last. These graph games can also be used to solve Church’s problem
in the more general setting of a reactive system (plant) interacting with its
environment (Abadi et al. 1989; Pnueli & Rosner 1989; Ramadge & Wonham
1989). The task is to synthesise a controller for the system such that the
system behaves correctly for all possible behaviours of the environment (or to
detect that this is impossible). If one combines the possible behaviours of the
system and the environment into one game, such a controller corresponds
to awinning strategy for one player in this game.
Graph games also play an important role in the automated verification
of systems with respect to logical specifications, known as model checking
(Clarke et al. 1999; Baier & Katoen 2008). For instance, the questionwhether
a formula in Hennessy-Milner logic (Hennessy & Milner 1985) holds in a
finite transition system can be reduced to the questionwhether one player
has awinning strategy in a reachability game on a certain graph,which can
easily be constructed from the formula and the system.
For more complex logics such as themodal µ-calculus Lµ (Kozen 1983), the
games that arise from themodel-checking problem havemore complicated
winning conditions which refer to the set of vertices occurring infinitely
often in a play. These games are called parity games, andwewill discuss them
in thenext chapter. Let us onlymention at this point that the computational
complexity ofmodel checking Lµ hinges on the complexity of decidingwhich
player has awinning strategy in a parity game (see Grädel 2007), a problem
which is not known to be solvable in polynomial time.
There aremanymore areas of computer sciencewhere games have en-
tered the picture. For instance, the semantics of a computational model can
often be naturally defined as a game. This can not only be done for models
that are close in spirit to games such as alternating Turing machines (Chandra
et al. 1981), but also for certain functional programming languages such as
PCF, for which game-theoretic semantics provided the first fully abstract
model (Abramsky et al. 2000; Hyland & Ong 2000).
An emerging area of computer sciencewhose subjects are games them-
selves is algorithmic game theory (Nisan et al. 2007),which is concernedwith
the computational content of game theory. In particular, algorithmic game
theory has dealt with the computational complexity of finding equilibria.
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Daskalakis et al. (2006, 2009) established that finding an ε-equilibrium of a
finitematrix game is complete for the class PPAD (a class of function prob-
lems situated between FP and FNP). Later, Chen&Deng (2006) strengthened
their result by establishing that computing a Nash equilibrium of a finite
two-player matrix game is also PPAD-complete.
The stochastic games we study in this work are closer to games in exten-
sive form than Shapley games. In particular, they differ from the classical
setting in two aspects: First, they are turn-based. Second, there are no im-
mediate rewards on transitions; instead, every player has a certain objective,
which is a (Borel) set of desired plays. Intuitively, every player aims at gen-
erating a play that meets her objective. Hence, the payoff a player receives
from a single play is just 0 or 1 (depending onwhether the play fulfils the
player’s objective or not). In the two-player zero-sum variant, these games
occur naturallywhen onewants to build a controller for a system interacting
with a probabilistic environment (Baier et al. 2004).
1.2 The stochastic dining philosophers problem
For the kind of stochastic games we study here, most research has con-
centrated on the two-player zero-sum case; see Chapter 2 for a survey of
results. To seewhy it is worthwhile to study games with multiple players in
computer science, let us look at an example,which is a variant of the dining
philosophers problem, originally introduced by Dijkstra (1971) to illustrate the
difficulties of synchronisation in concurrent systems.
In the dining philosophers problem, there are n + 1 philosophers (n ≥ 1)
sitting at a round table with a bowl of rice in the middle. Between any
two philosophers who sit next to each other lies a chopstick, which can
be accessed by both of them. Since the table is round, there are as many
chopsticks as there are philosophers; see Figure 1.2. To eat from the bowl,
a philosopher needs to acquire both of the chopsticks he has access to. Hence,
if one philosopher eats, then his two neighbours cannot eat at the same
time. The life of a philosopher is rather simple and consists of thinking and
eating; to survive, a philosopher needs to think and eat again and again. The
task is to design a protocol that allows all of the philosophers to survive.
There are many solutions to the dining philosophers problem. For ex-
ample, the philosophers could proceed in rounds: in each round, only one
philosopher eats and all others think (see below).
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Figure 1.2. Dining philosophers.
Now, let us make the problem a little harder by removing one of the
n + 1 chopsticks uniformly at random at the beginning of the game. Obvi-
ously, this makes it impossible for two philosophers to survive (since they
only have access to one chopstick). More precisely,with probability 2/(n + 1)
a philosopher will have access to only one chopstick and die.
What is a good protocol in such a situation? Clearly,wewant each philoso-
pher to survivewith high probability (i.e. with probability 1− 2/(n + 1)). More-
over, it is natural to require that a philosopher who does not survive if he
follows the protocol should not be able to survive by sabotaging the protocol
(possibly inflicting harmon the other philosophers). This property is ensured
if the proposed protocol forms a Nash equilibrium; being perfectly rational,
no philosopher has an incentive to deviate from such a protocol.
Let us model the stochastic dining philosophers problem by a stochastic
game. A state of the game comprises the state of each philosopher and the
state of each chopstick; a philosopher may either think, eat, wait for the
chopstick on his left (right) side, or wait to return the chopstick on his left
(right) side, and a chopstick may either bemissing, available, or occupied
by the philosopher on its left (right) side. Since our model is turn-based,
we also assume that there is a variable turn,whose value determines which
philosopher may execute an action; after the action has been performed,
the variable is reset randomly.
The complete game can be represented as the synchronous composition
of processes P0 , . . . , Pn , C0 , . . . , Cn , S: process Pi models the ith philosopher,
process Ci models the ith chopstick, and process Smodels the scheduler,which
controls the turn variable and removes one chopstickuniformly at random at
the beginning of the game. These processes and the actions they can execute
22
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Pi :
Think
WaitR WaitL
Eat
RetL RetR
idlei
reqi ,i reqi ,i+1reli ,i
reli ,i+1
idlei idlei
reqi ,i+1 reqi ,i
idlei
reli ,i+1 reli ,i
reli ,i reli ,i+1
Ci :
Avail
Miss
OccL OccR
losei
reqi−1,i reqi ,i
reli−1,ireli ,i
S:
⋮
turn=0
⋮
turn=n
lose0
losen
τ
τ
idle0 , req0,∗ , rel0,∗
idlen , reqn ,∗ , reln ,∗
Figure 1.3. Processes for the stochastic dining philosophers problem.
are depicted in Figure 1.3 (arithmetical operations ought to be understood as
modulo n+1). Diamond shaped vertices stand for states where a probabilistic
choice is taken; with probability 1/(n+1) each, one of the outgoing transitions
is selected, and the corresponding action is taken. Note that the actions reqi , j
and reli , j are shared by the processes Pi , C j and S,whereas the action idlei
is only shared by Pi and S, and the action losei is only shared by Ci and S;
the symbol τ denotes an internal action.
For n = 1, a part of the complete game is depicted in Figure 1.4; the part
of the game that is entered when the action lose0 is taken is symmetric
and not shown. In the figure, the vertex labelled (wr, or, t,m, 0) represents,
for instance, the statewhere the first philosopher waits for the chopstick on
his right (i.e. he has acquired the chopstick on his left), the first chopstick
23
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⋯
t, a, t,m, 0 t, a, t,m, 1
wr, or, t,m, 0 wr, or, t,m, 1 t, ol,wl,m, 0 t, ol,wl,m, 1
lose0
lose1
idle0 idle1
req0,0 req1,0
idle0 idle1 idle0 idle1
rel0,0 rel1,0
Figure 1.4. The stochastic dining philosophers gamewith two philosophers.
is occupied by the philosopher on its right (i.e. by the first philosopher),
the second philosopher thinks, the second chopstick is missing (since the
action lose1 has been executed), and the first philosopher may execute an
action. Note that no state where a philosopher eats is reachable from the
initial state (which is not surprising given that a philosopher needs two
chopsticks to eat). Hence, there does not exist a protocolwhere a philosopher
survives with non-zero probability.
For n > 1, the stochastic dining philosophers game has several equilibria:
in some of them, each philosopher survives with probability 0; in others,
the probability of survival is non-zero. For instance, consider the greedy
(albeit foolish) strategywhere a philosopherfirst tries to acquire the left chop-
stick and subsequently the right chopstick; once a philosopher has acquired
both chopsticks, he continues eating forever. In particular, a chopstick that
has been acquired once is never released. Clearly, every philosopher survives
with probability 0 if all philosophers adhere to this strategy. Yet, this profile
of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium; if one philosopher changes his
strategy and returns his two chopsticks to resume thinking,with positive
probability one of his neighbours (adhering to the greedy strategy) picks
up one of these chopsticks and never hands it back. Hence, the probability
24
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that the philosopher who has changed his strategy can go from thinking to
eating and back at least k times tends to 0.
Now consider the strategy where a philosopher only acquires a chopstick
if both chopsticks adjacent to him are present and no other philosopher is
holding a chopstick; once a philosopher has eaten, he puts both chopsticks
back on the table, so that he can resume thinking (the order inwhich chop-
sticks are put up and down is arbitrary). With probability 1, a philosopher
who is not missing a chopstickwill survive if all philosophers adhere to this
strategy. On the other hand, if a philosopher is missing one of his chopsticks,
hewill starve and die. Hence, since the probability of missing a chopstick
is 2/(n + 1), each philosopher survives with probability 1 − 2/(n + 1)with this
profile of strategies. Moreover, we have a Nash equilibrium since there is no
way for a philosopher who is missing a chopstick to survive.
Clearly, the latter equilibrium is preferable to the former because the
probability of survival is greater. Moreover, the equilibrium strategies have
the attractive property that the chosen action only depends on the current
state of the game; we call such strategies positional. In Chapter 4, we will
see that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in positional strategies is
NP-complete.
1.3 Contributions
The first step in analysing amathematical concept is to prove its existence.
For Nash equilibria in stochastic games, existencewas proven by Chatterjee
et al. (2004b). However, their proof contains an inaccuracy,whichwe address
in this work. By contrast, subgame-perfect equilibria do, in general, not
exist in stochastic games. Nevertheless,we show that they do exist in the
special case of deterministic games with Borel objectives.
From a computer science point of view, themere existence of an object is
not sufficient; we alsowant to compute it. We observe that, for games with
parity objectives,we can verify in polynomial timewhether a given strategy
profile is a Nash or subgame-perfect equilibrium. This puts the problem of
computing a Nash equilibrium of a stochastic gamewith parity objectives
into the class FNP of function problems for which a possible solution can be
verified in polynomial time. In particular, there exists a polynomial-space
algorithm for computing an arbitraryNash equilibriumof a stochastic game
with parity objectives.
25
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With the stochastic dining philosophers example in mind,we argue that
it makes sense to measure the computational complexity of equilibria not
only in terms of how hard it is to compute an arbitrary equilibrium (as in
algorithmic game theory), but also of how hard it is to compute an equilib-
riumwith a certain payoff. More precisely,we permit the placing of a lower
and an upper threshold on the payoff of each player. The corresponding
decision problem is:
Given a gamewith k players and payoff thresholds x, y ∈ [0, 1]k, decide
whether the game has an equilibriumwhose payoff lies in between
x and y.
Depending onwhether we ask for a Nash or a subgame-perfect equilibrium,
we already obtain two different decision problems. It turns out that it also
makes a difference in what types of strategies the equilibrium is realised.
In this work,we consider six types of strategies: positional strategies, sta-
tionary strategies (which can be randomised), pure finite-state strategies,
randomised finite-state-strategies (both ofwhich may depend on some fi-
nite information about the sequence of states seen so far), arbitrary pure
strategies and arbitrary randomised strategies (both ofwhich may depend
on the full sequence of states seen so far).
We show that the complexity of the decision problem is highly dependent
on the type of strategies that one allows for the equilibrium: The problem
is typically decidable if we look for equilibria in positional or stationary
strategies, but it becomes undecidable if we allow arbitrary (randomised
or pure) strategies or finite-state strategies. In fact,we prove that it is not
possible to decide the existence of an equilibriumwhere a designated player
wins with probability 1 for these types of strategies (for all other players
there is no constraint on the payoff ).
In order to perform amore refined complexity analysis, we need to re-
strict the type of objectives; we show that for the typical objectives used as
acceptance conditions for automata on infinite words, deciding whether
there exists a positional equilibriumwhose payoff lies in between x and y
is NP-complete, whereas we can only give a Pspace upper bound for the
stationary case. However, we prove that the latter problem is at least as
hard as the square root sum problem, a problem about exact numerical compu-
tations which is not known to lie inside the polynomial hierarchy. Hence,
our Pspace upper bound seems hard to improve.
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In fact, all the lower bounds we havementioned so far hold for stochastic
games with a very restricted type of objectives, namely simple reachability objec-
tives. In particular, this type of objectives is subsumed by all the objectives
that play a role in verification. Moreover, the payoff function defined by
simple reachability objectives is a special case of the limit-average payoff
functionwith binary rewards on transitions; hence, our lower bounds also
hold for stochastic games with limit-average payoffs.
Although it is, in general, not possible to decide the existence of an equi-
libriumwith a certain payoff,we prove decidability for several fragments
of the original decision problem: First,we show that the problem becomes
decidablewhen one looks for an equilibriumwhere each player either wins
or loses with probability 1. Second,we prove decidability for the restriction
where one requires all but one player towinwith probability 1; additionally,
for the payoff of the remaining player, we can specify a lower threshold.
Finally, we show that the problem is decidable for deterministic games if
we restrict ourselves to binary thresholds.
For all of the fragments we study,we classify the complexity of the prob-
lemwith respect to the type of objectives. Inmany cases, it turns out that
their complexity is comparable to the complexity of solving two-player
zero-sum stochastic games with the same type of objectives. In other cases,
the problems become harder; for instance, decidingwhether in a determin-
istic game with co-Büchi objectives there exists a Nash equilibrium that
is winning for the first player is NP-complete,whereas the corresponding
decision problem for two-player zero-sum games is solvable in polynomial
time. In addition,we show that for all of the fragments we consider it does
not make a differencewhether one considers randomised or pure strategies;
in fact, in most cases, pure finite-state strategies are sufficient.
Most of the results presented in Chapter 4 and some of the results pre-
sented in Chapter 5 were obtained in collaboration with Dominik Wojt-
czak. Preliminary expositions of most of the results presented in this work
were published in the proceedings of various conferences andworkshops
(Ummels 2008; Grädel & Ummels 2008; Ummels &Wojtczak 2009a, 2009b).
1.4 Relatedwork
In algorithmic game theory, the predominant question has been the com-
plexity of computing equilibria as a function problem. The decision version,
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where one asks whether there exists an equilibrium with certain proper-
ties, has attracted considerably less interest. Surely, one reason for this lack
of interest is that it was realised early on that such problems are usually
NP-hard for finitematrix games (Gilboa & Zemel 1989). In particular, decid-
ingwhether in a two-player matrix game there exists a Nash equilibrium
where the first player’s payoff is greater than a given threshold is NP-hard
(Conitzer & Sandholm 2003), even if the payoff matrix is binary (Codenotti &
Štefankovič 2005). Neither of these results implies one of our results since
our games are turn-based.
Amore restrictedmodel of stochastic games,where questions like ours
have been studied, areMarkov decision processes (MDPs) with multiple objec-
tives. These games can be considered as stochastic games where only one
player can influence the outcome of the game. For MDPs with multiple
ω-regular objectives, Etessami et al. (2008) showed that questions like the
one we ask are decidable. Their result relies on the fact that, for MDPs
with multiple simple reachability objectives, stationary strategies suffice to
achieve a payoff that is higher than a given threshold. Unfortunately, this
property does not extend to our model: we give an example of a stochastic
game with simple reachability objectives where every Nash equilibrium
inwhich the first player wins with probability 1 requires infinitememory
(see Proposition 4.12).
1.5 Outline
In Chapter 2,we define the gamemodel that underlies this work and survey
results on two-player zero-sum stochastic games.
Chapter 3 contains our results on the existence of Nash and subgame-
perfect equilibria in stochastic games. In that chapter, we also analyse
the complexity of computing an equilibriumwith an arbitrary payoff and
introduce the various decision problems associatedwithNash and subgame-
perfect equilibria in different types of strategies.
In Chapter 4, we present our results on the complexity of Nash and
subgame-perfect equilibria: Sections 4.1 and 4.2 dealwith equilibria in posi-
tional and stationary strategies respectively, for whichwe prove decidability
results. Finally, Sections 4.3 and 4.4 are concerned with equilibria in arbi-
trary (pure or randomised) strategies and finite-state strategies respectively,
for whichwe prove undecidability.
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In Chapter 5,we look at several fragments of the original decision prob-
lem for Nash equilibria and prove their decidability. Section 5.1 covers the
fragment where one restricts to equilibria inwhich each player either wins
or loses almost surely; Section 5.2 deals with the special casewhere all but
one player are required towinwith probability 1, and Section 5.3 contains
our results on deterministic games.
Finally, in Chapter 6,we list some open problems and point out possible
extensions to this work.
For readers who do not have the necessary background on probability or
complexity theory, Appendix A provides a brief introduction to the relevant
concepts. Additionally, Appendix B surveys results onMarkov chains and
Markov decision processes that are essential for this work.
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Stochastic Games
In this chapter,we introduce stochastic games formally, andwe summarise
themain results on two-player zero-sum stochastic games.
Notation
We denote by M = {0, 1, . . .} the set of all natural numbers (including 0), by e
the set of all real numbers, and by [0, 1] the set of all x ∈ e such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Given a set A, we denote by P(A) its power set, and by D(A) the set of all
(discrete) probability distributions over A, i.e. functions p∶ A → [0, 1] such that
p(a) = 0 for all but countablymany a ∈ A and ∑a∈A p(a) = 1. Moreover,we de-
note by A∗ and Aω the set of all finite, respectively infinite, sequences over A;
the empty sequence is denoted by ε, and we set A+ ∶= A∗ / {ε}. The length
of a finite sequence x is denoted by ∣x∣, and we write x ≺ y (x ⪯ y) if x is a
proper (non-proper) prefix of y. Given an infinite sequence α = α(0)α(1) . . . ,
we denote by α∣k = α(0) . . . α(k − 1) its prefix of length k ∈ M and by Inf(α) the
set of elements occurring infinitely often in α. Finally, for X ⊆ Aω and x ∈ X∗,
we denote by x−1X the set {α ∈ Aω ∶ x ⋅ α ∈ X}.
2.1 Arenas and objectives
Let us start by giving a formal definition of the gamemodel that underlies
this work. The games we are interested in are played by multiple players
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taken from a finite set Π of players; we usually refer to them as player 0,
player 1, player 2, and so on.
The arena of the game is basically a directed, coloured graph. Intuitively,
the players take turns to form an infinite path through the arena, a play.
Additionally, there is an element of chance involved: at some vertices, it is
not a player who decides how to proceed but nature,who chooses a successor
vertex according to a probability distribution. Tomodel this scenario,we par-
tition the set V of vertices into sets Vi of vertices controlled by player i ∈ Π
and a set of stochastic vertices, andwe extend the edge relation to a transition
relation that takes probabilities into account. Formally, an arena for a game
with players in Π consists of:
• a nonempty, countable set V of vertices or states,
• for each player i a set Vi ⊆ V of vertices controlled by player i,
• a transition relation ∆ ⊆ V × ([0, 1] ∪ {}) × V , and
• a colouring function χ∶V → C into a set C of colours.
We make the assumption that every vertex is controlled by at most one
player: Vi ∩ V j = ∅ if i ≠ j; vertices that are not controlled by any player
are called stochastic. Moreover, we require that  appears in a transition(v , p,w) ∈ ∆ if and only if v is a controlled vertex, and that transition prob-
abilities are unique: if v is a stochastic vertex and w is an arbitrary vertex,
then there exists precisely one p ∈ [0, 1] such that (v , p,w) ∈ ∆; we denote this
probability by ∆(w ∣ v). For computational purposes,we assume that these
probabilities are rational numbers. Naturally, for each stochastic vertex v
the probabilities on outgoing transitions must sum up to 1: ∑w∈V ∆(w ∣ v) = 1.
Finally, for v ∈ V , let
v∆ ∶= {w ∈ V ∶ there exists 0 ≠ p ∈ [0, 1] ∪ {} such that (v , p,w) ∈ ∆}
be the set of possible successor vertices; for technical reasons,we assume
that for each controlled vertex v ∈ ⋃i∈Π Vi the set v∆ is finite and nonempty.
The description of a game is completed by specifying an objective for each
player. On an abstract level, these are just arbitrary sets of infinite sequences
of colours, i.e. subsets of Cω. Sincewewant to assign a probability to them,
we assume that objectives are Borel sets (see Appendix A), if not stated oth-
erwise. Since objectives specify which plays arewinning for a player, they
are also called winning conditions.
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In general,we identify an objective Win ⊆ Cω over colours with the cor-
responding objective χ−1(Win) ∶= {π ∈ Vω ∶ χ(π) ∈ Win} ⊆ Vω over vertices
(which is also Borel since χ, as amapping Vω → Cω, is continuous). In fact,
for themathematical treatment of stochastic games, it is perfectly safe to
assume that C = V and that χ is the identity function. The reason that we
allow objectives to refer to a colouring of the vertices is that the number of
colours can bemuch smaller than the number of vertices, and it is possible
that an objective can be representedmore succinctly as an objective over
colours rather than as an objective over vertices.
If Π is a finite set of players, (V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ) is an arena and (Wini)i∈Π is
a collection of objectives,we call the tuple G = (Π, V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ , (Wini)i∈Π)
a stochasticmultiplayer game (SMG). An SMG is finite if its arena is finite.
A play of G is an infinite path through the arena of G, i.e. an infinite
sequence π = π(0)π(1) . . . of vertices such that π(k + 1) ∈ π(k)∆ for each k ∈ M.
Finite prefixes of plays are called histories. We say that a play π of G is won by
player i if the corresponding sequence of colours fulfils player i’s objective,
i.e. if χ(π) ∈ Wini ; the payoff of a play π is the vector x ∈ {0, 1}Π defined by
xi = 1 if and only if χ(π) ∈Wini .
Often, it is convenient to designate an initial vertex v0 ∈ V ; we call the
pair (G , v0) an initialised SMG. A play or a history of an initialised SMG (G , v0)
is just a play, respectively a history, of G that starts in v0. In the following,
wewill refer to both SMGs and initialised SMGs as SMGs; it should always
be clear from the context whether the game is initialised or not.
The SMGmodel may be generalised to allow for concurrent behaviour.
In this case, each player has at her command a number of actions, one of
which she has to pickwhenever the play arrives at a vertex. The joint profile
of actions, chosen by the players simultaneously, determines a probability
distribution on successor vertices. The resulting model, named concurrent
games by de Alfaro et al. (2007), is closer to the original model by Shapley
(1953), but lacks many of the attractive properties of our model.
Although they are devoid of concurrency, SMGs provide a versatilemodel
and generalise various other stochasticmodels, each of them the subject of
intensive research. First, there areMarkov chains, the basicmodel for stochas-
tic processes, inwhich no control is possible. These are SMGs where the set Π
of players is empty and (consequently) there are only stochastic vertices.
Ifwe extend Markov chains by a single controller,we arrive at themodel
of aMarkov decision process (MDP), amodel introduced by Bellman (1957) and
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heavily used in operations research. Formally, anMDP is an SMGwith only
one player (and only one objective).
Finally, in a (perfect-information) stochastic two-player zero-sum game (S2G),
there are only two players, player 0 and player 1,who have opposing objec-
tives: one player wants to fulfil her objective,while the other onewants to
prevent her from doing so. Hence, one player’s objective is the complement
of the other player’s objective. Due to their competitive nature, these games
are also known as competitive Markov decision processes (see Filar & Vrieze 1997).
The SMGmodel also incorporates several non-stochasticmodels. In par-
ticular,we call an SMG deterministic if it contains no stochastic vertices. In the
two-player zero-sum setting, the resulting model has found applications in
logic and controller synthesis (see Section 1.1).
Types of objectives
We have introduced objectives as abstract sets of infinite sequences. In order
to be amenable to algorithmicmanipulation,we need to restrict to a class of
objectives representable by finite objects. The objectives we consider for this
purpose are standard in logic and verification (see Grädel et al. 2002); for all
of them,we require that the set C of colours the objective refers to is finite.
• A reachability objective is given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours, and the objective
requires that a good colour is seen at least once. The corresponding subset
of Cω is Reach(F) ∶= {α ∈ Cω ∶ α(k) ∈ F for some k ∈ M}.
• A safety objective is also given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours, but this time
the objective requires that only good colours are seen. The corresponding
subset of Cω is Safe(F) ∶= {α ∈ Cω ∶ α(k) ∈ F for all k ∈ M}.
• A Büchi objective is again given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours, but it requires
that a good colour is seen infinitely often. The corresponding subset of Cω
is Bu¨chi(F) ∶= {α ∈ Cω ∶ Inf(α) ∩ F ≠ ∅}.
• A co-Büchi objective is also given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours; this time, the
objective requires that from some point onwards only good colours are seen.
The corresponding subset of Cω is coBu¨chi(F) = {α ∈ Cω ∶ Inf(α) ⊆ F}.
• A parity objective is given by a priority function Ω∶C → {0, . . . , d},where d ∈ M,
which assigns to each colour a certain priority. The objective requires that
the least priority that occurs infinitely often is even. The corresponding
subset of Cω is Parity(Ω) = {α ∈ Cω ∶min(Inf(Ω(α))) is even}.
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• A Streett objective is given by a set Ω of Streett pairs (F , G), where F , G ⊆ C.
The objective requires that, for each of the pairs, if a colour on the
left-hand side is seen infinitely often, then so is a colour on the right-
hand side of this pair. The corresponding subset of Cω is Streett(Ω) ={α ∈ Cω ∶ Inf(α) ∩ F = ∅ or Inf(α) ∩ G ≠ ∅ for all (F , G) ∈ Ω}.
• A Rabin objective is given by a set Ω of Rabin pairs (F , G),where F , G ⊆ C. The
objective requires that for some pair a colour on the left-hand side is seen
infinitely oftenwhile all colours on the right-hand side of this pair are
seen only finitely often. The corresponding subset of Cω is Rabin(Ω) ={α ∈ Cω ∶ Inf(α) ∩ F ≠ ∅ and Inf(α) ∩ G = ∅ for some (F , G) ∈ Ω}.
• AMuller objective is given by a familyF of accepting sets F ⊆ C, and it requires
that the set of colours seen infinitely often equals one of these accepting
sets. The corresponding subset of Cω is Muller(F) = {α ∈ Cω ∶ Inf(α) ∈ F}.
Parity, Streett, Rabin and Muller objectives are of particular relevance
because they provide a standard form for arbitrary ω-regular objectives;
any game with arbitrary ω-regular objectives can be reduced to one with
parity, Streett, Rabin or Muller objectives (over a larger arena) by taking the
product of its original arenawith a suitable deterministicword automaton
for each player’s objective (see Thomas 1990).
In this work, for reasons that will become clear later,we are particularly
attracted to objectives that are invariant under adding and removing finite
prefixes; we call such objectives prefix-independent. More formally, an objective
is prefix-independent if for each α ∈ Cω and x ∈ C∗ the sequence α satisfies
the objective if and only if the sequence x ⋅ α does. Note that, ifWin ⊆ Cω is a
prefix-independent objective over colours, then the corresponding objective
χ−1(Win) over vertices is also prefix-independent.
Of the objectives listed above, only reachability and safety objectives are,
in general, not prefix-independent. However,many of our results (in par-
ticular,many of the lower bounds we prove) apply to games with a prefix-
independent form of reachability,whichwe call simple reachability. For such
an objective,we assume that each vertex is coloured by itself, i.e. C = V , and
χ is the identitymapping. The simple reachability objective for a set F ⊆ V
coincides with the reachability objective for F, but we require that each v ∈ F
is a terminal vertex: v∆ = {v}. For any such set F, we have π(k) ∈ F for some
k ∈ M if and only if Inf(π) ∩ F ≠ ∅ (or equivalently, Inf(π) ⊆ F). Hence, simple
reachability objectives are prefix-independent.
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Streett Rabin
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Figure 2.1. A hierarchy of prefix-independent objectives.
For S2Gs, the distinction between reachability and simple reachability is
not important: every S2Gwith a reachability objective can easily be trans-
formed into an equivalent S2Gwith a simple reachability objective. For SMGs,
we believe that any such transformation requires exponential time: Decid-
ing whether in a deterministic game with simple reachability objectives
there exists a play that fulfils each of the objectives can be done in poly-
nomial time,whereas the same problem is NP-complete for deterministic
games with arbitrary reachability objectives (see Ummels 2005).
The resulting hierarchy of objectives is depicted in Figure 2.1. As explained
above, a simple reachability objective can be viewed as a (co-)Büchi objective.
Any (co-)Büchi objective is equivalent to a parity objective with only two
priorities, and any parity objective is equivalent to both a Streett and a Rabin
objective; in fact, the intersection (union) of two parity objectives is equiva-
lent to a Streett (Rabin) objective. Moreover, any Streett or Rabin objective
is equivalent to a Muller objective, although the translation from a set of
Streett/Rabin pairs to an equivalent family of accepting sets is, in general,
exponential. Finally, the complement of a Büchi (Streett) objective is equiva-
lent to a co-Büchi (Rabin) objective, and vice versa,whereas the complement
of a parity (Muller) objective is also a parity (Muller) objective. In fact, any ob-
jective that is equivalent to both a Streett and a Rabin objective is equivalent
to a parity objective (Zielonka 1998).
To denote the class of SMGs (S2Gs)with a certain type of objectives,we pre-
fix thename SMG (S2G) with thenames of the objectives; for instance,we use
the term Streett-Rabin SMG to denote SMGs where each player has a Streett or
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a Rabin objective. For S2Gs,we adopt the convention to name the objective
of player 0 first; hence, in a Streett-Rabin S2G player 0 has a Streett objec-
tive,while player 1 has a Rabin objective. Inspired by Condon (1992),wewill
refer to SMGs with simple reachability objectives and S2Gs with a (simple)
reachability objective for player 0 as simple stochasticmultiplayer games (SSMGs)
and simple stochastic two-player zero-sum games (SS2Gs), respectively.
2.2 Strategies and strategy profiles
Randomised and pure strategies
The notion of a strategy lies at the heart of game theory. Formally, a (ran-
domised) strategy of player i in an SMG G is a mapping σ∶V∗Vi → D(V ) as-
signing to each possible sequence xv ∈ V∗Vi of vertices ending in a vertex
controlled by player i a (discrete) probability distribution over V such that
σ(xv)(w) > 0 only if (v , ,w) ∈ ∆. Instead of σ(xv)(w), we usually write
σ(w ∣ xv). We say that a play π of G is compatiblewith a strategy σ of player i
if σ(π(k + 1) ∣ π(0) . . . π(k)) > 0 for all k ∈ M with π(k) ∈ Vi . Similarly, a his-
tory x = v0 . . . vn is compatiblewith σ if σ(vk+1 ∣ v0 . . . vk) > 0 for all 0 ≤ k < n.
A (randomised) strategy profile ofG is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π where σi is a strategy of
player i in G. We say that a play or a history of G is compatiblewith a strategy
profile σ if it is compatiblewith each σi . Given a strategy profile σ = (σ j ) j∈Π
and a strategy τ of player i,we denote by (σ−i , τ) the strategy profile obtained
from σ by replacing σi with τ.
A strategy σ of player i is called pure or deterministic if for each xv ∈ V∗Vi
there exists w ∈ v∆ with σ(w ∣ xv) = 1; note that a pure strategy of player i
can be identifiedwith a function σ∶V∗Vi → V . A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is
called pure (or deterministic) if each σi is pure.
The probabilitymeasure induced by a strategy profile
Given a game G and a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π of G, the conditional probability
of w ∈ V given xv ∈ V∗V is the number σi(w ∣ xv) if v ∈ Vi and the unique
p ∈ [0, 1] such that (v , p,w) ∈ ∆ if v is a stochastic vertex; let us denote this
probability by σ(w ∣ xv). Given an initial vertex v0 ∈ V , the probabilities
σ(w ∣ xv) give rise to a probabilitymeasure: the probability of a basic cylinder
set v0 . . . vk ⋅ Vω equals the product∏kj=1 σ(v j ∣ v0 . . . v j−1); basic cylinder sets
that start in a vertex different from v0 have probability 0. This definition
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Figure 2.2. An example of a two-player SSMG.
induces a probability measure on the algebra of cylinder sets, which—by
Carathéodory’s extension theorem (Theorem A.5)—can be extended to a
probabilitymeasure on the Borel σ-algebra over Vω; we denote the extended
measure by Prσv0 . Finally, by viewing the colouring function χ∶V → C as a
continuous function Vω → Cω,we obtain a probabilitymeasure on the Borel
σ-algebra over Cω; we abuse notation and denote this measure also by Prσv0 .
For a strategy profile σ, we are mainly interested in the probabilities
pi ∶= Prσv0 (Wini) of winning. We call pi the (expected) payoff of σ for player i
(from v0) and the vector (pi)i∈Π the (expected) payoff of σ (from v0). Note
that, if σ is a pure strategy profile of a deterministic game, then its payoff is
just the payoff of the unique play π of (G , v0) that is compatiblewith each σi .
Finally,we say that a history xv of (G , v0) is consistent with σ if Prσv0 (xv ⋅Vω) > 0,
i.e. if the basic cylinder induced by this history has positive probability. Note
that each history that is consistent with σ is also compatiblewith σ.
Example 2.1. Let G be the SSMG depicted in Figure 2.2 according to the fol-
lowing conventions, to which we adhere throughout this work: Vertices
controlled by players are drawn as circles, where the player who controls
a vertex is given by the label next to it. Stochastic vertices are drawn as
diamonds, and transition probabilities are given by labels on edges (the
default being 12 ). If there is a designated initial vertex, it is marked by a
dangling incoming edge. Finally, terminal vertices are generally depicted by
their associated payoff vector. As syntactic sugar,we allow arbitrary vectors
of rational probabilities as payoffs; this does not increase the power of the
model since such a payoff vector can easily be realised by an SSMG consisting
exclusively of stochastic and terminal vertices.
Now consider the strategy profile σ defined by σ(v1 ∣ xv0) = σ(v1 ∣ xv2) = 1
for each x ∈ V∗. Starting from the initial vertex v0 of G, the payoff of this
strategy profile is ( 12 , 12 ) because the probability of reaching the terminal
vertex that has this payoff equals 1.
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In order to apply known results about Markov chains,we can also view
the stochastic process induced by a strategy profile σ as a countable Markov
chain Gσ, defined as follows: The set of states of Gσ is the set V+ of all
nonempty sequences of vertices in G. The only transitions from a state xv ,
where x ∈ V∗ and v ∈ V , are to states of the form xvw ,where w ∈ V , and such
a transition occurs with probability p > 0 if and only if either v is stochastic
and (v , p,w) ∈ ∆, or v ∈ Vi and σi(w ∣ xv) = p. Finally, the colouring χ of
vertices is extended to a colouring of states by setting χ(xv) = χ(v) for all
x ∈ V∗ and v ∈ V . With this definition, we can recover the payoff of σ for
player i as the probability of the event χ−1(Wini) in (Gσ , v0).
For each player i, the Markov decision process Gσ−i is defined just as Gσ,
but states xv ∈ V∗Vi are controlled by player i (the sole player in Gσ−i ), and
there is a transition from such a state to any state of the form xvw ,where
w ∈ V , such that (v , ,w) ∈ ∆; player i’s objective is the same as in G.
Strategies with memory
A memory structure for a game G with vertices in V is a tripleM = (M, δ ,m0),
whereM is a set ofmemory states, δ∶M×V → M is the update function, andm0 ∈ M
is the initial memory. A (randomised) strategywithmemoryM of player i is a function
σ∶M × Vi → D(V ) such that σ(m, v)(w) > 0 only if w ∈ vE. The strategy σ is a
pure strategy with memoryM if additionally the following property holds: for
all m ∈ M and v ∈ V there exists w ∈ V such that σ(m, v)(w) = 1. Hence,
a pure strategy withmemoryM can be described by a function σ∶M×Vi → V .
Finally, a (pure) strategy profile with memoryM is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π such that
each σi is a (pure) strategy with memoryM of player i.
A (pure) strategy σ withmemoryM of player i defines a (pure) strategy
of player i in the usual sense as follows: Let δ∗(x) be thememory state after
x ∈ V∗, defined inductively by δ∗(ε) = m0 and δ∗(xv) = δ(δ∗(x), v) for x ∈ V∗
and v ∈ V . If v ∈ Vi , then the distribution (successor vertex) chosen by the
strategy σ for the sequence xv is σ(δ∗(x), v). Vice versa, every strategy (profile)
of G can be viewed as a strategy (profile) with memoryM ∶= (V∗ , ⋅, ε).
A finite-state strategy (profile) is a strategy (profile) with memoryM for a
finitememory structureM. Note that a strategy profile is finite-state if and
only if each of its strategies is finite-state. If ∣M∣ = 1,we call a strategy (profile)
with memoryM stationary. Moreover,we call a strategy (profile) that is both
pure and stationary a positional strategy (profile). A stationary strategy of
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Table 2.1. Types of strategies in stochastic games.
Pure Randomised
Stationary Vi → V Vi → D(V )
With memoryM M × Vi → V M × Vi → D(V )
General V∗Vi → V V∗Vi → D(V )
player i can be described by a function σ∶Vi → D(V ), and a positional strategy
by a function σ∶Vi → V .
If σ = (σi)i∈Π is a strategy profilewith memoryM,wemodify the Markov
chain Gσ by taking M × V as its domain. The transition relation is defined
as follows: there is a transition from (m, v) to (n,w)with probability p > 0 if
and only if δ(m, v) = n and either v is a stochastic vertex of G and (v , p,w) ∈ ∆
or v ∈ Vi and σi(m, v)(w) = p. Finally, a state (m, v) has the same colour as the
vertex v in G. Analogously,wemodify the Markov decision process Gσ−i by
using M × V as its domain: vertices (m, v) ∈ M × Vi are controlled by player i,
and there is a transition from such a vertex (m, v) to (n,w) ∈ M × V if and
only if n = δ(m, v) and (v , ,w) ∈ ∆. Note that the arenas of both Gσ and Gσ−i
are finite if thememoryM and the original arena of G are finite.
All the types of strategies we consider in this work and their representa-
tions are summarised in Table 2.1.
Residual games and strategies
Given an SMG G and a sequence x ∈ V∗ (which is usually a history), the residual
game G[x] has the same arena as G but different objectives: if the objective
of player i in G is Wini ⊆ Cω, then her objective in G[x] is given by the set
χ(x)−1Wini = {α ∈ Cω ∶ χ(x) ⋅ α ∈Wini}. In particular, if all objectives in G are
prefix-independent, then G[x] = G.
If player i plays according to a strategy σ in G, then the natural choice for
her strategy in G[x] is the residual strategy σ[x], defined by σ[x](yv) = σ(xyv).
If σ = (σi)i∈Π is a strategy profile, then the residual strategy profile σ[x] is just
the profile of the residual strategies σi [x]. The following lemma, taken from
(Zielonka 2004), shows how to compute probabilities with respect to a resid-
ual strategy profile.
Lemma 2.2. Let σ be a strategy profile of an SMG (G , v0), and let xv ∈ V∗V .
If X ⊆ Vω is a Borel set, then Prσv0 (X ∩ xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσ[x]v (x−1X).
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2.3 Subarenas and end components
Algorithms for stochastic games often employ a divide-and-conquer approach
and compute a solution for a complex game from the solutions of several
smaller games. These smaller games are usually obtained from the original
game by restricting to a subarena. Formally, given an SMG G, a set U ⊆ V is a
subarena if:
• U ≠ ∅,
• v∆ ∩ U ≠ ∅ for each v ∈ U, and
• v∆ ⊆ U for each stochastic vertex v ∈ U.
Clearly, if U is a subarena, then the restriction of G to vertices in U is again
an SMG,whichwe denote by G ↾ U. Formally,
G ↾ U ∶= (Π,U, (Vi ∩ U)i∈Π , ∆ ∩ (U × ([0, 1] ∪ {}) × U), χU , (Wini)i∈Π),
where χU ∶U → C∶ u ↦ χ(u) is the restriction of the colouring function to U.
Of particular interest are the strongly connected subarenas of a game
because they can arise as the sets Inf(π) of vertices visited infinitely often
in a play; we call these sets end components. Formally, ∅ ≠ U ⊆ V is an end
component if U is a subarena and every vertex w ∈ U is reachable from every
other vertex v ∈ U (i.e. there exists a sequence v = v1 , v2 , . . . , vn = w such
that vi+1 ∈ vi∆ for each 0 < i < n). An end component U is maximal in a set
S ⊆ V if there is no end component U ′ such that U ⊊ U ′ ⊆ S. For any finite
subset S ⊆ V , the set of all end components maximal in S can be computed
in quadratic time (see Appendix B for the algorithm).
The theory of end componentshas been developed by de Alfaro (1997, 1998)
and Courcoubetis & Yannakakis (1995, 1998). The central fact about end com-
ponents in finite SMGs is that, under any strategy profile, the set of vertices
visited infinitely often is almost surely an end component (cf. Lemma B.11).
Lemma 2.3. Let G be a finite SMG, and let σ be a strategy profile of G. Then
Prσv ({π ∈ Vω ∶ Inf(π) is an end component}) = 1 for each vertex v ∈ V .
Moreover, for any end component U,we can construct a stationary strat-
egy profile, or alternatively a pure finite-state strategy profile, that when
started in U guarantees almost surely to visit all (and only) vertices in U
infinitely often (cf. Lemma B.12).
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Lemma 2.4. Let G be a finite SMG, and let U be an end component of G.
There exists both a stationary and a pure finite-state strategy profile σ of G
such that Prσv ({π ∈ Vω ∶ Inf(π) = U}) = 1 for every vertex v ∈ U.
Given an SMG G with objectives representable as Muller objectives given
by the familyFi of accepting sets,we say that an end component U is winning
for player i if χ(U) ∈ Fi ; the payoff of U is the vector x ∈ {0, 1}Π, defined by
xi = 1 if and only if U is winning for player i.
2.4 Values, determinacy and optimal strategies
The notions of the value and an optimal strategy are central for the theory of
two-player zero-sum games. However, they can also be applied to SMGs.
Given a strategy τ of player i in G and a vertex v ∈ V , the value of τ from v
is the number valτ(v) ∶= inf σ Prσ−i ,τv (Wini),where σ ranges over all strategy
profiles of G. Moreover, the value of G for player i from v is the supremum
of these values: valGi (v) ∶= supτ valτ(v), where τ ranges over all strategies
of player i in G. Intuitively, valGi (v) is themaximal payoff that player i can
ensurewhen the game starts from v .
Given an initial vertex v0 ∈ V , a strategy τ of player i in G is called (almost-
surely) winning if valτ(v0) = 1. More generally, τ is called optimal if valτ(v0) =
valGi (v0). For ε > 0, it is called ε-optimal if valτ(v0) ≥ valGi (v0) − ε. A globally
(ε-)optimal strategy is a strategy that is (ε-)optimal for every possible initial
vertex v0 ∈ V . Note that optimal strategies do not need to exist since the
supremum in the definition of valGi is not necessarily attained; in this case,
only ε-optimal strategies do exist. However, if for every possible initial vertex
there exists an (ε-)optimal strategy, then there also exists a globally (ε-)
optimal strategy.
Beforewe state themost important result on stochastic two-player zero-
sum games,we define two other notions of optimality,whichwill be useful
for proving the existence of certain equilibria in thenext chapter: We say that
a strategy τ of player i in (G , v0) is residually optimal if the residual strategy τ[x]
is optimal in the residual game (G[x], v) for every history xv of (G , v0). More
generally, τ is strongly optimal if τ[x] is optimal in (G[x], v) for every history xv
of (G , v0) that is compatible with τ. Note that a positional strategy profile
that is globally optimal is also residually optimal. Apart from being relevant
for the existence of equilibria, strongly and residually optimal strategies
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have been considered as best-effort strategies in two-player zero-sum games
(Faella 2009).
Determining values and finding optimal strategies in SMGs actually re-
duces to performing the same tasks in S2Gs. Formally, given an SMG G,
define for each player i the coalition game Gi to be the same game as G but with
only two players: player i acting as player 0 and the coalition player Π / {i}
acting as player 1. The coalition controls all vertices that in G are controlled
by some player j ≠ i, and its objective is the complement of player i’s ob-
jective in G. Clearly, Gi is an S2G, and valGi (v) = valGi (v) for every vertex v .
Moreover, any (residually, strongly, ε-) optimal strategy for player i in (G , v0)
is (residually, strongly, ε-) optimal in (Gi , v0), and vice versa. Hence, when
we study values and optimal strategies, we can restrict our investigation
to S2Gs.
A celebrated theorem due toMartin (1998) and Maitra & Sudderth (1998)
(see alsoMaitra & Sudderth 2003) states that S2Gs with Borel objectives are
determined: valG0 = 1 − valG1 (where the equality holds pointwise).¹ The number
valG(v) ∶= valG0 (v) is consequently called the value of G from v . In fact, an in-
spection of the proof shows that—for the kind of games we study in this
work—both players not only have randomised ε-optimal strategies but pure
ε-optimal strategies.
Theorem 2.5 (Martin; Maitra & Sudderth). Every S2Gwith Borel objectives
is determined; for all ε > 0, both players have ε-optimal pure strategies.
For finite S2Gs with prefix-independent objectives, we can show a
stronger result than Theorem 2.5: in these games, both players not only
have ε-optimal pure strategies but optimal ones (Gimbert & Horn 2010).
In fact, their proof reveals not only the existence of optimal strategies but
the existence of residually optimal strategies; for an alternative proof of the
following theorem, see Section 2.6.
Theorem 2.6 (Gimbert & Horn). There exist residually optimal pure strate-
gies in every finite S2Gwith prefix-independent objectives.
As witnessed by the following two examples, Theorem 2.6 fails if either
the objective is not prefix-independent or the arena is not finite, even if
there is only one player.
¹ Martin proved the theorem originally for Blackwell games; Maitra & Sudderth adapted his proof
to stochastic games.
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v0 v1 v2
Figure 2.3. AnMDPwith no optimal strategy.
v0
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v1
34
⋯ vn
1 − 12n+1
⋯
Figure 2.4. Another MDPwith no optimal strategy.
Example 2.7. Consider theMDP G depicted in Figure 2.3 where player 0wins
if the number of visits to vertex v0 is finite but strictly greater than the num-
ber of visits to vertex v1. We claim that (G , v0) does not admit an optimal
strategy. First, for each n ∈ M, consider the pure strategy σn ofmoving from v0
to v1 after completingprecisely n loops around v0 . Clearly, Prσnv0 (Win) = 1 − 1/2n,
and therefore valG(v0) = 1. However, no strategy τ achieves this value:
if τ(v0 ∣ (v0)n+1) = 1 for all n ∈ M, then obviously Prτv0 (Win) = 0; other-
wise, consider the least n ∈ M such that p ∶= τ(v1 ∣ (v0)n+1) > 0; we have
Prτv0 (Win) ≤ 1 − p/2n < 1.
Example 2.8. Consider the MDP G depicted in Figure 2.4; every play that
visits each vertex vi is losing. Again,we claim that (G , v0) does not admit an
optimal strategy. First, for each n ∈ M, consider the positional strategy σn of
“leaving the game” at vertex vn . Clearly, Prσnv0 (Win) = 1 − 1/2n+1, and therefore
valG(v0) = 1. But again, no strategy τ achieves this value: if τ(vn+1 ∣ v0 . . . vn) = 1
for all n ∈ M, then Prτv0 (Win) = 0; otherwise, consider the least n ∈ M such
that p ∶= 1 − τ(vn+1 ∣ v0 . . . vn) > 0; then Prτv0 (Win) ≤ 1 − p/2n+1 < 1.
For deterministic two-player zero-sum games with Borel objectives, ev-
ery value is either 0 or 1, and every ε-optimal strategy is already optimal.
In particular, from every vertex either one of the two players has awinning
strategy. This follows easily from Theorem 2.5 because any pure strategy
profile of a deterministic game gives payoff 0 or 1 to each player. The determi-
nacy of deterministic two-player zero-sum games was proven earlier than
the corresponding result for stochastic games, also byMartin (1975, 1985).
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In fact, the proof of Theorem 2.5 relies on the determinacy of deterministic
two-player zero-sum games.
Theorem 2.9 (Martin). Every deterministic two-player zero-sumgamewith
Borel objectives is determined. From each vertex, either player 0 or player 1
has a purewinning strategy.
In fact, in every deterministic two-player zero-sumgamewithBorel objec-
tives there exists a pair of residually optimal pure strategies, i.e. a pair (σ , τ)
of pure strategies such that, for each history xv of the game, either σ[x]
or τ[x] is winning in the residual game (G[x], v).
Corollary 2.10. There exist residually optimal pure strategies in any deter-
ministic two-player zero-sum gamewith Borel objectives.
Proof. Let (G , v0) be a deterministic two-player zero-sum gamewith a Borel
objective Win ⊆ Vω for player 0. Since the class of Borel sets is closed under
complementation, it suffices to show that player 0 has a residually optimal
pure strategy. With Win, the set x−1Win is Borel for each x ∈ V∗. Hence,
by Theorem 2.9, for each history xv of (G , v0),we can fix a pure strategy σ x
of player 0 that is optimal in the residual game (G[x], v); note that we can
assume that σ x is independent of v . We have to combine these strategies in
an appropriateway to a residually optimal strategy σ. (Let us point out that
the trivial combination, namely σ(xv) ∶= σ x(v), does not work, in general.)
We say that a decomposition x = x1 ⋅ x2 is goodwith respect to vertex v if
σ x1 [x2] is winning in (G[x], v). If the strategy σ x is winning in (G[x], v), then
the decomposition x = x ⋅ε is goodwith respect to v; so, a good decomposition
exists in this case. For each history xv , if σ x is winning in (G[x], v),we choose
the good (with respect to vertex v) decomposition x = x1 ⋅ x2 withminimal x1 ,
and set σ(xv) ∶= σ x1 (x2v); otherwise,we set σ(xv) ∶= σ x(v).
To show that σ is residually optimal, it suffices to show that, for each
history xv of (G , v0), the strategy σ[x] is winning in (G[x], v) whenever the
strategy σ x is. Hence, assume that σ x is winning in (G[x], v), and let π be a
play starting in π(0) = v that is compatiblewith σ[x]. We need to show that
π ∈ x−1Win.
We claim that for each k ∈ M there exists a decomposition of the form
x ⋅ π∣k = x1 ⋅ (x2 ⋅ π∣k) that is good with respect to π(k). For k = 0, this is
obviously true. For k > 0, assume that there exists a decomposition x ⋅ π∣k−1 =
x1 ⋅ (x2 ⋅ π∣k−1) that is goodwith respect to π(k−1), and consider the onewhere
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x1 is minimal. Then π(k) = σ(x ⋅ π∣k) = σ x1 (x2 ⋅ π∣k), and x ⋅ π∣k = x1 ⋅ (x2 ⋅ π∣k) is a
good decompositionwith respect to π(k).
Now, consider the sequence x01 , x11 , . . . of prefixes of the decompositions
x ⋅π∣k = xk1 ⋅(xk2 ⋅π∣k) that are goodwith respect to π(k) andwhere xk1 is minimal.
We have x01 ⪰ x11 ⪰ ⋯ because for each k > 0 the decomposition x ⋅ πk =
xk−11 ⋅ (xk−12 ⋅ πk) is also good with respect to π(k). Since ≺ is well-founded,
theremust exist k ∈ M such that xk1 = x j1 and xk2 = x j2 for each j ≥ k. But then
the play π(k)π(k + 1) . . . is compatiblewith σ xk1 [xk2 ⋅ π∣k],which is winning in(G[x ⋅ π∣k], π(k)). Hence, π(k)π(k + 1) . . . ∈ (x ⋅ π∣k)−1Win and π ∈ x−1Win. □
For deterministic games, the payoff of a strategy profile is well-defined
even if the game has non-Borel objectives. Does Theorem 2.9 hold for such
games as well? Unfortunately, the answer is negative: Gale & Stewart (1953)
gave an example of a deterministic two-player zero-sum gamewith a non-
Borel objectivewhere none of the two players has a purewinning strategy.
For finite S2Gs with ω-regular objectives,more attractive strategies than
arbitrary pure strategies suffice for optimality. In particular, in any finite
Rabin-Streett S2G there exists a globally optimal positional strategy for
player 0 (Klarlund 1994; Chatterjee et al. 2005).
Theorem 2.11 (Klarlund; Chatterjee et al.). In any finite Rabin-Streett S2G,
player 0 has a globally optimal positional strategy.
It follows from Theorem 2.11 that the values of a finite Rabin-Streett S2G
are rational of polynomial bit complexity in the size of the arena: Given a
positional strategy profile σ of G, the finite MDP Gσ−1 is not larger than the
game G. Moreover, if σ0 is globally optimal, then for every vertex v the value
of G from v and the value of Gσ−1 from v sum up to 1. But the values of a
Streett MDP form the optimal solution of a linear programme of polynomial
size (see Appendix B) and are therefore rational of polynomial bit complexity.
Of course, it also follows from Theorem 2.11 that finite parity S2Gs are
positionally determined: both players have globally optimal positional strate-
gies. This result was first proven for deterministic two-player zero-sum
parity games (even over infinite arenas) independently by Emerson & Jutla
(1991) and Mostowski (1991). For SS2Gs, the existence of optimal positional
strategies follows from amore general result of Liggett & Lippman (1969). In-
dependently, McIver &Morgan (2002), Chatterjee et al. (2004a) and Zielonka
(2004) extended these results to parity S2Gs.
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Corollary 2.12. In any finite parity S2G, both players have globally optimal
positional strategies.
Since every finite S2G with ω-regular objectives can be reduced to one
with parity objectives,we can conclude from Corollary 2.12 that both play-
ers have residually optimal pure finite-state strategies in finite S2Gs with
arbitrary ω-regular objectives.
Corollary 2.13. In anyfinite S2Gwith ω-regular objectives, both players have
residually optimal pure finite-state strategies.
Corollary 2.13 generalises thewell-known theorem by Büchi & Landweber
(1969) that both players have optimal pure finite-state strategies in every
deterministic two-player zero-sum gamewith ω-regular objectives.
2.5 Algorithmic problems
Throughout this section,we only consider finite two-player zero-sumgames.
Themain computational problems for these games are computing the value
and optimal strategies for one or both players. Instead of computing the
value exactly, we can ask whether the value is greater than some given
rational probability p, a problemwhichwe call the quantitative decision problem:
Given an S2G G, a vertex v and a rational number p ∈ [0, 1], decide
whether valG(v) ≥ p.
Inmany cases, it suffices to knowwhether the value is 1, i.e. whether player 0
has a strategy towin the game almost surely (asymptotically, at least). Wecall
the resulting decision problem the qualitative decision problem.
Clearly, ifwe can solve the quantitative decision problem,we can approx-
imate the values valG(v) up to any desired precision by using binary search.
In fact, for parity S2Gs it turns out that it suffices to solve the decision prob-
lems, since the other problems (computing the values and optimal strategies)
are polynomial-time equivalent to the quantitative decision problem.
Proposition 2.14. Either none or all of the following problems are solvable
in polynomial time:
1. the quantitative decision problem for parity S2Gs,
2. computing the values valG(v) of a parity S2G,
3. computing globally optimal positional strategies in a parity S2G.
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Proof. (1.⇒ 2.) Assume that we have a polynomial-time algorithm for the
quantitative decision problem. Since the values of a finite parity S2G are
always rational of bit complexity polynomial in the size of the game, binary
search for the value valG(v) terminates after polynomiallymany steps with
the exact value of valG(v).
(2.⇒ 3.) Assume that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for com-
puting the values. Then, given a parity S2G G,we can find a globally optimal
positional strategy for player 0 by the following procedure: In the case that
every vertex controlled by player 0 has only one outgoing transition,we are
done. Otherwise, let v ∈ V0 be a vertex with ∣v∆∣ > 1. Since there exists an op-
timal positional strategy, theremust exist a transition (v , ,w) ∈ ∆ such that
the values of the game do not changewhen all other transitions (v , ,w ′) are
removed. Using the polynomial-time algorithm for computing the values,
we can find such a transition. Now, we can iterate the procedure on the
(smaller) game that is obtained from G by removing all other transitions
that originate in v .
(3.⇒ 1.) Assume that there exists apolynomial-time algorithmfor comput-
ing globally optimal positional strategies. To determine valG(v),we can then
compute a pair (σ , τ) of such strategies, one for each player, and construct
the Markov chain G(σ ,τ). The value valG(v) equals the probability of reaching
from v a bottom SCC of G(σ ,τ) inwhich the least priority is even. By solving a
systemof linear equations,we can easily compute this probability and check
whether it is greater than p (see Appendix B). □
For a Markov decision process whose objective can be represented as
a Muller objective, we can compute the values by an analysis of its end
components: for a given initial vertex v , the value of the MDP from v is the
maximal probability of reaching awinning end component from v . Once all
vertices that reside inwinning end components have been identified, these
probabilities can be computed in polynomial time via linear programming.
For MDPs with Rabin or Muller objectives, it is easy to see that the union
of allwinning end components can be computed in polynomial time (see
Appendix B); for MDPs with Streett objectives, Chatterjee et al. (2005) gave a
polynomial-time algorithm for computing this set. Hence, for MDPs with
any of these objectives, the quantitative decision problem is solvable in
polynomial time.
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Theorem 2.15 (de Alfaro; Chatterjee et al.). The quantitative decision prob-
lem is in P for Streett, Rabin or Muller MDPs.
It follows from Theorems 2.11 and 2.15 that the quantitative decision
problem for Rabin-Streett S2Gs is inNP: to decidewhether valG(v) ≥ p, it suf-
fices to guess a positional strategy for player 0 and to checkwhether in the
resulting Streett MDP the value from v is ≥ p. By determinacy, this result
implies that the quantitative decision problem is in coNP for Streett-Rabin
S2Gs and in NP ∩ coNP for parity S2Gs.
Corollary 2.16. The quantitative decision problem is
• in NP for Rabin-Streett S2Gs,
• in coNP for Streett-Rabin S2Gs, and
• in NP ∩ coNP for parity S2Gs.
A correspondingNP-hardness result for deterministic Rabin-Streett S2Gs
was established by Emerson & Jutla (1999). In particular, this hardness result
also holds for the qualitative decision problem. Moreover, by determinacy,
this result can be turned into a coNP-hardness result for (deterministic)
Streett-Rabin S2Gs.
For S2Gs with Muller objectives, Chatterjee (2007) showed that the
quantitative decision problem falls into Pspace; for deterministic games,
a polynomial-space algorithm had been given earlier byMcNaughton (1993).
A matching lower bound for deterministic games with Muller objectives
was provided by Hunter & Dawar (2005).
Theorem 2.17 (Chatterjee). The quantitative decision problem is in Pspace
for Muller S2Gs.
Theorem 2.18 (Hunter & Dawar). The qualitative decision problem for de-
terministic Muller S2Gs is Pspace-hard.
Theorem 2.18 does not hold if the Muller objectives are given by a family
of subsets of vertices: Horn (2008a,b) showed that the qualitative decision
problem for explicit Muller S2Gs is in P, and that the quantitative problem is
in NP ∩ coNP.
Another class of S2Gs for which the qualitative decision problem is in P is,
for each d ∈ M, the class Parity[d] of all parity S2Gs whose priority function
refers to at most d priorities (de Alfaro & Henzinger 2000). In particular,
the qualitative decision problem for SS2Gs as well as (co-)Büchi S2Gs is in P.
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Table 2.2. The complexity of deciding the value in S2Gs.
Qualitative Quantitative
SS2Gs P-complete NP ∩ coNP
Parity[d] P-complete NP ∩ coNP
Parity UP ∩ coUP NP ∩ coNP
Rabin-Streett NP-complete NP-complete
Streett-Rabin coNP-complete coNP-complete
Muller Pspace-complete Pspace-complete
For general parity S2Gs, however, the qualitative decision problem is only
known to lie in UP ∩ coUP (Jurdziński 1998; Chatterjee et al. 2003).
Theorem 2.19 (Jurdziński; Chatterjee et al.). The qualitative decision prob-
lem is in UP ∩ coUP for parity S2Gs.
Theorem 2.20 (de Alfaro & Henzinger). For each d ∈ M, the qualitative deci-
sion problem is in P for parity S2Gs with at most d priorities.
Table 2.2 summarises the results about the complexity of the quantitative
and the qualitative decision problem for S2Gs. P-hardness (via Logspace-
reductions) for all these problems follows from the fact that and-or graph
reachability is P-complete (Immerman 1981).
The results summarised in Table 2.2 leave open the possibility that at
least one of the following problems is decidable in polynomial time:
1. the qualitative decision problem for parity S2Gs,
2. the quantitative decision problem for SS2Gs,
3. the quantitative decision problem for parity S2Gs.
Note that, given that all of them are contained in both NP and coNP, it is
unlikely that one of them is NP-hard or coNP-hard; such a result would
imply that NP = coNP, and the polynomial hierarchy would collapse.
For the first problem, Chatterjee et al. (2003) gave a polynomial-time
reduction to the qualitative decision problem for deterministic two-player
zero-sum parity games. Hence, solving the qualitative decision problem for
parity S2Gs is not harder than decidingwhich of the two players has awin-
ning strategy in a deterministic two-player zero-sum parity game. Whether
the latter problem is decidable in polynomial time is a long-standing open
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problem. Several years after Emerson & Jutla (1991) put the problem into
NP ∩ coNP, Jurdziński (1998) improved this bound slightly to UP ∩ coUP.
Together with Paterson and Zwick (2008), he also gave an algorithm that
decides the winner in subexponential time; a randomised subexponential
algorithm had been given earlier by Björklund et al. (2003).
Another line of research has identified structural subclasses of graphs
onwhich deterministic parity games can be solved efficiently. In particular,
deterministic two-player zero-sum parity games can be solved in polynomial
time on graphs of bounded tree width (Obdržálek 2003), bounded entan-
glement (Berwanger & Grädel 2005), bounded DAGwidth (Berwanger et al.
2006; Obdržálek 2006), bounded Kelly width (Hunter & Kreutzer 2007) and
bounded cliquewidth (Obdržálek 2007). However, Friedmann (2009) recently
showed that themost promising candidate for a polynomial-time algorithm
for the general case so far, the discrete strategy improvement algorithm due to
Vöge & Jurdziński (2000), requires exponential time in theworst case.
Regarding the second problem, only some progress towards a polynomial-
time algorithm has been made since Condon (1992) provedmembership in
NP ∩ coNP; for instance, Björklund & Vorobyov (2005) gave a randomised
subexponential algorithm for solving SS2Gs, and Gimbert & Horn (2009)
showed that the quantitative decision problem for SS2Gs is fixed-parameter
tractablewith respect to the number of stochastic vertices as the parameter.
For the third problem, Andersson &Miltersen (2009) recently established
a polynomial-time Turing reduction to the second. Hence, there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm for 2. if and only if there exists one for 3. In partic-
ular, a polynomial-time algorithm for 2. would also give a polynomial-time
algorithm for 1. However, to the best of our knowledge, it is plausible that
the qualitative decision problem for parity S2Gs is in Pwhile the quantitative
decision problem for SS2Gs is not.
2.6 Existence of residually optimal strategies
The goal of this section is to prove the existence of residually optimal pure
strategies in finite S2Gs with prefix-independent objectives (Theorem 2.6).
Although they did not state this explicitly, Gimbert & Horn (2010) actually
proved this (stronger) result in their proof for the existence of optimal strate-
gies in these games. We present an alternative proof of Theorem 2.6,which
uses a concept introduced by Chatterjee et al. (2005). Our starting points are
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the following two propositions, proved in (Gimbert & Horn 2010) using the
notion of reset strategies.
Proposition 2.21. Let G be a finite S2Gwith prefix-independent objectives.
If valG(v) = 1, then player 0 has awinning strategy in (G , v).
Proposition 2.22. Let G be a finite S2Gwith prefix-independent objectives.
If valG(v) > 0 for all vertices v , then valG(v) = 1 for all vertices v .
In order to apply Proposition 2.21,we partition the state space into regions
of states with equal value and show that a residually optimal strategy can
be obtained from awinning strategy in each of these regions. Formally, a
value class of G is amaximal subset U of V such that valG is constant on U, i.e.
U = {v ∈ V ∶ valG(v) = r} ≠ ∅ for some r ∈ [0, 1]. We call a value class U positive
if valG(U) > 0. If both players play optimally, a value class can only be left
through a stochastic vertex; we denote by Bnd(U) the set of all stochastic
vertices v ∈ U with v∆ ⊈ U. Note that, since the value of a stochastic vertex
is aweighted average of the values at its successors, every vertex in Bnd(U)
must have both a successor with a higher value and onewith a lower value.
Due to the possibility that Bnd(U) ≠ ∅, a value class U is, in general, not
a subarena. However, the value classes of G are subarenas of the game G
that is derived from G by turning every vertex v ∈ V such that v ∈ Bnd(U)
for a value class U of G into a terminal vertex that is winning for player 0.
Moreover, all vertices in the subgame G ↾ U have value 1 if U is a positive
value class.
Lemma 2.23. Let G be a finite S2Gwith prefix-independent objectives, and
let U be a positive value class of G. Then valG↾U(v) = 1 for all v ∈ U.
Proof. LetWin ⊆ Vω be the objective of player 0, let U = {v ∈ V ∶ valG(v) = r} for
r > 0, and denote by s the highest value of a vertex v ∉ U that is a successor
of a vertex u ∈ U ∩ V0, i.e. v ∈ u∆; if no such vertex exists, we set s ∶= 0.
Since U is a positive value class,we have s < r . By Proposition 2.22,we only
need to show that there is no vertex u ∈ U with valG↾U(u) = 0. Towards a
contradiction, assume there is such a vertex u. Then, by Proposition 2.21,
player 1 would have a strategy τ such that Prσ ,τu (Win ∪ Reach(Bnd(U))) = 0
for all strategies σ of player 0 in G ↾ U. Now, let 0 < ε < r − s and fix a globally
ε-optimal strategy τε of player 1 in G. We devise a new strategy τ∗ of player 1
in G as follows: as long as the play stays in U, τ∗ behaves like τ; as soon as
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the play leaves U, τ∗ starts to behave like τε . Formally,we set τ∗(xv) = τ(xv)
for histories xv that stay in U and τ∗(xvy) = τε(vy) for histories of the form
xvy ∈ V∗ ⋅ V ⋅ V∗ with x ∈ U∗ and v ∈ V / U.
We claim that supσ Prσ ,τ
∗
u (Win) ≤ s + ε and therefore valG(u) < r , a contra-
diction to valG(u) = r . Let σ be a strategy of player 0 in G. By the definition
of τ∗,we have Prσ ,τ∗u (Win ∩ Uω) = 0 and Prσ ,τ∗u (U∗ ⋅ v ⋅ Vω) > 0 only if v ∈ U or
v ∈ u∆ for some u ∈ U ∩ V0. Hence,
Prσ ,τ∗u (Win)= Prσ ,τ∗u (Win ∩ Uω) + ∑
xv∈U∗(V/U)Pr
σ ,τ∗u (Win ∩ xv ⋅ Vω)
= ∑
xv∈U∗(V/U)Pr
σ ,τ∗u (xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσ[x],τ∗[x]v (Win)
= ∑
xv∈U∗(V/U)Pr
σ ,τ∗u (xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσ[x],τεv (Win)
≤ ∑
xv∈U∗(V/U)Pr
σ ,τ∗u (xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ (valG(v) + ε)
≤ ∑
xv∈U∗(V/U)Pr
σ ,τ∗u (xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ (s + ε)
≤ s + ε .
Since σ was chosen arbitrarily,we get that supσ Prσ ,τ
∗
u (Win) ≤ s + ε. □
By Lemma 2.23 and Proposition 2.21, player 0 has a winning strategy
in G ↾ U if U is a positive value class of G. To prove Theorem 2.6, we show
that we can compose these strategies to a residually optimal strategy in G.
Proof (of Theorem 2.6). Let Win ⊆ Vω be the objective of player 0. It suffices
to prove that player 0 has a residually optimal strategy; the claim for player 1
follows from exchanging the players’ roles. Let U1 , . . . ,Uk be an enumeration
of the positive value classes of G such that valG(Ui) < valG(U j ) for i < j, and
let U0 be the set of all vertices with value 0. For each i = 1, . . . , k, let σi be a
winning strategy in the game G ↾ Ui , and let σ0 be an arbitrary strategy of
player 0 in G ↾ U0 . Define a strategy σ of player 0 in G by setting σ(xv) = σi(yv)
if v ∈ Ui and y is the longest suffix of x that is contained in Ui . In order to
prove that σ is residually optimal, let xv be a history of (G , v0), and let τ be a
strategy of player 1 in G. We claim that
Prσ[x],τv (Win ∪ coBu¨chi(U0)) = 1 . (2.1)
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It follows from Lemma 2.23 and the definition of Bnd(Ui) that
1. Prσ[x],τv (Vω /Win ∩ Bu¨chi(Ui / Bnd(Ui)) / Bu¨chi(Bnd(Ui))) = 0, and
2. Prσ[x],τv (Bu¨chi(Bnd(Ui)) / Bu¨chi(⋃ j>i U j )) = 0
for all i = 1, . . . , k. Using these two facts,we can establish (2.1) by proving that
the complementary event Vω /Win∩Bu¨chi(V /U0) occurs with probability 0:
Prσ[x],τv (Vω /Win ∩ Bu¨chi(V / U0))
= k∑
i=1 Pr
σ[x],τ
v (Vω /Win ∩ Bu¨chi(Ui) / Bu¨chi(⋃ j>i U j ))
= k∑
i=1 Pr
σ[x],τ
v (Vω /Win ∩ Bu¨chi(Ui / Bnd(Ui)) / Bu¨chi(Bnd(Ui) ∪⋃ j>i U j ))
+ k∑
i=1 Pr
σ[x],τ
v (Vω /Win ∩ Bu¨chi(Bnd(Ui)) / Bu¨chi(⋃ j>i U j ))
≤ k∑
i=1 Pr
σ[x],τ
v (Vω /Win ∩ Bu¨chi(Ui / Bnd(Ui)) / Bu¨chi(Bnd(Ui)))
+ k∑
i=1 Pr
σ[x],τ
v (Bu¨chi(Bnd(Ui)) / Bu¨chi(⋃ j>i U j ))
= 0 .
It remains to be shown that σ[x] is optimal in (G , v). Consider the random
variables Θn ∶Vω → V , where n ∈ M, defined by Θn(π) = π(n). The expectation
of valG(Θn) under the probabilitymeasure Prσ[x],τv equals
f (n) ∶= ∑
w∈V Pr
σ[x],τ
v (Θn = w) ⋅ valG(w) .
It is easy to see that, by the definition of σ, we have f (n) ≤ f (n + 1) for
all n ∈ M. Hence, f ∗ ∶= limn f (n) exists, and we have f (n) ≤ f ∗ for all
n ∈ M. Moreover, since f (n) ≤ 1 − Prσ[x],τv (Θn ∈ U0) for all n ∈ M, we have
f ∗ = lim supn f (n) ≤ 1 − lim inf n Prσ[x],τv (Θn ∈ U0) ≤ 1 − Prσ[x],τv (coBu¨chi(U0)).
By (2.1), we have Prσ[x],τv (Win) ≥ 1 − Prσ[x],τv (coBu¨chi(U0)) and therefore
valG(v) = f (0) ≤ f ∗ ≤ Prσ[x],τv (Win). Since τ was chosen arbitrarily, we get
that valσ[x](v) ≥ valG(v). □
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Equilibria
In this chapter,we introduce the equilibrium concepts that we consider in
this work, i.e. Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria, and prove their exis-
tence for (subclasses of ) stochastic games. Towards the end of this chapter,
we turn to computational questions and introduce the decision problems
that will occupy us for the rest of this work.
3.1 Definitions and basic properties
To capture rational behaviour of (selfish) players, JohnNash (1950) introduced
the notion of, what is now called, a Nash equilibrium. Formally, given a
strategy profile σ of a game (G , v0),we call a strategy τ of player i in G a best
response to σ if τ maximises the expected payoff of player i: Prσ−i ,τ ′v0 (Wini) ≤
Prσ−i ,τv0 (Wini) for all strategies τ′ of player i. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is a
Nash equilibrium if each σi is a best response to σ.
In a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve her payoff by unilater-
ally switching to a different strategy. In fact, to have a Nash equilibrium,
it suffices that no player can gain from switching to a pure strategy.
Proposition 3.1. A strategy profile σ of a game (G , v0) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if, for each player i and for each pure strategy τ of player i in G,
Prσ−i ,τv0 (Wini) ≤ Prσv0 (Wini).
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Proof. Clearly, if σ is a Nash equilibrium, then Prσ−i ,τv0 (Wini) ≤ Prσv0 (Wini) for
each pure strategy τ of player i in G. Now, assume that σ is not a Nash
equilibrium. Hence, p ∶= supτ Prσ−i ,τv0 (Wini) = Prσv0 (Wini) + ε for some player i
and some ε > 0. Consider the Markov decision process Gσ−i . Clearly, the value
of Gσ−i from v0 equals p. By Theorem 2.5, there exists an ε/2-optimal pure
strategy τ in (Gσ−i , v0). Since the arena of Gσ−i is a forest, we can assume
that τ is a positional strategy,which can be viewed as a pure strategy in G.
We have Prσ−i ,τv0 (Wini) ≥ p − ε/2 > p − ε = Prσv0 (Wini). □
For two-player zero-sum games, a Nash equilibrium is nothing other
than a pair of optimal strategies.
Proposition 3.2. Let (G , v0) be an S2G. A strategy profile (σ , τ) of (G , v0) is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if both σ and τ are optimal. In particular, every
Nash equilibrium of (G , v0) has payoff (valG(v0), 1 − valG(v0)).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that both σ and τ are optimal, but that (σ , τ) is not a Nash
equilibrium. Hence, one of the players, say player 1, can improve her payoff
by playing another strategy τ′. Hence, valG(v0) = Prσ ,τv0 (Win0) > Prσ ,τ ′v0 (Win0).
However, since σ is optimal, valG(v0) ≤ Prσ ,τ′v0 (Win0), a contradiction. The rea-
soning in the case that player 0 can improve is analogous.(⇐) Let (σ , τ) be a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0), and let us first assume
that σ is not optimal, i.e. valσ (v0) < valG(v0). By the definition of valG, there
exists another strategy σ ′ of player 0 such that valσ (v0) < valσ ′ (v0) ≤ valG(v0).
Moreover, since (σ , τ) is a Nash equilibrium,
Prσ ,τv0 (Win0) ≤ valσ (v0) < valσ ′ (v0) = inf τ′ Prσ ′,τ′v0 (Win0) ≤ Prσ ′,τv0 (Win0) .
Thus, player 0 can improve her payoff by playing σ ′ instead of σ, a contradic-
tion to the fact that (σ , τ) is a Nash equilibrium. The argumentation in the
case that τ is not optimal is analogous. □
In general, a Nash equilibrium can give a player a higher payoff than her
value. However, the payoff a player receives in a Nash equilibrium can never
be lower than her value, and this is true for every history that is consistent
with the equilibrium.
Lemma 3.3. Let (G , v0) be an SMGwith objectives Wini ⊆ Vω. If σ is a Nash
equilibrium of (G , v0), then Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≥ valG[x]i (v) for each player i
and every history xv that is consistent with σ.
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Proof. Assume there exists a history xv of (G , v0) such that Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω) > 0,
but p ∶= Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) < valG[x]i (v). By the definition of valG[x]i , there
exists a strategy τ of player i in G[x] such that valτ(v) > p. We define a new
strategy σ ′ for player i in G as follows: σ ′ is defined as σi for histories that do
not beginwith xv . For histories of the form xvy, however,we set σ ′(xvy) =
τ(vy). Clearly, Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω). Moreover,we claim that
Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (X / xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσv0 (X / xv ⋅ Vω) (3.1)
for every Borel set X ⊆ Vω. Eq. (3.1) is obviously true if X is a cylinder set.
To prove (3.1) for all Borel sets, by themonotone class theorem (Theorem A.1),
it suffices to prove that whenever we are given Borel sets X0 , X1 , . . . ⊆ Vω
with X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆⋯ or X0 ⊇ X1 ⊇⋯ such that each Xn fulfils (3.1), then the set
limn Xn ∶= ⋃n∈M Xn or limn Xn ∶= ⋂n∈M Xn , respectively, also fulfils (3.1). Hence,
assume that X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆⋯ or X0 ⊇ X1 ⊇⋯ and that each Xn fulfils (3.1). Clearly,(limn Xn) / xv ⋅ Vω = limn (Xn / xv ⋅ Vω). Moreover, since probabilitymeasures
are continuous from below and above,
Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (limn(Xn / xv ⋅ Vω))= limn Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (Xn / xv ⋅ Vω)= limn Prσv0 (Xn / xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσv0 (limn (Xn / xv ⋅ Vω)) ,
which proves that (3.1) also holds for limn Xn . Using Lemma 2.2, we can
conclude that
Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (Wini)= Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (Wini ∩ xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσv0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + Prσ[x]−i ,σ ′[x]v (x−1Wini) ⋅ Prσ−i ,σ ′v0 (xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσv0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + Prσ[x]−i ,τv (x−1Wini) ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)≥ Prσv0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + valτ(v) ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)> Prσv0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + p ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσv0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσv0 (Wini / xv ⋅ Vω) + Prσv0 (Wini ∩ xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσv0 (Wini) .
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v0
0
v1
1 (1, 1)
(0, 0) (0, 0)
Figure 3.1. A two-player reachability gamewith an irrational Nash equilibrium.
Hence, player i can improver her payoff by switching to σ ′, a contradiction to
σ being a Nash equilibrium. □
As demonstrated by the following example, some Nash equilibria lack
rationality in games that progress over time—such as the games we study
in this work.
Example 3.4. Consider the deterministic two-player reachability game(G , v0) depicted in Figure 3.1. Intuitively, the only rational outcome of this
game should be the play leading to the terminal vertex with payoff (1, 1).
However, there are two Nash equilibria in this game:
• both players move “right” andwin;
• both players move “down” and lose.
Clearly, the first strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. For the second profile,
note that player 1 cannot get a better payoff by changing her strategy since
v1 is never reached from v0 if player 0moves down.
The justification for the second Nash equilibrium in Example 3.5 is that
player 1 threatens tomove down if the game reaches v1 . However, this threat
is not credible: if the game reaches v1, then the only rational choice for
player 1 is to move right because this is the only way for her towin. An equi-
librium concept that eliminates such threats was introduced by Selten (1965).
Formally, a strategy profile σ of a game (G , v0) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if
σ[x] is a Nash equilibrium of the residual game (G[x], v) for every history xv
of (G , v0).
In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, every strategy is not only a best re-
sponse after the initial history but after every possible history of the game
(including histories that are not consistent with the equilibrium profile).
Example 3.5. Consider the same game as in Example 3.4. The Nash equilib-
riumwhere both players move down is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium
becausemoving down is not a best response after the history v0v1.
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Recall that for two-player zero-sum games, Nash equilibria correspond
to pairs of optimal strategies (Proposition 3.2). Similarly, subgame-perfect
equilibria correspond to pairs of residually optimal strategies.
Proposition 3.6. Let (G , v0) be a two-player zero-sum game. A strategy pro-
file (σ , τ) of (G , v0) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if both σ and τ
are residually optimal.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2. □
3.2 Existence of Nash equilibria
It follows from Theorem 2.6 and Proposition 3.2 that every finite two-player
zero-sum stochastic gamewith prefix-independent objectives has a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. The question arises whether this is still true
if the two-player zero-sum assumption is relaxed.
By Lemma 3.3, a strategy profile σ can only be a Nash equilibrium if
Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≥ valGi (v) for each player i and for each history xv con-
sistent with σ. The next lemma shows that, conversely,we can turn every
strategy profile that fulfils this property into a Nash equilibrium. The proof
uses so-called threat strategies (or trigger strategies),which are added on top
of the given strategy profile: each player threatens to change her behaviour
when one of the other players deviates from the prescribed strategy profile.
Before being applied to stochastic games, this concept proved fruitful in the
related area of repeated games (see Osborne & Rubinstein 1994, Chapter 8, and
Aumann 1981).
Lemma 3.7. Let (G , v0) be a finite SMGwith prefix-independent objectives
Wini ⊆ Vω. If σ is a pure strategy profile such thatPrσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅Vω) ≥ valGi (v)
for each player i and for each history xv of (G , v0) that is consistent with σ,
then (G , v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium σ∗ with Prσv0 = Prσ∗v0 .
Proof. By Theorem 2.6, for each player i we can fix a globally optimal pure
strategy τi of the coalition Π / {i} in the coalition game Gi ; denote by τ j ,i the
corresponding pure strategy of player j ≠ i in G. To simplify notation, we
also define τi ,i to be an arbitrary pure strategy of player i in G. Player i’s equi-
librium strategy σ∗i is defined as follows: For histories xv that are compatible
with σ, we set σ∗i (xv) = σi(xv). If xv is not compatible with σ, then decom-
pose x into x = x1 ⋅ x2,where x1 is the longest prefix of x that is compatible
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with σ, and let j be the player who has deviated, i.e. x1 ends in V j ; we set
σ∗i (xv) = τi , j (x2v). Intuitively, σ∗i behaves like σi as long as no other player j
deviates from playing σ j , inwhich case σ∗i starts to behave like τi , j .
Note that Prσ∗v0 = Prσv0 . We claim that σ∗ is additionally a Nash equilibrium
of (G , v0). Let i ∈ Π, and let ρ be a pure strategy of player i in G; by Proposi-
tion 3.1, it suffices to show that Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini) ≤ Prσ∗v0 (Wini).
Let us call ahistory xv ∈ V∗Vi a deviation history if xv is compatiblewith both
σ and (σ−i , ρ), but σi(xv) ≠ ρ(xv); we denote the set of all deviation histories
consistent with σ by D. Clearly, Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσ∗v0 (xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)
for all xv ∈ D.
Claim. Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (X / D ⋅ Vω) = Prσv0 (X / D ⋅ Vω) for every Borel set X ⊆ Vω.
Proof. The proof of this claim uses themonotone class theorem and resem-
bles the proof of the corresponding claim in the proof of Lemma 3.3.
Claim. Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≤ valGi (v) for every xv ∈ D.
Proof. By the definition of the strategies τ j ,i ,we have that Pr(τ j ,i ) j≠i ,ρv (Wini) ≤
valGi (v) for every vertex v ∈ V and every strategy ρ of player i. Moreover, if xv is
a deviation history, then for each player j ≠ i the residual strategy σ∗j [xv] is
equal to τ j ,i on histories that start in w ∶= ρ(xv). Hence, by Lemma 2.2 and
since Wini is prefix-independent,
Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω)= Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∣ xvw ⋅ Vω)= Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∩ xvw ⋅ Vω) / Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (xvw ⋅ Vω)= Prσ∗−i [xv],ρ[xv]w (Wini)= Pr(τ j ,i ) j≠i ,ρ[xv]w (Wini)≤ valGi (w)≤ valGi (v) .
Using the previous two claims,we prove that Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini) ≤ Prσ∗v0 (Wini)
as follows:
Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini)= Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈DPr
σ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∩ xv ⋅ Vω)
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= Prσv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈DPr
σ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∩ xv ⋅ Vω)
= Prσv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈DPr
σ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσ∗−i ,ρv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)
= Prσv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈DPr
σ∗−i ,ρv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)
≤ Prσv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈D val
G
i (v) ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)
≤ Prσv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈DPr
σv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ⋅ Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω)
= Prσv0 (Wini / D ⋅ Vω) + ∑
xv∈DPr
σv0 (Wini ∩ xv ⋅ Vω)
= Prσv0 (Wini)= Prσ∗v0 (Wini) . □
A variant of Lemma 3.7handles gameswith prefix-independent ω-regular
objectives and finite-state strategies.
Lemma 3.8. Let (G , v0) be a finite SMGwith prefix-independent ω-regular
objectives Wini ⊆ Vω. If σ is a pure finite-state strategy profile such that
Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≥ valGi (v) for each player i and for each history xv consis-
tent with σ, then (G , v0) has a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium σ∗ with
Prσv0 = Prσ∗v0 .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.7. Since, by Corol-
lary 2.13, there exist optimal pure finite-state strategies in every finite SMG
with ω-regular objectives, the strategies τ j ,i defined there can be assumed
to be pure finite-state strategies. Consequently, the equilibrium profile σ∗
can be implemented using finite-state strategies as well. □
Using Lemma 3.7 and Theorem 2.6,we can easily prove the existence of
pure Nash equilibria in finite SMGs with prefix-independent objectives.
Theorem 3.9. There exists a pure Nash equilibrium in any finite SMGwith
prefix-independent objectives.
Proof. Let G be a finite SMGwith prefix-independent objectives Wini ⊆ Vω
and initial vertex v0. By Theorem 2.6, each player i has a strongly optimal
strategy σi in G. Let σ = (σi)i∈Π . For every history xv that is consistent with σ
and each player i, we have Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσ[x]v (Wini) ≥ valGi (v). By
Lemma 3.7, this implies that (G , v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium. □
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v0
0
(0, 0)
v1
1
(1, 0)
(1, 1)
Figure 3.2. A two-player game with a pair of optimal strategies that cannot be ex-
tended to a Nash equilibrium.
Forfinite SMGswithω-regular objectives,we can even show the existence
of a pure finite-state equilibrium
Theorem 3.10. There exists a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium in any fi-
nite SMGwith ω-regular objectives.
Proof. Since any SMGwith ω-regular objectives can be reduced to onewith
parity objectives, it suffices to consider parity SMGs. For these games,
the claim follows from Corollary 2.12 and Lemma 3.8 using the same ar-
gumentation as in the proof of Theorem 3.9. □
For deterministic games, one can prove the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium even if the game has an infinite arena and arbitrary Borel objectives.
Wewill prove an even stronger theorem, namely the existence of subgame-
perfect equilibria in these games, in the next section (Theorem 3.15).
Theorem 3.11. There exists a pure Nash equilibrium in any deterministic
gamewith Borel objectives.
Theorem 3.10, Theorem 3.11 and a variant of Theorem 3.9 appeared origi-
nally in (Chatterjee et al. 2004b). However, their proof contains an inaccuracy:
Essentially, they claim that any profile of optimal strategies can be extended
to a Nash equilibrium with the same payoff (by adding threat strategies
on top). This is, in general, not true, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 3.12. Consider the deterministic two-player game (G , v0) depicted
in Figure 3.2. Clearly, the value valG0 (v0) for player 0 from v0 is 1, and player 0’s
optimal strategy σ is to play from v0 to v1 . For player 1, the value from v0 is 0,
and both of her positional strategies are optimal (albeit not necessarily glob-
ally optimal). In particular, her strategy τ of playing from v1 to the terminal
vertex with payoff (1, 0) is optimal. The payoff of the strategy profile (σ , τ)
is (1, 0). However, there is no Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff (1, 0):
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v3
v0
0
v1
1
v2
2
( 13 , 0, 1)
(1, 13 , 0)
(0, 1, 13 )
13
13
13
Figure 3.3. An SSMGwith no stationary Nash equilibrium.
In any Nash equilibrium of (G , v0), player 0 will move from v0 to v1 with
probability 1. To have a Nash equilibrium, player 1 must play from v1 to
the terminal vertex with payoff (1, 1)with probability 1; hence, every Nash
equilibrium of this game has payoff (1, 1).
Note that Theorem 3.10 only guarantees the existence of a pure finite-
state Nash equilibrium, even for games with objectives where each player
is guaranteed to have a positional optimal strategy. The question arises
whether we can also guarantee the existence of a positional Nash equilib-
rium in such games. Kuipers et al. (2009) proved that this is not the case.
In fact, they gave an example of a finite three-player SSMG that has no
stationary Nash equilibrium.¹
Proposition 3.13 (Kuipers et al.). There exists a finite SSMG that has no sta-
tionary Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the three-player SSMG G depicted in Figure 3.3. We claim
that (G , v3) does not admit a stationary Nash equilibrium. Towards a con-
tradiction, assume that σ = (σ0 , σ1 , σ2) is a stationary Nash equilibrium, and
denote by pi ∶= σi(vi+1 mod 3 ∣ vi) the probability that player i stays inside the
cycle. Since the game is symmetric,we can assumewithout loss of generality
that p1 = min{p0 , p1 , p2}. Clearly, p1 < 1 since otherwise each player would
receive payoff 0 but could improve her payoff by leaving the cycle. Now, since
p1 ≤ p2, player 0’s only best response to σ is the strategy that plays to v1 with
probability 1; this gives player 1 payoff ≥ 12 because the probability of reaching
the terminal vertex with payoff 1 is higher than the probability of reaching
¹ A similar game has been described by Boros & Gurvich (2003).
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v3
v0
0
v1
1
v2
( 14 , 0)
(1, 12 )
(0, 1)
Figure 3.4. A two-player SSMGwith no positional Nash equilibrium.
the terminal vertex with payoff 0. Hence, p0 = 1. Since p0 = 1, player 2’s only
best response to σ is to leave the cyclewith probability 1. Hence, p2 = 0 and,
due to theminimality of p1 , also p1 = 0. But then σ is not a Nash equilibrium
because player 1 is better off by playing to v2 with probability 1. □
The existence of stationary Nash equilibria in finite two-player SSMGs is
open. As the following proposition shows, the stronger statement that every
such game has a positional Nash equilibrium remains false.
Proposition 3.14. There exists a finite two-player SSMG that has no posi-
tional Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the SSMG (G , v3) depicted in Figure 3.4. It is easy to see that
none of the four positional strategy profiles in this game constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. Note however that the stationary strategy profile (σ , τ) defined
by σ(v2 ∣ v0) = τ(v0 ∣ v1) = 23 is a Nash equilibrium of (G , v3).
For deterministic SSMGs, the existence of positionalNash equilibria is open;
Boros & Gurvich (2003) only proved their existence for certain special cases
such as games with only two players. For deterministic two-player parity
games,wewill prove the existence of positional equilibria (even subgame-
perfect ones) in the next section (Theorem 3.17).
3.3 Existence of subgame-perfect equilibria
Themain result presented in this section is the existence of subgame-perfect
equilibria in deterministic games with Borel objectives (Ummels 2005);
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in our presentation of the result,we followGrädel&Ummels (2008). The con-
struction is conceptually similar to the one used for proving the existence
of Nash equilibria, but more involved: in particular,wewill employ a fixed-
point construction.
Theorem 3.15. There exists a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium in any de-
terministic gamewith Borel objectives.
Proof. Let (G , v0) be a deterministic game with Borel objectives Wini ⊆ Vω.
Without loss of generality, assume that the arena of G is a treewith v0 as its
root: this can be achieved by unravelling the arena from v0; the resulting
arena is bisimilar to the original one.
For each ordinal α,we define a set ∆α ⊆ ∆, beginningwith ∆0 = ∆ and ∆γ =⋂α<γ ∆α for limit ordinals γ. To define ∆α+1 from ∆α, consider for each player i
the two-player zero-sum game Gαi obtained from the coalition game Gi by
restricting to transitions in ∆α. Denote by r0 , r1 , . . . the roots of Gαi , i.e. the
vertices that have no predecessor with respect to the transition relation
∆α, and let x0r0 , x1r0 , . . . be the unique histories of (G , v0) ending in r0 , r1 , . . .
(where r0 = v0 and x0 = ε). By Corollary 2.10, and since the arena of Gαi
is a forest, for every k = 0, 1, . . . there exist residually optimal positional
strategies σα ,ki and τα ,ki for player i and the coalitionΠ /{i}, respectively, in the
game (Gαi [xk], rk). Let σαi and ταi be the respective unions of these strategies,
i.e. σαi (v) = σα ,ki (v) and ταi (v) = τα ,ki (v) for the unique k ∈ M such that v lies
in the tree with root rk ; the strategies σαi and ταi are residually optimal in(Gαi [xk], rk) for each k ∈ M. The set ∆α+1 is obtained from ∆α by removing all
edges that are not taken by awinning strategy. Formally, if Xαi is the set of
all v ∈ Vi such that σαi is winning in (Gαi [x], v),where xv is the unique history
of (G , v0) ending in v , then
∆α+1 = ∆α ∩⋂
i∈Π {(v ,w) ∈ ∆ ∶ v ∉ Xαi or w = σαi (v)} .
Obviously, the sequence (∆α)α∈On is non-increasing. Thus we can fix the
least ordinal ξ with ∆ξ = ∆ξ+1 and define σi ∶= σ ξi and τi ∶= τξi . Moreover,
for each player j ≠ i, let τ j ,i be the positional strategy of player j in G induced
by τi . Intuitively, player i’s equilibrium strategy σ∗i works as follows: player i
plays σi as long as no other player deviates; whenever some player j ≠ i
deviates from her equilibrium strategy, player i switches to τi , j . Formally,
define δ(v) ∈ Π ∪ {} for each v ∈ V by setting δ(v0) =  and
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δ(v) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 if δ(u) =  and v = σi(u),
δ(u) if i ≠ δ(u) ≠  and v = τi ,δ(u)(u),
i otherwise,
for u ∈ Vi and v ∈ u∆. Then, for v ∈ Vi ,we set σ∗i (v) = σi(v) if δ(v) ∈ {i, } and
σ∗i (v) = τi ,δ(v)(v) otherwise.
It remains to be shown that σ∗ ∶= (σ∗i )i∈Π is a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of (G , v0). First note that σi is winning in (G ξi [x], v) if σαi is winning
in (Gαi [x], v) for some ordinal α because, if σαi is winning in (Gαi [x], v), then
every play of (Gα+1i [x], v) is compatiblewith σαi and thereforewon by player i.
Since ∆ξ ⊆ ∆α+1, this also holds for every play of (G ξi [x], v). Now, let v be any
vertex of G, and let xv be the unique history of (G , v0) ending in v . We claim
that σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium of (G[x], v): Let σ ′ be a strategy of any player i
in G, and denote by π and π ′ the unique plays of (G[x], v) compatiblewith σ∗
and (σ∗−i , σ ′), respectively; we need to show that π ∈ x−1Wini or π ′ ∉ x−1Wini .
The claim is trivial if π = π ′. Hence, assume that π ≠ π ′ and fix the least
n ∈ M such that π(n + 1) ≠ π ′(n + 1); clearly, π(n) ∈ Vi and σ ′(π(n)) ≠ σ∗i (π(n)).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that n = 0 and thus π(n) = v .
We distinguishwhether σi is winning in (G ξi [x], v) or not.
First, assume that σi is winning in (G ξi [x], v). By the definition of the
strategies σ∗j , the play π is a play of (G ξi [x], v). We claim that π is compatible
with σi ,which implies that π ∈ x−1Wini . Otherwise, fix the least k ∈ M such
that π(k) ∈ Vi and σi(π(k)) ≠ π(k + 1). Since σi is winning in (G ξi [x], v), this
strategy is alsowinning in (G ξi [x ⋅π∣k], π(k)). But then (π(k), π(k+1)) ∈ ∆ξ /∆ξ+1,
a contradiction to ∆ξ = ∆ξ+1.
Now, assume that σi is not winning in (G ξi [x], v). By determinacy and
since σi and τi are residually optimal, τi is winning in (G ξi [x], v). Since σ ′(v) ≠
σ∗i (v), player i has deviated; hence, π ′ is compatible with τi . We claim that
π ′ is a play of (G ξi [x], v). Since τi is winning in (G ξi [x], v), this implies that
π ′ ∉ x−1Wini . Otherwise, fix the least k ∈ M such that (π ′(k), π ′(k + 1)) ∉ ∆ξ
and the ordinal α such that (π ′(k), π ′(k + 1)) ∈ ∆α / ∆α+1. Hence, σαi is winning
in (Gαi [x ⋅ π ′ ∣k], π ′(k)), which implies that σi is winning in (G ξi [x ⋅ π ′ ∣k], π ′(k)).
Since π ′ is compatiblewith τi , this implies that τi is not winning in (G ξi [x], v),
a contradiction. □
Similar to the situation for Nash equilibria in stochastic games, Theo-
rem 3.15 can be strengthened for finite games with ω-regular objectives.
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Theorem 3.16. There exists a purefinite-state subgame-perfect equilibrium
in any finite deterministic gamewith ω-regular objectives.
Proof. Again, it suffices to consider games with parity objectives. For such
games, the existence of globally optimal positional strategies allows us to
perform the construction used in the proof of Theorem 3.15 directly on the
arena of the game (regardless ofwhether it is a tree or not). It is easy to see
that the resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium σ∗ can be implemented as a
strategy profilewith memory of size (∣Π∣ + 1) ⋅ ∣V ∣. □
Finally, for games with only two players and parity objectives, we can
prove the existence of a positional subgame-perfect equilibrium, even for
games with an infinite arena.
Theorem 3.17. There exists a positional subgame-perfect equilibrium in
any deterministic two-player parity game.
Proof. Let (G , v0) be a deterministic two-player (not necessarily zero-sum)
parity game. As pointed out in the proof of Theorem 3.16, the construction
used in the proof of Theorem 3.15 can be performed directly on the arena
of G. Moreover, since the games Gαi [x] are all deterministic two-player zero-
sum parity games, both strategies τ1,0 and τ0,1, as defined in the proof of
Theorem 3.15, can be assumed to be positional. It is easy to see that the
strategy profile (τ1,0 , τ0,1) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v0). □
In contrast to the situation for Nash equilibria, Theorems 3.15 and 3.16
fail for stochastic games, as was demonstrated by Solan & Vieille (2003).
Proposition 3.18 (Solan & Vieille). There exists a finite two-player Büchi
SMG that has no subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the SSMG (G , v0) depicted in Figure 3.5,where player 1wins
additionally all plays that visit v0 infinitely often (a Büchi objective) or, equiv-
alently, all plays that do not end in a terminal vertex (a safety objective).
We claim that (G , v0) has no subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Towards a contradiction, assume that (σ , τ) is a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of (G , v0), and let αk ∶= σ(v1 ∣ (v0v1)k v0) and ϐk ∶= τ(v0 ∣ (v0v1)k) for each
k ∈ M. Additionally,we define xk ∶=∏∞i=k αi and yk =∏∞i=k ϐi . We distinguish
whether xk > 12 for some k or not.
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v0
0
v1
1
( 12 , 0) (1, 12 )
Figure 3.5. A Büchi SMGwith no subgame-perfect equilibrium.
First, assume that xk > 12 for some k (and consequently xi > 12 for each
i ≥ k). We claim that ϐi = 1 for each i > k. Otherwise, yk+1 < 1, and the expected
payoff for player 1 after history (v0v1)k v0 would be
≤ xkyk+1 + (1 − yk+1) ⋅ 12< xkyk+1 + xk(1 − yk+1)= xk .
But with the strategy of playing to v0 with probability 1 all the time, player 1
would receive expected payoff xk .
Hence, ϐi = 1 for each i > k, and the expected payoff for player 0 after
history (v0v1)k v0 equals (1− xk) ⋅ 12 < 14 . But then, she could improve after this
history by leaving the game,whichwould give her payoff 12 , a contradiction.
Now assume that xk ≤ 12 for all k. Then theremust exist infinitelymany k
such that αk < 1; we claim that ϐk = 0 for any such k. Otherwise, the expected
payoff for player 1 after history (v0v1)k would be
≤ (1 − ϐk) ⋅ 12 + αk ϐk(xk+1yk+1 + (1 − yk+1) ⋅ 12 )≤ (1 − ϐk) ⋅ 12 + αk ϐk(yk+1 ⋅ 12 + (1 − yk+1) ⋅ 12 )= (1 − ϐk) ⋅ 12 + αk ϐk ⋅ 12< 12 .
However, by leaving the game, player 1 could get payoff 12 immediately.
Hence, we can fix k1 < k2 such that αk1 < 1, ϐk2 = 0 and αk = 1 for all
k1 < k < k2. The expected payoff for player 0 after history (v0v1)k1 v0 equals(1 − αk1 ) ⋅ 12 + αk1 < 1. But then player 0 could improve bymoving to v1 with
probability 1, inwhich case she receives payoff 1, again a contradiction. □
The existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in finite SSMGs remains
open. However, Flesch et al. (2010) proved the existence of subgame-perfect
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ε-equilibria in these games for all ε > 0. Moreover, they showed that subgame-
perfect equilibria do exist indeterministic SSMGswith arbitrarynonnegative
payoffs on terminal vertices.
3.4 Computing equilibria
The first computational problem coming to mindwhen one considers equi-
libria is computing an equilibrium for a given game. For this problem to be
meaningful, we need to make sure that both the possible inputs and the
possible outputs are representable by finitemeans. In order to ensure this,
wewill restrict the inputs to finite SMGs with ω-regular objectives, and the
outputs to equilibria in pure finite-state strategies. Moreover, for the sake
of simplicity,we concentrate on parity SMGs.²
ComputingNash equilibria
For Nash equilibria, it is easy to see that the problem of computing an equi-
librium lies in the class FNP of function problems where a potential solution
can be verified in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.19. The problem of computing a pure finite-state Nash equilib-
rium (of polynomial size) in a finite parity SMG is in FNP.
Proof. To prove membership in FNP, we need to show that, given a fi-
nite parity SMG (G , v0) and a pure strategy profile σ with finite memory
M = (M, δ ,m0), we can decide in polynomial time whether σ is a Nash
equilibrium of the game. This can be achieved as follows: First, for each
player i,we calculate the payoff zi of σ by computing the probability of the
event χ−1(Wini) in the Markov chain (Gσ , (v0 ,m0)). To checkwhether σ is a
Nash equilibrium, we additionally need to compute for each player i the
value ri of the MDP Gσ−i from (v0 ,m0). Clearly, σ is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if ri ≤ zi for each player i. Sincewe can compute the values of anMDP
(or a Markov chain) with a parity objective in polynomial time, all this can
be done in polynomial time. □
Arguably more interesting is the following theorem which essentially
states that we can reduce the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium to
² One problem with computing equilibria for games with more complex objectives is that
optimal strategies might be of exponential size (Dziembowski et al. 1997; Horn 2005).
69
3 Equilibria
the problem of computing optimal strategies. For any class C of parity S2Gs,
let C∗ be the class of all parity SMGs G such that for each player i the coalition
game Gi is in C.
Theorem 3.20. Let C be any class of finite parity S2Gs. There exists a
polynomial-time Turing reduction from the problem of computing a Nash
equilibrium for games in C∗ to the problem of computing globally optimal
positional strategies for games in C.
Proof. We describe a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for comput-
ing Nash equilibria for games in C∗ with access to an oracle for computing
globally optimal positional strategies for games in C. On input (G , v0),whereG ∈ C∗, the algorithm starts by requesting from the oracle, for each player i,
globally optimalpositional strategies σi and τi forbothplayers in the coalition
game Gi ∈ C. Then, the algorithm constructs a finite-state Nash equilibrium
of (G , v0) by combining the strategies σi and τi in theway it is done in the
proof of Lemma 3.7,which can be done in polynomial time. □
Since optimal strategies can be computed in polynomial time for de-
terministic two-player zero-sum parity games with a bounded number of
priorities, Theorem 3.20 implies that a Nash equilibrium of a deterministic
multiplayer parity gamewith a bounded number of priorities can be com-
puted in polynomial time. We will prove a stronger result below, namely
that we can even compute a subgame-perfect equilibrium of such a game
in polynomial time. Finally, it follows from Theorem 3.20 that computing
a finite-state Nash equilibrium in a parity SMG can be done in polynomial
time if and only if the quantitative decision problem for parity S2Gs and
related problems are solvable in polynomial time.
Corollary 3.21. Either none or all of the following problems are solvable in
polynomial time:
1. the quantitative decision problem for parity S2Gs,
2. computing the values of a parity S2G,
3. computing globally optimal positional strategies in a parity S2G,
4. computing a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium of a parity SMG,
5. computing a finite-state Nash equilibrium of a parity SMG.
Proof. The polynomial-time equivalence of 1., 2. and 3. is the subject of Propo-
sition 2.14. That 4. can be done in polynomial time if 3. can follows from
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Algorithm 3.1. Computing the set of consistent memory-vertex pairs.
Input: SMG G = (Π, V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ , (Wini)i∈Π), v0 ∈ V ,memoryM = (M, δ ,m0)
Output: {(m, v) ∈ M × V ∶ exists history xv of (G , v0)with δ∗(m0 , x) = m}
X ∶= {(m0 , v0)}
repeat
X ′ ∶= X
X ∶= X ∪ {(n,w) ∈ M × V ∶ exists (m, v) ∈ X with δ(m, v) = n and w ∈ v∆}
until X = X ′
output X
Theorem 3.20, and that 5. can be done in polynomial time if 4. can is trivial.
Finally, to compute valG(v) for a parity S2G G,we can compute a finite-state
Nash equilibrium (σ , τ) of (G , v). It follows from Proposition 3.2 that the
payoff of (σ , τ) for player 0 equals valG(v). This payoff can be computed in
polynomial time from (σ , τ) by analysing the generatedMarkov chain. Hence,
2. can be done in polynomial time if 5. can. □
Computing subgame-perfect equilibria
For subgame-perfect equilibria, the problem of computing a pure finite-
state equilibrium of polynomial size in a parity SMG can again easily be put
into FNP. The restriction to polynomial size is important: we do not know
whether the existence of a pure finite-state subgame-perfect equilibrium in
a parity SMG implies the existence of onewith polynomial size.
Theorem 3.22. The problem of computing a pure finite-state subgame-
perfect equilibrium of polynomial size in a finite parity SMG is in FNP.³
Proof. We need to show that, given afinite parity SMG (G , v0) and a pure strat-
egy profile σ withfinitememoryM = (M, δ ,m0),we can decide in polynomial
time whether σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. Our algo-
rithm starts by computing the set C of consistent pairs of a memory state
and a vertex, i.e. the set of all pairs (m, v) ∈ M × V such that there exists a
history xv of (G , v0)with δ∗(m0 , x) = m. This can be achieved in polynomial
time (for any kind of SMG) by Algorithm 3.1.
³ More precisely, the problem of computing a pure finite-state subgame-perfect equilibrium of
size at most p(n) in a finite parity SMG of size n is in FNP for any polynomial p.
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After having computed the set C, the algorithm proceeds by computing
(in polynomial time) for each i ∈ Π and (m, v) ∈ C the probability zi(m, v)
of the event χ−1(Wini) in the Markov chain (Gσ , (m, v)) and the value ri(m, v)
of the MDP Gσ−i from (m, v). Clearly, σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
of (G , v0) if and only if ri(m, v) ≤ zi(m, v) for each i ∈ Π and each (m, v) ∈ C. □
For deterministic games, we know how to construct a finite-state
subgame-perfect equilibrium (Theorem 3.16). It is easy to see that the equi-
librium can be computed in polynomial time if globally optimal positional
strategies can be computed in polynomial time. For a class C of parity S2Gs,
the class C∗ is defined as above.
Theorem 3.23. Let C be any class of finite deterministic two-player zero-
sum parity games. There exists a polynomial-time Turing reduction from
the problemof computing a subgame-perfect equilibrium for games in C∗ to
the problem of computing globally optimal positional strategies for games
in C.
Theorem 3.23 makes the entiremachinery that has been developed for
solving (subclasses of ) deterministic two-player zero-sum parity games
available for the computation of subgame-perfect equilibria in deterministic
multiplayer parity games. For example, the deterministic subexponential
algorithm due to Jurdziński et al. (2008) can be adapted to compute subgame-
perfect equilibria. Moreover,we can compute subgame-perfect equilibria
in polynomial time for games on arenas that admit a polynomial-time al-
gorithm for solving deterministic two-player zero-sum parity games, such
as the ones mentioned in Section 2.5. In particular, we can compute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of a deterministicmultiplayer parity game
with a bounded number of priorities in polynomial time.
Corollary 3.24. For each d ∈ M, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a finite deterministicmulti-
player parity gamewith at most d priorities.
Finally, it follows from Theorem 3.23 that computing a Nash or subgame-
perfect equilibriumof a deterministicmultiplayer parity game is polynomial-
time equivalent to deciding thewinner of a deterministic two-player zero-
sum parity game.
Corollary 3.25. Either none or all of the following problems are solvable in
polynomial time:
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1. deciding whether player 0 has a winning strategy in a deterministic
two-player zero-sum parity game,
2. computing globally optimal positional strategies in a deterministic two-
player zero-sum parity game,
3. computing a pure finite-state subgame-perfect equilibrium of a deter-
ministicmultiplayer parity game,
4. computing a finite-state subgame-perfect equilibrium of a deterministic
multiplayer parity game,
5. computing a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium of a deterministicmulti-
player parity game,
6. computing a finite-state Nash equilibriumof a deterministicmultiplayer
parity game.
Proof. The polynomial-time equivalence of 1. and 2. is standard (see Propo-
sition 2.14). That 3. can be done in polynomial time if 2. can follows from
Theorem 3.23. That 4. and 5. can be done in polynomial time if 3. can and that
6. can be done in polynomial time if 4. or 5. can is obvious. Finally, it follows
from Proposition 3.2 that 1. can be done in polynomial time if 6. can. □
3.5 Decision problems
In applications, computing an arbitrary equilibrium is often not enough.
For instance, in the stochastic dining philosophers problem, introduced in
Section 1.2, we are after an equilibrium where each philosopher survives
with high probability. In order to compute a “good” equilibrium,we permit
the placing of a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. More precisely,
for each player one may put both a lower and an upper threshold on her
payoff. For any solution concept, the corresponding decision problem can be
phrased as follows (the ordering ≤ is applied componentwise):
Given a finite SMG (G , v0) and x, y ∈ [0, 1]Π, decidewhether there exists
a solutionwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
To obtainmeaningful results,we assume that all transition probabilities inG
as well as the thresholds x and y are rational numbers (with numerator and
denominator given in binary) and that all objectives are ω-regular. For the
two solution concepts we study in this work, namely Nash and subgame-
perfect equilibria,we obtain the decision problems NE and SPE.
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Note that we have not put any restriction on the type of strategies that
realise the equilibrium. It is natural to restrict the search space to equilibria
in pure, finite-state, pure finite-state, stationary, or even positional strate-
gies. For Nash equilibria, let us call the resulting decision problems PureNE,
FinNE, PureFinNE, StatNE and PosNE, respectively; for subgame-perfect
equilibria, the corresponding problems are PureSPE, FinSPE, PureFinSPE,
StatSPE and PosSPE, respectively.
Often,we are not interested in the exact payoff of a solution, but only in
which players win or lose almost surely. For any of the aforementioned deci-
sion problems,we obtain its qualitative fragment by requiring the thresholds x
and y to be binary:
Given a finite SMG (G , v0) and x, y ∈ {0, 1}Π, decidewhether there exists
a solutionwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
It will turn out that the difficulty of the general problems manifests itself in
this fragment: almost all of the lower bounds on the complexity of NE, SPE
and their relatives we are going to prove in Chapter 4 can be obtained by a
reduction to the qualitative fragment. In fact, in most cast cases,we show
hardness for the following problem:
Given afinite SMG (G , v0), decidewhether there exists a solutionwhere
player 0 wins almost surely.
We already know that there exist SSMGs that have a stationary Nash
equilibrium but no positional one. Hence, the problems StatNE and PosNE
are distinct. Another extension of PosNE is PureFinNE. In fact, these ex-
tensions are incomparable, even ifwe consider only SSMGs. This has to be
comparedwith the situation for SS2Gs,where all these problems coincide
because SS2Gs admit globally optimal positional strategies.
Proposition 3.26. There exists a finite SSMG with a stationary subgame-
perfect equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely, but with no pure
Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins with positive probability.
Proof. Consider the three-player SSMG depicted in Figure 3.6. Clearly, the sta-
tionary strategy profilewhere from vertex v2 player 0 selects both outgoing
transitions with probability 12 each, player 1 plays from v0 to v1 and player 2
plays from v1 to v2 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium where player 0 wins
almost surely. However, for any pure strategy profilewhere player 0 wins
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v0
1
v1
2
v2
0
(1, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 1)
(0, 12 , 0) (0, 0, 12 )
Figure 3.6. An SSMG thathas a stationary subgame-perfect equilibriumwhere player 0
wins almost surely but no pure Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins with positive
probability.
with positive probability (i.e. with probability 1), either player 1 or player 2
receives payoff 0 and could improve her payoff by switching her strategy at
v0 or v1, respectively. □
Proposition 3.27. There exists a finite SSMG with a pure finite-state sub-
game-perfect equilibrium, but with no stationary Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the game (G , v3) given in the proof of Proposition 3.13 and
depicted in Figure 3.3. We have already shown that this game does not admit
a stationary Nash equilibrium. Now consider the pure strategy profile σ
where player i leaves the cycle after history xvi if and only if x is of even
length. We claim that σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v3). By sym-
metry,we only need to show that player 1 cannot improve her payoff after
any history. Let xv be a history of (G , v3); without loss of generality, v = v1.
If x is even, then player 1 receives payoff 13 after history xv , but would receive
payoff 0 by staying in the cycle. On the other hand, if x is odd, then player 1
receives payoff 1 after history xv ,which is the best she can get. □
The complete taxonomy of the decision problems related to Nash and
subgame-perfect equilibria is depicted in Figure 3.7. An edge from prob-
lem A to problem Bmeans that A is a subset of B, i.e. all positive instances
of A are positive instances of B. All inclusions are strict; this follows from
Example 3.4, Propositions 3.26 and 3.27 as well as a result on finite-state
Nash equilibria (Proposition 4.12),whichwewill present in the next chapter.
Note however that an edge from A to B does, in general, not imply that one
problem is computationally harder than the other (in the sense that there is
a computable reduction between these problems). Hence, decidability has
to be studied separately for each of these problems.
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PosNE
PureFinNE
PureNE
StatNE
FinNE
NE
PosSPE
PureFinSPE
PureSPE
StatSPE
FinSPE
SPE
Figure 3.7. The different decision problems related to Nash and subgame-perfect
equilibria.
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Complexity of Equilibria
The aim of this chapter is to establish tight bounds on the complexity of the
decision problems we have introduced in Chapter 3. All upper bounds apply
to SMGs with Streett-Rabin or Muller objectives, while all lower bounds
apply to SSMGs. Throughout this chapter, all games are finite.
4.1 Positional equilibria
In this section,we analyse the complexity of the presumably simplest of the
decision problems introduced so far: PosNE and PosSPE. Not surprisingly,
both these problems are decidable; in fact, they are NP-complete for all types
of objectives we consider in this work. Let us start by proving membership
in NP; it suffices to consider Streett-Rabin and Muller SMGs.
Theorem4.1. PosNE is in NP for Streett-Rabin SMGs and Muller SMGs.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.19. To decide PosNE, on
input G , v0 , x, y,we can guess a positional strategy profile σ, i.e. amapping⋃i∈Π Vi → V ; then,we verifywhether σ is a Nash equilibriumwith the desired
payoff. To do this, we first compute the payoff zi of σ for each player i by
computing the probability of the event Wini in the (finite) Markov chain(Gσ , v0). Once each zi is computed,we can easily checkwhether xi ≤ zi ≤ yi .
To verify that σ is a Nash equilibrium, we additionally compute, for each
player i, the value ri of the (finite) MDP Gσ−i from v0. Clearly, σ is a Nash
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equilibrium if and only if ri ≤ zi for each player i. Sincewe can compute the
value of anMDP (or aMarkov chain) with a Streett, Rabin or Muller objective
in polynomial time (Theorem 2.15), all these checks can be carried out in
polynomial time. □
Theorem4.2. PosSPE is in NP for Streett-Rabin SMGs and Muller SMGs.
Proof. The proof is virtually identical to the proof of Theorem 4.1. Since a
stationary strategy profile σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a Muller
SMG (G , v0) if and only if σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G , v) for every vertex
v ∈ V reachable from v0 ,we only have to adapt the algorithm as follows: For
each player i, instead of computing only the payoff zi of σ in (G , v0) and the
value ri of the MDP Gσ−i from v0, we compute for each v ∈ V the payoff z iv
of σ for player i in (G , v) and the value r iv of Gσ−i from v . Finally,we compute
(in polynomial time) the set R of vertices that are reachable from v0 and
check whether r iv ≤ z iv for each v ∈ R. Clearly, the resulting algorithm still
runs in polynomial time. □
To establishNP-completeness,we still need to showNP-hardness. In fact,
the reduction we are going to present does not only work for PosNE and
PosSPE, but also for the problems StatNE and StatSPE,wherewe allow arbi-
trary stationary equilibria.
Theorem4.3. PosNE, StatNE, PosSPE and StatSPE are NP-hard, even for
SSMGs with only two players (three players for the qualitative fragments).
Proof. The proof is by reduction from SAT. Let φ = C1∧⋅ ⋅ ⋅∧Cm ,wherem ≥ 1, be
a formula in conjunctive normal formover propositional variables X1 , . . . , Xn;
without loss of generality,we assume that each clause is nonempty. Our aim
is to construct a two-player SSMG (G , v0) such that the following statements
are equivalent:
1. φ is satisfiable;
2. (G , v0) has a positional subgame-perfect equilibriumwith payoff (1, 12 );
3. (G , v0) has a stationary Nash equilibriumwith payoff (1, 12 ).
Provided that the game can be constructed in polynomial time, these equiv-
alences establish all desired reductions. The game G is depicted in Figure 4.1.
The game proceeds from the initial vertex v0 to X i or ¬X i with probabil-
ity 1/2i+1 each, and to vertex φ with probability 1/2n+1; with the remaining
probability of 1/2n+1 the game proceeds to a terminal vertex with payoff (1, 0).
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Figure 4.1. Reducing SAT to PosNE, StatNE, PosSPE and StatSPE.
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From φ, the game proceeds to each vertex C j with probability 1/(m + 1); with
the remaining probability of 1/(m+1), the game proceeds to a terminal vertex
with payoff (1, 1). From vertex C j (controlled by player 1), there is a transi-
tion to a literal L, i.e. L = X i or L = ¬X i , if and only if L occurs inside the
clause C j . Obviously, the game G can be constructed from φ in polynomial
time. We conclude the proof by showing that 1.–3. are equivalent.
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that α∶ {X1 , . . . , Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying assign-
ment of φ. In the positional subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v0), player 0
moves from a literal L to the neighbouring ⊺-labelled vertex if and only if
L is mapped to true by α. Player 1 moves from vertex C j to a (fixed) literal L
that is contained in C j andmapped to true by α (which is possible since α is a
satisfying assignment); at ⊺-labelled vertices, player 1 never leaves the game.
Obviously, player 0 wins almost surely in this strategy profile. For player 1,
the payoff equals
1
2n+1 + n∑i=1 12i+1 = 12n+1 + 12 (
n∑
i=1
1
2i ) = 12n+1 + 12 (1 − 12n ) = 12 ,
where the first summand is the probability of going from the initial vertex
to φ, fromwhere player 1wins almost surely since from every clause vertex
she plays to a “true” literal. Obviously, changing her strategy at any ver-
tex cannot give her a better payoff. Therefore,we have a subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Let σ = (σ0 , σ1) be a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G , v0) with
payoff (1, 12 ). Our first aim is to show that σ0 is actually a positional strat-
egy. Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a literal L such that
σ0(L) assigns probability 0 < q < 1 to the neighbouring ⊺-labelled vertex.
Since player 0 wins almost surely, player 1 never leaves the game. Hence,
the expected payoff for player 1 from vertex L equals q. However, if she left
the game at the ⊺-labelled vertex, she would receive payoff 2q/(1 + q) > q.
Therefore, σ is not a Nash equilibrium, a contradiction.
Since σ0 is a positional strategy, we can define a pseudo assignment
α∶ {X1 ,¬X1 , . . . , Xn ,¬Xn} → {true, false} by setting α(L) = true if σ0 prescribes
to go from vertex L to the neighbouring ⊺-labelled vertex. Our next aim
is to show that α is actually an assignment: α(X i) = true if and only if
α(¬X i) = false. To see this, note that we can compute player 1’s expected
payoff as follows:
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1
2 = p2n+1 + n∑i=1 ai2i+1 , ai =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if α(X i) = α(¬X i) = false,
1 if α(X i) ≠ α(¬X i),
2 if α(X i) = α(¬X i) = true,
where p is the expected payoff for player 1 from vertex φ. By the construction
of G, we have p > 0, and the equality only holds if p = 1 and ai = 1 for all
i = 1, . . . , n,which proves that α is an assignment.
Finally,we claim that α satisfies φ. If this were not the case, therewould
exist a clause C such that player 1’s expected payoff from vertex C equals 0
and therefore p < 1. This is a contradiction to p = 1, as shown above.
To show that the qualitative fragments of PosNE and StatNE are also
NP-hard, it suffices to modify the game G as follows: First,we add one new
player, player 2,whowins at precisely those terminal vertices where player 1
loses. Second,we add two newvertices v1 and v2 . At v1 , player 1 has the choice
to leave the game; if she decides to stay inside the game, the play proceeds
to v2,where player 2 has the choice to leave the game; if she also decides to
stay inside the game, the play proceeds to vertex v0 fromwhere the game
continues normally; if player 1 or player 2 decide to leave the game, then
each of them receives payoff 12 , but player 0 receives payoff 0. Let us denote
the modified game by G ′. It is straightforward to see that the following
statements are equivalent:
1. (G ′ , v1) has a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost
surely;
2. (G , v0) has a stationary Nash equilibriumwith payoff (1, 12 );
3. φ is satisfiable;
4. (G , v0) has a positional subgame-perfect equilibriumwith payoff (1, 12 );
5. (G ′ , v1) has a positional subgame-perfect equilibriumwhere player 0 wins
almost surely. □
Recall from Chapter 3 that not every SMG has a positional Nash equi-
librium (Proposition 3.14). Hence, it is also a nontrivial problem to decide
whether an SMG has a positional Nash equilibrium at all. It follows from
Theorem 4.1 that, e.g. for SMGs withMuller objectives, there exists a nonde-
terministic polynomial-time algorithm for deciding this problem. On the
other hand, this problem is NP-hard, even for three-player SSMGs.
Corollary 4.4. Decidingwhether in a given three-player SSMG there exists
a positional Nash equilibrium is NP-hard.
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Proof. The proof is by reduction from the following problem,whichwe just
proved to be NP-hard: Given a three-player SSMG (G , v0), decide whether(G , v0) has a positional Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins almost surely.
In the following, let (G1 , v1) be a fixed three-player SSMG that does not have a
positional Nash equilibrium andwhere player 0 wins almost surely in every
strategy profile (such a game can be derived from Proposition 3.14 by adding
onemore player). We need to show how to construct (in polynomial time)
from a given three-player SSMG (G , v0) a new three-player SSMG (G̃ , ṽ0) such
that (G , v0) has a positional Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins almost
surely if and only if (G̃ , ṽ0) has a positional Nash equilibrium at all. The
game G̃ is the disjoint union of G and G1 combinedwith one new vertex ṽ0,
controlled by player 0. At ṽ0, player 0 can choose to move to v0 or to v1; in
either case, the remaining play stays inside G or G1, respectively. Obviously,G̃ can be constructed from G in polynomial time. It remains to be shown that(G , v0) has positional Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins almost surely if
and only if (G̃ , ṽ0) has a positional Nash equilibrium.
(⇒). Assume that (G , v0) has a positionalNash equilibriumwhere player 0
wins almost surely. This equilibrium can easily be extended to a positional
Nash equilibrium of (G̃ , ṽ0) by letting player 0move from ṽ0 to v0 (and choos-
ing an arbitrary positional strategy profile for G1).
(⇐) Assume that (G̃ , ṽ0) has a positional Nash equilibrium σ. We claim
that σ0(ṽ0) = v0. Otherwise, σ would induce a positional Nash equilibrium
of (G1 , v1), a contradiction. Hence, σ0(ṽ0) = v0, and σ induces a positional
Nash equilibriumof (G , v0). We claim that player 0wins almost surely in this
equilibrium. Otherwise, she could improve her payoff by playing from ṽ0
to v1 fromwhere shewins with probability 1, a contradiction. □
4.2 Stationary equilibria
To prove the decidability of StatNE and StatSPE,we appeal to results estab-
lished for the existential theory of the reals, the set of all existential first-order
sentences (over the appropriate signature) that hold in the ordered field
R ∶= (e,+, ⋅, 0, 1, ≤). The best known upper bound for the complexity of
the associated decision problem is Pspace (Canny 1988),which leads to the
following theorem.
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Theorem4.5. StatNE is in Pspace for SMGs with Streett-Rabin or Muller
objectives.
Proof. Since Pspace = NPspace, it suffices to provide a nondeterministic al-
gorithmwith polynomial space requirements for deciding StatNE. On inputG , v0 , x, y,wherewithout loss of generality G is an SMGwithMuller objec-
tives given byFi ⊆ P(C), the algorithm starts by guessing the support S ⊆ V ×V
of a stationary strategy profile σ of G, i.e. S = {(v ,w) ∈ V × V ∶ σ(w ∣ v) > 0}.
From the set S alone, by standard graph algorithms, one can compute for
each player i the following sets in polynomial time (see Appendix B):
1. the union Fi of all end components (i.e. bottom SCCs) U of the Markov
chain Gσ with χ(U) ∈ Fi ,
2. the set R i of vertices v such that Prσv (Reach(Fi)) > 0,
3. the union Ti of all end components of the MDP Gσ−i that arewinning for
player i.
After computing all these sets, the algorithm evaluates an existential
first-order sentence ψ,which can be computed in polynomial time fromG, v0 ,
x, y, (R i)i∈Π , (Fi)i∈Π and (Ti)i∈Π , overR and returns the answer to this query.
How does ψ look like? Let α = (αvw )v ,w∈V , r = (r iv )i∈Π,v∈V and z = (z iv )i∈Π,v∈V
be three sets of variables, and let V∗ = ⋃i∈Π Vi . The formula
φ(α) ∶= ⋀
v∈V∗ ( ⋀w∈v∆ αvw ≥ 0 ∧ ⋀w∈V/v∆αvw = 0 ∧ ∑w∈v∆ αvw = 1) ∧⋀
v∈V/V∗w∈V
αvw = ∆(w ∣ v) ∧ ⋀(v ,w)∈Sαvw > 0 ∧ ⋀(v ,w)∉Sαvw = 0
states that themapping σ∶V → D(V ), defined by σ(w ∣ v) = αvw , constitutes a
valid stationary strategy profile of G whose support is S. Provided that φ(α)
holds inR, the formula
ηi(α, z) ∶= ⋀
v∈F i z
iv = 1 ∧ ⋀
v∈V/R iz
iv = 0 ∧ ⋀
v∈V/F iz
iv = ∑
w∈v∆ αvw ⋅ z iw
states that z iv = Prσv (Wini) for each v ∈ V ,where σ is defined as above. This
follows from a well-known result about Markov chains, namely that the
vector of the aforementioned probabilities is the unique solution of the given
system of equations (see Appendix B). Finally, the formula
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θi(α, r) ∶= ⋀
v∈V r
iv ≥ 0 ∧ ⋀
v∈Ti r
iv = 1 ∧ ⋀
v∈Viw∈v∆
r iv ≥ r iw ∧ ⋀
v∈V/Vir
iv = ∑
w∈v∆ αvw ⋅ r iw
states that r is a solution of the linear programme for computing the values
of the MDP Gσ−i (see Appendix B). In particular, the formula is fulfilled if
r iv = supτ Prσ−i ,τv (Reach(Ti)) = supτ Prσ−i ,τv (Wini) (the latter equality follows
from Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4), and every other solution is greater than this one
(in each component).
The desired sentence ψ is the existential closure of the conjunction of φ
and, for each player i, the formulae ηi and θi combinedwith formulae stating
that player i cannot improve her payoff and that the expected payoff for
player i lies in between the given thresholds:
ψ ∶= ∃α ∃r ∃z (φ(α) ∧⋀
i∈Π(ηi(α, z) ∧ θi(α, r) ∧ r iv0 ≤ z iv0 ∧ xi ≤ z iv0 ≤ yi)) .
Clearly, ψ holds inR if and only if (G , v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium
with payoff at least x and at most y whose support is S. Consequently, the
algorithm is correct. □
Theorem4.6. StatSPE is in Pspace for SMGs with Streett-Rabin or Muller
objectives.
Proof. Again, the proof is virtually identical to the proof of Theorem 4.5.
As part of the preprocessing, we compute (in polynomial time) the set R
of vertices reachable from v0. Finally, instead of evaluating the sentence ψ,
we evaluate the following sentence:
ψ ′ ∶= ∃α ∃r ∃z (φ(α) ∧⋀
i∈Π(ηi(α, z) ∧ θi(α, r) ∧ ⋀v∈R r iv ≤ z iv ∧ xi ≤ z iv0 ≤ yi)) .
Clearly, ψ ′ holds inR if and only if there exists a stationary subgame-perfect
equilibrium of G with payoff at least x and at most y whose support is S. □
In the previous section,we showed that StatNE and StatSPE are NP-hard,
leaving a considerable gap to our upper bound of Pspace. Towards gaining a
better understanding of these problems,we relate StatNE and StatSPE to the
square root sum problem (SqrtSum) of deciding, given numbers d1 , . . . , dn , k ∈ M,
whether ∑ni=1 √di ≥ k.
Recently, Allender et al. (2009) showed that SqrtSum belongs to the fourth
level of the counting hierarchy, a slight improvement over the previously known
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0
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1 − p
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(b) The game G(p)
Figure 4.2. Reducing SqrtSum to StatNE and StatSPE.
Pspace upper bound. However, it has been an open question since the 1970s
as towhether SqrtSum falls into the polynomial hierarchy (Garey et al. 1976;
Etessami&Yannakakis 2010). We identify a polynomial-time reduction from
SqrtSum to StatNE and StatSPE, even for four-player SSMGs.¹ Hence, StatNE
and StatSPE are at least as hard as SqrtSum, and showing that StatNE or
StatSPE resides inside the polynomial hierarchy would imply amajor break-
through in understanding the complexity of numerical computation.
Theorem4.7. SqrtSum is polynomial-time reducible to both StatNE and
StatSPE, even for four-player SSMGs.
Beforewe state the reduction, let us first examine the game G(p),where
1
2 ≤ p < 1,which is depicted in Figure 4.2 (b).
Lemma 4.8. Themaximal payoff player 3 receives in a stationary Nash or
subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G(p), s0) equals (√2 − 2p − p + 1)/(2p + 2).
Proof. Note that a stationary strategy profile σ can only be aNash equilibrium
where player 3 receives payoff > 0 if player 1 plays from t1 to r1 with probabil-
ity 1 and player 2 plays from t2 to r2 with probability 1 (or if t2 is not reachable
with σ, but then player 3 receives payoff ≤ 1 − p) because otherwise player 0
¹ Some authors define SqrtSum using ≤ instead of ≥. With this definition, we would reduce
from the complement of SqrtSum instead.
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would prefer to leave the game at v0. Moreover, themaximum payoff for
player 3 can only be attainedwhen player 0 plays with probability 1 from s0
to t1 because, if player 0 plays from s0 to t1 with probability 0 < x < 1, then set-
ting x to 1 yields a Nash equilibriumwith a better payoff for player 3. Hence,
the only variable quantities are the probabilities x1 and x2 that player 0 plays
from s1 to t2 respectively from s2 to t1. Given x1 and x2, we can compute
the probabilities p1(x1 , x2) ∶= Prσt1 (Win1) and p2(x1 , x2) ∶= Prσt2 (Win2) as fol-
lows: p1(x1 , x2) = p(1 − x1)/(1 − x1x2 p2), and p2(x1 , x2) = p(1 − x2)/(1 − x1x2 p2).
To have a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that p1(x1 , x2), p2(x1 , x2) ≥ 12
since otherwise player 1 or player 2 would prefer to leave the game at t1
or t2 , respectively,where they could obtain payoff 12 immediately. Vice versa,
if p1(x1 , x2), p2(x1 , x2) ≥ 12 then σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium with ex-
pected payoff (1 − p)/(1 − x1x2 p2) ≥ 1 − p for player 3.
Hence, to determine the maximum payoff for player 3 in a stationary
Nash or subgame-perfect equilibrium,wehave tomaximise (1−p)/(1−x1x2 p2),
the expected payoff for player 3, under the constraints p1(x1 , x2), p2(x1 , x2) ≥ 12
and 0 ≤ x1 , x2 ≤ 1. We claim that the maximum is reached only if x1 = x2.
If e.g. x1 > x2, then we can achieve a higher payoff for player 3 by setting
x′2 ∶= x1, and the constraints are still satisfied:
p(1 − x′2)
1 − x1x′2 p2 = p(1 − x1)1 − x21 p2 ≥ p(1 − x1)1 − x1x2 p2 ≥ 12 .
Thus, it suffices to maximise (1− p)/(1− x2 p2) subject to p(1− x)/(1− x2 p2) ≥ 12
and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Since 12 ≤ p < 1, this is equivalent tomaximising (1−p)/(1− x2 p2)
subject to p2x2 − 2px + 2p − 1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The roots of the former
polynomial are (1±√2 − 2p) / p, but (1+√2 − 2p) / p > 1 for 12 ≤ p < 1. Therefore,
any solution must be less than (or equal to) x0 ∶= (1 − √2 − 2p) / p. In fact,
we always have 0 ≤ x0 < 1 for p ∈ ( 12 , 1). Therefore, x0 is the optimal solution,
and themaximal payoff for player 3 does indeed equal
1 − p
1 − x20p2 = 1 − p1 − (1 − √2 − 2p)2 =
√2 − 2p − p + 1
2p + 2 . □
Proof (of Theorem 4.7). Given an instance (d1 , . . . , dn , k) of SqrtSum, where
without loss of generality n > 0, di > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n and k ≤ d ∶= ∑ni=1 di ,
we construct a four-player SSMG (G , v0) such that the following statements
are equivalent:
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1. ∑ni=1 √di ≥ k;
2. (G , v0) has a stationary subgame-perfect equilibriumwhere player 0 wins
almost surely;
3. (G , v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost
surely.
Define pi ∶= 1 − di/2d2 for i = 1, . . . , n. Note that 12 ≤ pi < 1 since 0 < di ≤ d ≤ d2.
For the reduction,we use n copies of the game G(p),where in the ith copy we
set p to pi . The complete game G is depicted in Figure 4.2 (a); it can obviously
be constructed in polynomial time.
By Lemma 4.8, themaximal payoff player 3 receives in a stationary Nash
or subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G(pi), s0) equals√2 − 2pi − pi + 1
2pi + 2 =
√di/d − (1 − di/2d2) + 1
4 − di/d2 = d
√di + di/2
4d2 − di .
Consequently, themaximal payoff player 3 receives in a stationary Nash or
subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v1) equals
q ∶= n∑
i=1
4d2 − di
4d2n ⋅ d
√di + di/2
4d2 − di = n∑i=1
√di
4dn + n∑i=1 di8d2n =
n∑
i=1
√di
4dn + 18dn .
To complete the proof,we need to establish the equivalence of 1.–3.
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that∑ni=1 √di ≥ k. Then q ≥ (2k+1)/8dn, and any stationary
subgame-perfect equilibrium σ of (G , v1) with this payoff for player 3 can
be extended to a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v0)where
player 0 wins almost surely by setting σ(v1 ∣ v0) = 1.
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Assume that (G , v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium where
player 0 wins almost surely, but ∑ni=1 √di < k. Then q < (2k + 1)/8dn, and in
every stationary Nash equilibrium of (G , v0) player 3 leaves the game at v0,
which gives payoff 0 to player 0, a contradiction. □
In Chapter 3,we have seen that not every SSMG admits a stationaryNash
equilibrium (Proposition 3.13). As for positional equilibria,we can thus ask
whether a given game has a stationary Nash equilibrium at all. With a
construction similar to the one used in the proof of Corollary 4.4, we can
infer from Theorems 4.3 and 4.7 that this problem is both NP-hard and
SqrtSum-hard, even for four-player SSMGs.
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Corollary 4.9. Decidingwhether in a given four-player SSMG there exists a
stationary Nash equilibrium is both NP-hard and SqrtSum-hard.
Remark. The positive results of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 can easily be extended
to equilibria in pure or randomised strategies with a memory of a fixed
size k ∈ M: a nondeterministic algorithm can guess amemoryM of size k
and then look for a positional, respectively stationary, equilibrium in the
product of the original game G with thememoryM. Hence, for any fixed
k ∈ M, we can decide in Pspace (NP) the existence of a randomised (pure)
equilibrium of size k with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
4.3 Pure and randomised equilibria
In this section, we show that all of the following problems are undecid-
able: PureNE, PureSPE, NE and SPE. In fact, we prove that the qualitative
fragments of these problems are not recursively enumerable. The proof pro-
ceeds by a single reduction from an undecidable problem about deterministic
two-counter machines.
Let Γ ∶= {inc( j), dec( j), zero( j) ∶ j = 1, 2}. A two-counter machineM is of
the formM = (Q , q0 , δ),where
• Q is a finite set of states,
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
• δ ⊆ Q × Γ × Q is a transition relation.
For q ∈ Q let δ(q) ∶= {(γ , q′) ∈ Γ × Q ∶ (q, γ , q′) ∈ δ}. We callM deterministic if for
each q ∈ Q either δ(q) = ∅, or δ(q) = {(inc( j), q′)} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q′ ∈ Q ,
or δ(q) = {(zero( j), q1), (dec( j), q2)} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q1 , q2 ∈ Q .
A configuration ofM is a triple C = (q, i1 , i2) ∈ Q × M × M,where q denotes
the current state and i j denotes the current value of counter j. A config-
uration C ′ = (q′ , i ′1 , i ′2) is a successor of configuration C = (q, i1 , i2), denoted
by C ⊢ C ′, if there exists a “matching” transition (q, γ , q′) ∈ δ. For exam-
ple, (q, i1 , i2) ⊢ (q′ , i1 + 1, i2) if and only if (q, inc(1), q′) ∈ δ. The instruction
zero( j) performs a zero test: (q, i1 , i2) ⊢ (q′ , i1 , i2) if and only if i1 = 0 and(q, zero(1), q′) ∈ δ, or i2 = 0 and (q, zero(2), q′) ∈ δ.
A partial computation ofM is a finite or infinite sequence ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . .
of configurations such that ρ(0) ⊢ ρ(1) ⊢ ⋯ and ρ(0) = (q0 , 0, 0) (the initial
configuration). A partial computation ofM is a computation ofM if it is infinite
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or ends in a configuration C for which there is no C ′ with C ⊢ C ′. Note that
each deterministic two-counter machine has a unique computation.
The halting problem is to decide, given amachineM,whether the compu-
tation ofM is finite. It is well-known that deterministic two-counter ma-
chines are Turing powerful,which makes the halting problem and its dual,
the non-halting problem, undecidable, evenwhen restricted to deterministic
two-counter machines. In fact, the non-halting problem for deterministic
two-counter machines is not recursively enumerable.
Theorem4.10. PureNE, PureSPE, NE and SPE are not recursively enumer-
able, even for 10-player SSMGs.
To prove Theorem4.10,we give a reduction from thenon-halting problem
for deterministic two-counter machines. Our aim is thus to compute from
amachineM a 10-player SSMG (G , v0) such that the following statements
are equivalent:
1. the computation ofM is infinite;
2. (G , v0) has a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium inwhich player 0 wins
almost surely;
3. (G , v0) has a Nash equilibrium inwhich player 0 wins almost surely.
Without loss of generality,we assume that inM there is no zero test that is
followed by another zero test: if (zero( j), q′) ∈ δ(q), then ∣δ(q′)∣ ≤ 1.
The game G is played by players 0, 1 and eight other players Atj and Btj ,
indexed by j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, player 0 and player 1 build up
the computation ofM: player 0 updates the counters, and player 1 chooses
transitions. The other players make sure that player 0 updates the counters
correctly: if player 0 cheats or the computation halts, one of themwill prefer
to play a strategy that gives a bad payoff to player 0. More precisely, in every
step of the computation, the players A0j and A1j make sure that the value
of counter j is not too high, and the players B0j and B1j make sure that the
value of counter j is not too low. Hereby, they alternate: the first step of the
computation is monitored by the players A0j and B0j , the second step by the
players A1j and B1j , the third step again by the players A0j and B0j , and so on.
Let Γ ′ ∶= Γ ∪ {init}. For each q ∈ Q , each γ ∈ Γ ′, each j ∈ {1, 2} and each
t ∈ {0, 1}, the game G contains the gadgets Stγ ,q , Itq and C tγ , j ,which are depicted
in Figure 4.3. For better readability, terminal vertices are depicted as squares;
the label indicates which players win. The initial vertex of G is v0 ∶= v0init,q0 .
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Stγ ,q :
v tγ ,qAt1
At1 , At2
At2
Bt1
Bt1 , Bt2
Bt2
C tγ ,1
C tγ ,2
Itq
13
23
16
56
12
14
14
Itq for δ(q) = {(inc( j), q′)}:
1
S1−tinc( j),q′
Itq for δ(q) = {(zero( j), q1), (dec( j), q2)}:
1 S1−tzero( j),q1
S1−tdec( j),q2
Itq for δ(q) = ∅:
C tγ , j for γ ∉ {init, inc( j), dec( j), zero( j)}:
0
0, Atj , A1−tj
0, Atj , B1−tj
0, Btj , B1−tj
0, Atj , B1−tj
C tγ , j for γ = inc( j):
0
0, Atj , A1−tj
0, Atj , A1−tj
0, Btj , A1−tj
0, Atj , B1−tj
C tγ , j for γ = dec( j):
0
0, Atj , B1−tj
0, Atj , A1−tj
0, Btj , B1−tj
0, Atj , B1−tj
C tγ , j for γ ∈ {init, zero( j)}:
0, 1, Atj , A1−tj 0, 1, Atj , B1−tj
0, 1, Btj , B1−tj
Figure 4.3. Simulating a two-counter machine.
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Note that in the gadget Stγ ,q , each of the players Atj and Btj may quit the game,
which gives her a payoff of 13 or 16 , respectively, but payoff 0 to players 0 and 1.
It will turn out that player 1will play a pure strategy in any Nash equilib-
riumof (G , v0)where player 0wins almost surely, except possibly forhistories
that arenot consistent with the equilibrium. Formally,we say that a strategy
profile σ of (G , v0) is safe if for all histories xv consistent with σ and ending
in a vertex v ∈ Itq there exists w ∈ V with σ1(w ∣ xv) = 1.
For a safe strategy profile σ where player 0 wins almost surely, let x0v0 ≺
x1v1 ≺ x2v2 ≺ ⋯ (where xi ∈ V∗, vi ∈ V and x0 = ε) be the unique sequence
containing all histories xv of (G , v0) that are consistent with σ and end in
a vertex v of the form v = v tγ ,q . This sequence is infinite because player 0
wins almost surely. Additionally, let q0 , q1 , . . . be the corresponding sequence
of states and γ0 , γ1 , . . . be the corresponding sequence of instructions, i.e.
vn = v0γn ,qn or vn = v 1γn ,qn for all n ∈ M. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ M,we set:
anj ∶= Prσv0 (player An mod 2j wins ∣ xnvn ⋅ Vω) ;
bnj ∶= Prσv0 (player Bn mod 2j wins ∣ xnvn ⋅ Vω) .
Note that at every terminal vertex of the counter gadgets C tγ , j and C1−tγ , j either
player Atj or player Btj wins. For each j, the conditional probability that, given
the history xnvn ,we reach such a vertex is∑k∈M 1/2k ⋅ 14 = 12 . Hence, anj = 12 − bnj
for all n ∈ M. We say that σ is stable if anj = 13 or, equivalently, bnj = 16 for each
j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈ M.
Finally, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ M, we define a number cnj ∈ [0, 1] as
follows: After the history xnvn ,with probability 14 the play enters the counter
gadget Cn mod 2γn , j . The number cnj is defined as the probability of subsequently
reaching a grey-coloured vertex. Note that, by the construction of G, it holds
that cnj = 1 if γn = zero( j) or γn = init. In particular, c01 = c02 = 1.
Lemma 4.11. Let σ be a safe strategy profile of (G , v0) inwhich player 0 wins
almost surely. Then σ is stable if and only if
cn+1j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2 ⋅ cnj if γn+1 = inc( j),
2 ⋅ cnj if γn+1 = dec( j),
cnj = 1 if γn+1 = zero( j),
cnj otherwise,
(4.1)
for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ M.
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To prove the lemma, consider a safe strategy profile σ of (G , v0) inwhich
player 0 wins almost surely. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ M, set
pnj ∶= Prσv0 (player An mod 2j wins ∣ xnvn ⋅ Vω / xn+2vn+2 ⋅ Vω) .
The following claim relates the numbers anj and pnj .
Claim. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Then anj = 13 for all n ∈ M if and only if pnj = 14 for all n ∈ M.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that anj = 13 for all n ∈ M. We have anj = pnj + 14 ⋅ an+2j and
therefore 13 = pnj + 112 for all n ∈ M. Hence, pnj = 14 for all n ∈ M.
(⇐) Assume that pnj = 14 for all n ∈ M. Since anj = pnj + 14 ⋅ an+2j for all n ∈ M, the
numbers anj must satisfy the following recurrence: an+2j = 4anj − 1. Since all
the numbers anj are probabilities, 0 ≤ anj ≤ 1 for all n ∈ M. It is easy to see that
the only values for a0j and a1j such that 0 ≤ anj ≤ 1 for all n ∈ M are a0j = a1j = 13 .
But this implies that anj = 13 for all n ∈ M. □
Proof (of Lemma 4.11). By the previous claim, we only need to show that
pnj = 14 if and only if (4.1) holds. Let j ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ M and t = n mod 2. The
probability pnj can be expressed as the sum of the probability that the play
reaches a terminal vertex that is winning for player Atj inside C tγn , j and the
probability that the play reaches such a vertex inside C1−tγn+1 , j . The first proba-
bility does not depend on γn , but the second depends on γn+1 . Let us consider
the case γn+1 = inc( j). In this case, the aforementioned sum is equal to
1
4 ⋅ (1 − 14 ⋅ cnj ) + 18 ⋅ cn+1j = 14 − 116 ⋅ cnj + 18 ⋅ cn+1j .
Obviously, this sum is equal to 14 if and only if cn+1j = 12 ⋅ cnj . For any other
value of γn+1, the argumentation is similar. □
To establish the reduction,weneed to show that the following statements
are equivalent:
1. the computation ofM is infinite;
2. (G , v0) has a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium inwhich player 0 wins
almost surely;
3. (G , v0) has a Nash equilibrium inwhich player 0 wins almost surely.
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that the computation ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . ofM is infinite.
Player 0’s pure equilibrium strategy σ0 can be described as follows: for a
history that ends at the unique vertex v ∈ C tγ , j controlled by player 0 after
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visiting a vertex of the form v tγ ′ ,q or v 1−tγ ′ ,q exactly n > 0 times and v exactly
k ≥ 0 times, player 0 plays to the grey-coloured successor vertex if k is greater
than or equal to the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n − 1); otherwise,
player 0 plays to the other successor vertex.
The only place where player 1 has a choice is the sole vertex inside the
gadget Itq for δ(q) = {(zero( j), q1), (dec( j), q2)}. If the play arrives at such a
vertex after visiting a vertex of the form v tγ ,q′ or v 1−tγ ,q′ exactly n > 0 times,
then player 1’s pure strategy σ1 prescribes to play to S1−tzero( j),q1 if the value
of counter j in configuration ρ(n − 1) is zero and to S1−tdec( j),q2 if the value of
counter j in configuration ρ(n − 1) is non-zero.
Any other player’s pure strategy is defined as follows: after a history end-
ing in Stγ ,q , the strategy prescribes to quit the game if and only if the history
is not compatiblewith ρ (i.e. if the corresponding sequence of instructions
does not match ρ).
Note that the resulting strategy profile σ is safe. Moreover, since player 0
and player 1 follow the computation ofM, a terminal vertex inside one of
the counter gadgets C tγ , j is reachedwith probability 1. Hence, player 0 wins
almost surely in σ. Finally, by the definition of σ, (4.1) holds, and we can
conclude from Lemma 4.11 that σ is stable.
We claim that σ is, in fact, a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v0): It is
obvious that player 0 cannot improve her payoff, even for histories where
she receives payoff < 1. If player 1 deviates, we reach a history that is not
compatiblewith ρ. Hence, player A01 or A02 will quit the game,which ensures
that player 1will receive payoff 0 after this history. Finally, since σ is stable,
none of the players Atj or Btj can improve her payoff after a history that is
consistent with σ. For all other histories, this follows immediately from the
definition of σ. For instance, if player A01 changes her strategy after such a
history and decides not to quit the game, then shewill still receive payoff 13 ,
because player A02 will still quit the game.
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Assume that σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0) inwhich player 0
wins almost surely. In order to apply Lemma 4.11,we first prove that σ is safe.
Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a history xv ending in
a vertex v ∈ Itq such that Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω) > 0 and σ1(xv) assigns probability > 0
to two distinct successor vertices. Hence, δ(q) = {(zero( j), q1), (dec( j), q2)} for
some j ∈ {1, 2} and q1 , q2 ∈ Q . By our assumption that there are no consecu-
tive zero tests and since player 0 wins almost surely,
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Prσv0 (player 1wins ∣ xv ⋅ v 1−tzero( j),q1 ⋅ Vω) ≥ 14 ,
but
Prσv0 (player 1wins ∣ xv ⋅ v 1−tdec( j),q2 ⋅ Vω) ≤ 16 .
Hence, player 1 could improve her payoff by playing to v 1−tzero( j),q1 with proba-
bility 1, a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium.
To apply Lemma 4.11 and obtain (4.1), it remains to be shown that σ is
stable. In order to derive a contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ {1, 2}
and n ∈ M such that either anj < 13 or anj > 13 (i.e. bnj < 16 ). In the former
case, player An mod 2j could improve her payoff by quitting the game after
history xnvn ,while in the latter case, player Bn mod 2j could improve her payoff
by quitting the game, again a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium.
From c0j = 1 and (4.1), it follows that each cnj is of the form cnj = 1/2i where
i ∈ M. We denote by inj the unique number i such that cnj = 1/2i and set
ρ(n) = (qn , in1 , in2 ) for each n ∈ M. We claim that ρ ∶= ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . is in fact the
computation ofM. In particular, this computation is infinite. It suffices to
verify the following two properties:
• ρ(0) = (q0 , 0, 0);
• ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n + 1) for all n ∈ M.
The first property is immediate. To prove the second property, let ρ(n) =(q, i1 , i2) and ρ(n + 1) = (q′ , i ′1 , i ′2). Hence, vn lies inside Stγ ,q , and vn+1 lies in-
side S1−tγ ′ ,q′ for suitable γ , γ ′ and t = n mod 2. We only prove the claim for
δ(q) = {(zero(1), q1), (dec(1), q2)}; the other cases are similar. Note that, by
the construction of the gadget Itq , it must be the case that either q′ = q1 and
γ ′ = zero(1), or q′ = q2 and γ ′ = dec(1). By (4.1), if γ ′ = zero(1), then i ′1 = i1 = 0 and
i ′2 = i2, and if γ ′ = dec(1), then i ′1 = i1 − 1 and i ′2 = i2 . This implies ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n + 1):
on the one hand, if i1 = 0, then i ′1 ≠ i1 − 1,which implies γ ′ ≠ dec(1) and thus
γ ′ = zero(1), q′ = q1 and i ′1 = i1 = 0; on the other hand, if i1 > 0, then γ ′ ≠ zero(1)
and thus γ ′ = dec(1), q′ = q2 and i ′1 = i1 − 1. □
Remark. For the problems PureNE and PureSPE, we can strengthen Theo-
rem 4.10 slightly by showing undecidability already for 9-player SSMGs.
This can be achieved bymerging player 0 and player 1 in the game described
in the proof of Theorem 4.10: if player 0 is a priori restricted to play a pure
strategy, she cannot cheat by playing to both Stzero( j),q1 and Stdec( j),q2 with
positive probability.
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The proof of Theorem 4.10 can also be viewed as a proof for the undecid-
ability of a problem about the logic PCTL (probabilistic computation tree logic),
introduced by Hansson & Jonsson (1994). PCTL is evaluated over labelled
Markov chains and replaces the universal and existential path quantifiers
of CTL by a family of probabilistic quantifiers P∼x ,where ∼ is a comparison
operator and x ∈ [0, 1] is a rational probability. For example, the formula
P=1/2FQ holds in state v if (and only if ) the probability of reaching a state
labelledwith Q from v equals 12 .
By employing a similar reduction to ours, Brázdil et al. (2006) proved the
undecidability of the following problem: given a labelled Markov decision
process (G , v0) and a PCTL formula φ, decide whether the controller has a
strategy σ such that the Markov chain (Gσ , v0) is amodel of φ. We can prove
a stronger result, namely that there exists a fixed PCTL formula φ,which only
contains the quantifiers P=xF and P=xG, for which the problem is undecidable.
It suffices to add propositions A01 , A11 , A02 , A12 , Q , Q 1 , Q 2 , T , Z0 and Z1 according
to the following rules:
1. if v is a terminal vertex that is winning for player A ∈ {A01 , A11 , A02 , A12},
then label v with A;
2. if v ∈ Itq , then label v with Q ;
3. if v = v tγ ,q for γ ≠ zero( j), then label v with Q 1; if v = v tzero( j),q , then label v
with Q 2;
4. if v is a terminal vertex that is winning for player 0, then label v with T;
5. if v = v0γ ,q , then label v with Z0; if v = v 1γ ,q , then label v with Z1.
To obtain anMDP,wemake all non-stochastic vertices controlled by player 0.
Finally, the PCTL formula for whichwe prove undecidability is
P=1F T ∧ ⋀
t=0,1P
=1G (Zt → P=1/3F At1 ∧P=1/3F At2)∧P=1G (Q → P=1FQ 1 ∨P=1FQ 2) .
The first part of the formula states that player 0 wins almost surely, the
second part requires the strategy to be stable, and the last part of the formula
requires the strategy to be safe.
An immediate corollary to this result is that there exists afixed formula of
stochastic game logic (Baier et al. 2007) for which themodel-checking problem
(with respect to pure or randomised strategies) is undecidable.
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4.4 Finite-state equilibria
We can use the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.10 to show that Nash
and subgame-perfect equilibriamay require infinitememory, even ifwe are
only interested inwhether a player wins with probability 0 or 1.
Proposition 4.12. There exists an SSMG that has a pure subgame-perfect
equilibriumwhere player 0 wins almost surely but that has no finite-state
Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins with positive probability.
Proof. Consider the game (G , v0) constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.10
for themachineMwith the single transition (q0 , inc(1), q0). Wemodify this
game by adding a new initial vertex v1,which is controlled by a new player,
player 2, and from where she can either move to v0 or to a new terminal
vertex where she receives payoff 1 and every other player receives payoff 0.
Additionally, player 2 wins at every terminal vertex of the game G that is
winning for player 0. Let us denote themodified game by G ′.
Since the computation of M is infinite, the game (G , v0) has a pure
subgame-perfect equilibriumwhere player 0 wins almost surely. This equi-
librium induces a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G ′ , v1)where both
player 0 and player 2 win almost surely.
Now assume that there exists a finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G ′ , v1)
where player 0 wins with positive probability. Such an equilibrium induces
a finite-state Nash equilibrium σ of (G , v0) where player 2, and thus also
player 0, wins almost surely: otherwise, player 2 would prefer to quit the
game. Using the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 4.10, it follows
from Lemma 4.11 that cn1 = 1/2n for each n ∈ M. But this is impossible if σ is a
finite-state strategy profile. □
Propositions 3.26 and 4.12 (together with Example 3.4) imply that the
decision problems NE, SPE, FinNE, FinSPE, PureNE, PureSPE, PureFinNE
and PureFinSPE are pairwise distinct. Another way to see that PureNE and
PureFinNE are distinct is to observe that PureFinNE is recursively enumer-
able: to decide whether an SMG (G , v0) has a pure finite-state Nash equi-
librium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y, one can just enumerate all possible pure
finite-state profiles σ and check for each of themwhether it constitutes a
Nash equilibriumwith the desired properties by analysing the finite Markov
chain Gσ and the finite MDPs Gσ−i . Hence, to prove that PureFinNE is unde-
cidable,we cannot reduce from the non-halting problem. Instead,we reduce
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Itq for δ(q) = ∅:
C1−thalt,1
C1−thalt,2
0, A1−t1 , A1−t2 0, At1 , At2 ,B1−t1 , B1−t2
0, Bt1 , Bt2 ,
A1−t1 , A1−t2
1
2
1
4
1
4
2
3
1
3
C tγ , j for γ = halt:
0
0, A1−tj
0, B1−tj
0, B1−tj
Figure 4.4. Reducing from the halting problem.
from the halting problem (which is recursively enumerable itself ). The same
reduction proves that PureFinSPE, FinNE and FinSPE are undecidable.
Theorem4.13. PureFinNE, PureFinSPE, FinNE and FinSPE are undecidable,
even for 14-player SSMGs.
Proof (Sketch). The construction is similar to the one for proving the unde-
cidability of NE. Given a two-counter machineM,wemodify the SSMG G
constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.10 by adding another counter (to-
gether with four more players for checkingwhether the counter is updated
correctly) that has to be incremented in each step. Moreover, the gadget Iγ ,q
for δ(q) = ∅ is replaced by the gadget shown in Figure 4.4, and a new instruc-
tion halt is added, together with a suitable gadget C thalt, j , also depicted in
Figure 4.4. Let us denote the new game by G ′. Now, ifM does not halt, any
Nash equilibrium of (G ′ , v0) where player 0 wins with probability 1 needs
infinite memory: to win almost surely, player 0 must follow the compu-
tation ofM and increment the new counter at each step, which requires
infinitememory. On the other hand, ifM halts, there exists a pure finite-
state subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G ′ , v0) inwhich player 0 wins almost
surely. (The arguments for the existence of such an equilibrium are the
same as in the proof of Theorem 4.10; sinceM halts, the equilibrium can be
implementedwith finitememory). □
Remark. With the same reasoning as for PureNE and PureSPE,we can elim-
inate one player in the reductions for PureFinNE and PureFinSPE. Hence,
these problems are already undecidable for 13-player SSMGs.
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Table 4.1. The complexity of NE, SPE and their relatives.
Pure Randomised
Stationary NP-complete PspaceNP-hard +SqrtSum-hard
Finite-state undecidable (r.e.) undecidable
General undecidable (not r.e.) undecidable (not r.e.)
4.5 Summary of results
Table 4.1 summarises our findings on the complexity of NE, SPE and their
relatives. The rows of the table correspond to the restrictions of strategies
with respect to memory,whereas the columns of the table indicatewhether
randomisation is allowed ornot. The complexity bounds shownhold for both
Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria in SSMGs as well as SMGs with Streett,
Rabin or Muller objectives. Moreover, each lower bound holds already for
the qualitative fragment of the respective decision problem.
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Decidable Fragments
This chapter is devoted to proving decidability results for fragments of NE.
Thefirst fragment,whichwe call the strictly qualitative fragment, arises fromNE
by restricting the thresholds to be the same binary payoff (i.e. each entry is
either 0 or 1). For the second fragment,whichwe call the positive-one fragment,
we require that the upper threshold is trivial and the that lower threshold
is of the form (p, 1, . . . , 1), where p ∈ [0, 1] is an arbitrary rational number.
Hence, the strictly qualitative fragment asks for an equilibriumwith a binary
payoff x, whereas the positive-one fragment asks for an equilibrium that
is almost surely winning for all but one player and that is winning for the
remaining player with probability ≥ p. Finally,we show that the qualitative
fragment of NE (and thereby PureNE) is decidable for deterministic games.
As in the previous chapter, all games in this chapter are finite.
5.1 The strictly qualitative fragment
In this section,we prove that the problem StrQualNE is decidable. Formally,
StrQualNE is the following decision problem:
Given a finite SMG (G , v0) and x ∈ {0, 1}Π, decidewhether there exists
a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff x.
To prove decidability,we first characterise the existence of a Nash equilib-
riumwith a binary payoff in games with prefix-independent objectives.
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Characterisation of existence
Given an SMG G and a player i,we denote by Wi the set of all vertices v ∈ V
with valGi (v) > 0.
Proposition 5.1. Let (G , v0) be a finite SMGwith prefix-independent objec-
tives Wini ⊆ Vω, and let x = (xi)i∈Π ∈ {0, 1}Π. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
1. (G , v0) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff x;
2. there exists a strategy profile σ of (G , v0)with payoff x such that
Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0;
3. there exists a pure strategy profile σ of (G , v0)with payoff x such that
Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0;
4. (G , v0) has a pure Nash equilibriumwith payoff x.
If additionally all objectives are ω-regular, then each of the above statements
is equivalent to each of the following statements:
5. there exists a pure finite-state strategy profile σ of (G , v0)with payoff x
such that Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0;
6. (G , v0) has a pure finite-state Nash equilibriumwith payoff x.
Proof. (1.⇒ 2.) Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff x. We claim
that σ is already the strategy profilewe are looking for: Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0
for each player i with xi = 0. Let i ∈ Π be a player with xi = 0. By Lemma 3.3
and since Wini is prefix-independent, we have 0 = Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≥
valGi (v) for all histories xv that are consistent with σ. Hence, v ∈ V /Wi for
all such histories xv , and Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0.
(2.⇒ 3.) Let σ be a strategy profile of (G , v0) with payoff x such that
Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0. Consider the MDPM
that is obtained from G by removing all vertices v ∈ V such that v ∈ Wi for
some player i with xi = 0,merging all players into one, and imposing the
objective
Win = ⋂
i∈Πx i=1
Wini ∩ ⋂
i∈Πx i=0
Vω /Wini .
The MDP M is well-defined since its domain is a subarena of G. More-
over, the value valM(v0) of M from v0 equals 1 because the strategy pro-
file σ induces a strategy σ inM satisfying Prσv0 (Win) = 1. Since each of the
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objectives Wini is prefix-independent, so is the objective Win. Hence, by
Theorem 2.6, (M, v0) admits an optimal pure strategy τ. Since valM(v0) = 1,
we have Prτv0 (Win) = 1, and τ induces a pure strategy profile of (G , v0)with
the desired properties.
(3.⇒4.) Let σ be a pure strategy profile of (G , v0)with payoff x such that
Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0. We show that the require-
ments of Lemma 3.7 are fulfilled: Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅Vω) ≥ valGi (v) for each player i
and each history xv of (G , v0) that is consistent with σ. There are two cases:
If x1 = 1, then Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) = 1 for all histories xv consistent with σ,
and the inequality holds. Otherwise, xi = 0 and Prσv0 (Reach(Wi)) = 0. Hence,
valGi (v) = 0 for all histories xv consistent with σ, and the inequality holds
as well. Now, by Lemma 3.7, we can extend σ to a pure Nash equilibrium
with payoff x.
(4.⇒ 1.) Trivial.
Under the additional assumption that all objectives are ω-regular, the im-
plications (2.⇒ 5.) and (5.⇒6.) are proven analogously (using Lemma 3.8
instead of Lemma 3.7); the implication (6.⇒ 1.) is trivial. □
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 5.1,we can conclude that
pure finite-state strategies are as powerful as arbitrary randomised strate-
gies as far as the existence of a Nash equilibriawith binary payoffs in finite
SMGs with ω-regular objectives is concerned.
Corollary 5.2. Let (G , v0) be a finite SMGwith ω-regular objectives, and let
x ∈ {0, 1}Π. There exists a Nash equilibriumof (G , v0)with payoff x if and only
if there exists a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff x.
Proof. The claim follows from Proposition 5.1 and the fact that every SMG
with ω-regular objectives can be reduced to onewith parity objectives. □
Computational complexity
We can now describe an algorithm that decides StrQualNE for SMGs with
Muller objectives. The algorithm relies on Proposition 5.1,which allows us
to reduce StrQualNE to anMDP problem.
Formally, given a Muller SMG G = (Π, V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ , (Fi)i∈Π) and a binary
payoff x = (xi)i∈Π ,we define the Markov decision process G(x) as follows: Let
Z ⊆ V be the set of all vertices v such that valGi (v) = 0 for each player i with
xi = 0; the set of vertices of G(x) is precisely the set Z,with the set of vertices
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controlled by player 0 being Z0 ∶= ⋃i∈Π(Vi ∩ Z); if Z = ∅,we define G(x) to be
a trivial MDP with the empty set as its objective. The transition relation
of G(x) is the restriction of ∆ to transitions between Z-states. Note that the
transition relation of G(x) is well-defined since Z is a subarena of G. Finally,
the single objective in G(x) is Reach(T)where T ⊆ Z is the union of all end
components U ⊆ Z with payoff x.
Lemma 5.3. Let (G , v0) be a finiteMuller SMG, and let x ∈ {0, 1}Π. Then (G , v0)
has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff x if and only if valG(x)(v0) = 1.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that (G , v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff x. By
Proposition 5.1, there exists a strategy profile σ of (G , v0) with payoff x
such that Prσv0 (Reach(V / Z)) = 0. We claim that Prσv0 (Reach(T)) = 1. Oth-
erwise, by Lemma 2.3, therewould exist an end component U ⊆ Z such that
Prσv0 ({π ∈ Vω ∶ Inf(π) = U}) > 0, and U is either not winning for some player i
with xi = 1 or it is winning for some player i with xi = 0. But then σ cannot
have payoff x, a contradiction. Now, since Prσv0 (Reach(V /Z)) = 0, the strategy
profile σ induces a strategy σ in G(x) such that Prσv0 (X) = Prσv0 (X) for every
Borel set X ⊆ Zω. In particular, Prσv0 (Reach(T)) = 1 and hence valG(x)(v0) = 1.(⇐) Assume that valG(x)(v0) = 1 (in particular, v0 ∈ Z), and let σ be an
optimal strategy in (G(x), v0). From σ, using Lemma 2.4, we can devise
a strategy σ ′ such that Prσ ′v0 ({π ∈ Vω ∶ Inf(π) has payoff x}) = 1. Finally,
σ ′ can be extended to a strategy profile σ of (G , v0) with payoff x such that
Prσv0 (Reach(V / Z)) = 0. By Proposition 5.1, this implies that (G , v0) has a Nash
equilibriumwith payoff x. □
Since the values of anMDPwith a reachability objective can be computed
in polynomial time, the difficult part lies in computing the MDP G(x) fromG and x (i.e. its domain Z and the target set T). For Muller SMGs, polynomial
space suffices to achieve this. In fact, StrQualNE is Pspace-complete for
these games.
Theorem 5.4. StrQualNE is Pspace-complete for Muller SMGs.
Proof. Hardness follows from Theorem 2.18. To provemembership in Pspace,
we describe a polynomial-space algorithm for deciding StrQualNE onMuller
SMGs: On input G , v0 , x, the algorithm starts by computing for each player i
with xi = 0 the set of vertices v such that valGi (v) = 0, which can be done
in polynomial space by Theorem 2.17. The intersection of these sets is the
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domain Z of the Markov decision process G(x). If v0 is not contained in this
intersection, the algorithm immediately rejects. Otherwise, the algorithm
determines the union T of all end components with payoff x contained
in Z by enumerating all subsets of Z, one at a time, and checking which
ones are end components with payoff x. Finally, the algorithm computes
(in polynomial time) the value valG(x)(v0) of theMDP G(x) from v0 and accepts
if this value is 1. In all other cases, the algorithm rejects. The correctness of
the algorithm follows immediately from Lemma 5.3. □
For games with Streett objectives, StrQualNE becomes NP-complete; we
start by proving the upper bound.
Theorem 5.5. StrQualNE is in NP for Streett SMGs.
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm for solv-
ing StrQualNE: On input G , v0 , x, the algorithm starts by guessing a sub-
arena Z′ ⊆ V and for each player i with xi = 0 a positional strategy τi of
the coalition Π / {i} in the coalition game Gi . In the next step, the algo-
rithm checks (in polynomial time) whether valτ i (v) = 1 for each vertex v ∈ Z′
and each player i with xi = 0. If not, the algorithm rejects immediately.
Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds by guessing (at most) n ∶= ∣V ∣ subsets
U1 , . . . ,Un ⊆ Z′ and checks whether they are end components with pay-
off x (which can be done in polynomial time). If yes, the algorithm sets
T ′ ∶= ⋃nj=1 U j and computes (in polynomial time) the value valG(x)(v0) of the
MDP G(x) from v0 with Z′ substituted for Z and T ′ substituted for T . If this
value equals 1, the algorithm accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
It remains to be shown that the algorithm is correct: On the one hand,
if (G , v0) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff x, then the run of the algorithm
where it guesses Z′ = Z, globally optimal positional strategies τi (which exist
by Theorem 2.11) and end components Ui such that T ′ = T will be accept-
ing since then, by Lemma 5.3, valG(x)(v0) = 1. On the other hand, in any
accepting run of the algorithmwe have Z′ ⊆ Z and T ′ ⊆ T , and the computed
value cannot be higher than valG(x)(v0); hence, valG(x)(v0) = 1, and Lemma 5.3
guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibriumwith payoff x. □
Thematching lower bound does not only hold for StrQualNE, but also
for the analogous problem for subgame-perfect equilibria, which we de-
note by StrQualSPE. Moreover, both these problems are NP-hard even for
deterministic two-player Streett games.
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Figure 5.1. Reducing SAT to StrQualNE for games with Streett objectives.
Theorem 5.6. StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are NP-hard for deterministic
two-player Streett games.
Proof. The proof is accomplished by a variant of the proof for NP-hardness
of the qualitative decision problem for deterministic two-player zero-sum
Rabin-Streett games (Emerson & Jutla 1999) and by a reduction from SAT.
Given a Boolean formula φ = C1 ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ Cm in conjunctive normal form,where
without loss of generality each clause is nonempty,we construct a determin-
istic two-player Streett game G as follows: For each clause C, the game G has
a vertex C,which is controlled by player 0, and for each literal L occurring
in φ, there is a vertex L,which is controlled by player 1. There are edges from
a clause to each literal that occurs in this clause, and from a literal to each
clause occurring in φ. The structure of the game is depicted in Figure 5.1.
Player 0’s objective is given by the single Streett pair (∅, V ), i.e. she wins
every play of the game, whereas player 1’s objective consists of all Streett
pairs of the form ({X}, {¬X}) or ({¬X}, {X}), i.e. shewins if, for each variable X,
either X and ¬X are both visited infinitely often or neither of them is.
Clearly, G can be constructed from φ in polynomial time. We claim that
the following statements are equivalent:
1. φ is satisfiable;
2. (G , C1) has a subgame-perfect equilibriumwith payoff (1, 0);
3. (G , C1) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff (1, 0).
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that φ is satisfiable, and consider the following positional
strategy σ0 of player 0: whenever the play reaches a clause, then σ0 plays to
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a literal that is mapped to true by the satisfying assignment. This strategy
ensures that, for each variable X and after any initial history, at most one of
the literals X or ¬X is visited infinitely often. Hence, (σ0 , σ1) is a subgame-
perfect equilibriumof (G , C1)with payoff (1, 0) for every strategy σ1 of player 1.
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Let (σ0 , σ1) be a Nash equilibrium of (G , C1)with payoff (1, 0), and
assume that φ is not satisfiable. Consider the two-player zero-sum Rabin-
Streett game G̃,which is derived from G by setting player 0’s objective to the
complement of player 1’s objective. We claim that player 1 has a winning
strategy in (G̃ , C1),which she could use to improve her payoff in (G , C1), a con-
tradiction to (σ0 , σ1) being a Nash equilibrium. By determinacy,we only need
to show that player 0 does not have awinning strategy. Let τ be an optimal
positional strategy of player 0 in (G̃ , C1) (which exists by Theorem 2.11). Since
φ is unsatisfiable, theremust exist a variable X and clauses C and C ′ such
that τ(C) = X and τ(C ′) = ¬X. But player 1 can counter this strategy by playing
from X to C ′ and from any other literal to C. Hence, τ is not winning. □
For games with Rabin objectives, the situation is more delicate. One
might think that, because of the duality of Rabin and Streett objectives,
StrQualNE is in coNP for SMGs with Rabin objectives.¹ However, as wewill
see later, this is rather unlikely, and we can only show that the problem
lies in the class PNP[log] of problems solvable by a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm that may perform a logarithmic number of queries to an
NP oracle (see Appendix A). In fact, the same upper bound holds for games
with a Streett or a Rabin objective for each player.
Theorem 5.7. StrQualNE is in PNP[log] for Streett-Rabin SMGs.
Proof. Let us describe a polynomial-time algorithm performing a logarith-
mic number of queries to an NP oracle for the problem. On input G , v0 , x,
the algorithm starts by determining for each vertex v and each Rabin player i
with xi = 0 whether valGi (v) = 0. Naively implemented, this requires a super-
logarithmicnumber of queries to the oracle. To reduce thenumber of queries,
we use a neat trick, due toHemachandra (1989). Let us denote by R and S the
set of players i ∈ Π with xi = 0 who have a Rabin, respectively a Streett objec-
tive. Instead of looping through all pairs of a vertex and a player,we start by
determining the number r of all pairs (v , i) such that i ∈ R and valGi (v) = 0.
¹ In fact, Ummels &Wojtczak (2009b) claimed that the problem is in coNP.
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It is not difficult to see that this number can be computed using binary
search by performing only a logarithmic number of queries to an NP oracle,
which we can use for deciding whether valGi (v) > 0 (Corollary 2.16). Then
we perform onemore query; we askwhether for each player i ∈ R ∪ S there
exists a set Z i ⊆ V as well as sets U1 , . . . ,U∣V ∣ ⊆ V and positional strategies(σi)i∈R and (τi)i∈S ,where σi is a strategy of player i and τi is a strategy of the
coalition Π / {i} in the coalition game Gi ,with the following properties:
1. Z ∶= ⋂i∈R∪S Z i is a subarena of G with v0 ∈ Z, and ∑i∈R ∣Z i ∣ = r;
2. valσ i (v) > 0 for each player i ∈ R and each v ∈ V / Z i ;
3. valτ i (v) = 1 for each player i ∈ S and each v ∈ Z i ;
4. each U j is an end component of G ↾ Z with payoff x;
5. the value from v0 of the MDP that is obtained from G by restricting to ver-
tices inside Z and imposing the objective Reach(⋃{U1 , . . . ,U∣V ∣}) equals 1.
This query can be decided by an NP oracle by guessing suitable sets and
strategies and verifying 1.–5. in polynomial time. If the answer to the query
is yes, the algorithm accepts; otherwise it rejects.
Obviously, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. To see that the algo-
rithm is correct, first note that for each player i ∈ R the set Z i does not only
include all v ∈ V such that valGi (v) = 0, but also excludes all other vertices.
Otherwise, therewould exist a vertex v ∈ Z i with valGi (v) > 0. But then the
number of pairs (v , i)with i ∈ R and valGi (v) = 0 would be strictly less than r ,
a contradiction. Now, the correctness of the algorithm follows with the same
reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5.5. □
Remark. For a bounded number of players, StrQualNE is in coNP for SMGs
with Rabin objectives.
Regarding lower bounds for StrQualNE in SMGs with Rabin objectives,
we start by proving that the problem is coNP-hard, even for deterministic
two-player games. Moreover, the same lower bound holds for StrQualSPE,
the corresponding problem for subgame-perfect equilibria. In particular,
unless NP = coNP, both StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are not in NP for SMGs
with Rabin objectives.
Theorem 5.8. StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are coNP-hard for deterministic
two-player Rabin games.
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.6 and is accomplished
by a reduction from the unsatisfiability problem for Boolean formulae in
conjunctivenormal form. Given a Boolean formula φ = C1∧⋅ ⋅ ⋅∧Cm in conjunc-
tive normal form,wherewithout loss of generality each clause is nonempty,
we construct a deterministic two-player Rabin game G as follows. The arena
of G is the same as in the proof of Theorem 5.6, depicted in Figure 5.1. How-
ever, this time player 1wins every play of the game, and player 0’s objective
consists of all Rabin pairs of the form ({X}, {¬X}) or ({¬X}, {X}).
Clearly, G can be constructed from φ in polynomial time. We claim that
the following statements are equivalent:
1. φ is unsatisfiable;
2. (G , C1) has a subgame-perfect equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1);
3. (G , C1) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1).
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that φ is unsatisfiable, and consider the two-player zero-
sum Rabin-Streett game G̃, which is derived from G by setting player 1’s
objective to the complement of player 0’s objective. By Theorem 3.15, the
game (G̃ , C1) has a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (σ0 , σ1). We claim that
σ1[x] is winning in (G̃ , v) for every history xv of (G , C1). Consequently, (σ0 , σ1)
is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , C1)with payoff (0, 1). Otherwise,
player 0 would have a positionalwinning strategy in (G̃ , v). But a positional
strategy τ of player 0 picks for each clause a literal contained in this clause.
Since φ is unsatisfiable, theremust exist a variable X and clauses C and C ′
such that τ(C) = X and τ(C ′) = ¬X. Player 1 could counter this strategy by
playing from X to C ′ and from any other literal to C, a contradiction.
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Let (σ0 , σ1) be a Nash equilibrium of (G , C1)with payoff (0, 1), and
assume that φ is satisfiable. Consider the following positional strategy τ of
player 0: whenever the play reaches a clause, then τ plays to a literal that
is mapped to true by the satisfying assignment. This strategy ensures that
for each variable X at most one of the literals X or ¬X is visited infinitely
often. Since the construction of G ensures that, under any strategy profile,
at least one literal is visited infinitely often, τ ensures a winning play for
player 0. Hence, player 0 can improve her payoff by playing τ instead of σ0,
a contradiction to the fact that (σ0 , σ1) is a Nash equilibrium. □
The next result shows that StrQualNE is not only coNP-hard for Rabin
games, but also NP-hard. In fact, it is even NP-hard to decide whether in
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Figure 5.2. Reducing SAT to deciding the existence of a play winning for all players in
a deterministic Rabin game.
a deterministic Rabin game there exists a play that fulfils the objective of
each player.
Proposition 5.9. Theproblemofdeciding, given a deterministicRabin game,
whether there exists a play that is won by each player is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce from SAT: given a Boolean formula φ = C1 ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ Cm in con-
junctive normal form over propositional variables X1 , . . . , Xn ,wherewithout
loss of generality each clause is nonempty, we show how to construct in
polynomial time a deterministic (n + 1)-player Rabin game G such that φ is
satisfiable if and only if there exists a play of G that is won by each player.
The game has vertices C1 , . . . , Cm and, for each clause C and each literal L
that occurs in C, a vertex (C , L). All vertices are controlled by player 0. There
are edges from a clause C j to each vertex (C j , L) such that L occurs in C j
and from there to C( j mod m)+1. The arena of G is schematically depicted in
Figure 5.2. The Rabin objectives are defined as follows:
• player 0 wins every play of G;
• player i ≠ 0 wins if each vertex of the form (C , X i) is visited only finitely
often or each vertex of the form (C ,¬X i) is visited only finitely often.
Clearly, G can be constructed from φ in polynomial time. To establish the
reduction,we need to show that φ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a
play of G that is won by each player.
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(⇒) Assume that α∶ {X1 , . . . , Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying assignment
of φ. Clearly, the positional strategy of player 0 where from each clause C
she plays to a fixed vertex (C , L) such that L is mapped to true by α induces a
play that is won by each player.(⇐) Assume that there exists a play π of G that is won by each player.
Obviously, it is not possible that both a vertex (C , X i) and a vertex (C ′ ,¬X i)
are visited infinitely often in π since this would violate player i’s objective.
Consider the variable assignment that maps X to true if some vertex (C , X) is
visited infinitely often in π. This assignment satisfies the formula because,
by the construction of G, for each clause C there exists a literal L in C such
that the vertex (C , L) is visited infinitely often in π. □
It follows from Theorem 5.8 and Proposition 5.9 that, unless NP = coNP,
both StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are not contained in NP ∪ coNP, even for
deterministic Rabin games. A slightly stronger result is that these problems
are hard for the class DP (see Appendix A).
Theorem 5.10. StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are DP-hard for deterministic
Rabin games.
Proof. Let us focus on StrQualNE; the proof for StrQualSPE is similar.
The proof proceeds by a reduction from SAT-UNSAT: we show how to con-
struct in polynomial time from a pair (φ, ψ) of Boolean formulae in conjunc-
tive normal form a game (G , v0) such that φ is satisfiable and ψ is not if and
only if (G , v0) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1).
By Proposition 5.9,we know that from φ we can construct in polynomial
time a deterministic Rabin game (G1 , v1) such that φ is satisfiable if and only
if there exists a play of (G1 , v1) that is won by each player. Moreover, by (the
proof of ) Theorem 5.6,we know that from ψ we can construct in polynomial
time a two-player deterministic Rabin game (G2 , v2) such that every play
of G2 is won by player 1, and ψ is unsatisfiable if and only if (G2 , v2) has a Nash
equilibrium with payoff (0, 1). Assume that G1 is played by players 1, . . . , n
and that G2 is played by players 0 and 1. The game G is the disjoint union
of G1 and G2 combined with a new vertex v0, controlled by player 0, with
transitions to v1 and v2 . All plays that go through v1 or v2 are lost by player 0,
respectively players 2, . . . , n. We claim that φ is satisfiable and ψ is not if and
only if (G , v0) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1).
(⇒) Assume that φ is satisfiable and ψ is not. Hence, there exists a strategy
profile (σ1 , . . . , σn) of (G1 , v1) where all players win and a Nash equilibrium
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(τ0 , τ1) of (G2 , v2)with payoff (0, 1). Define a strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗0 , . . . , σ∗n )
of (G , v0) by setting σ∗i [v0] = σi for i ≥ 1, σ∗i [v0] = τi for i ≤ 1 and σ∗0(v1 ∣ v0) = 1.
Clearly, σ∗ has payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1). Moreover, σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium because(σ1 , . . . , σn) and (τ0 , τ1) are Nash equilibriawith suitable payoffs. In particular,
player 0 cannot improve her payoff of 0 by playing to v2 since (τ0 , τ1) is a
Nash equilibrium of (G2 , v2)where player 0 receives payoff 0.
(⇐)Assume that σ = (σ0 , . . . , σn) is aNash equilibriumof (G , v0)with payoff(0, 1, . . . , 1). Since all players 1, . . . , n win,wemust have σ0(v1 ∣ v0) = 1. Hence,
σ induces a Nash equilibrium of (G1 , v1)with payoff (1, . . . , 1) and, by the con-
struction of G1, the formula φ is satisfiable. Why is ψ unsatisfiable? Assume
the opposite. Then, by the construction of G2, there exists a strategy τ for
player 0 such that (τ, σ1[v0]) gives payoff > 0 to player 0 in (G2 , v2). But then
player 0 could improve her payoff in (G , v0) by playing from v0 to v2 and
applying strategy τ afterwards, a contradiction. □
For stochastic Rabin games,we can show a completeness result: for these
games, StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are also hard for PNP[log].
Theorem 5.11. StrQualNE and StrQualSPE are PNP[log]-hard for Rabin SMGs.
Proof. Let us focus on StrQualNE; the proof for StrQualSPE is completely
analogous. Wagner (1990) and, independently, Buss&Hay (1991) showed that
PNP[log] equals the closure of NPwith respect to polynomial-time Boolean formula
reducibility. The canonical complete problem for this class is to decide, given
a Boolean combination α of statements of the form “φ is satisfiable”,where
φ ranges over all Boolean formulae,whether α evaluates to true. We claim
that for every such statement α we can construct in polynomial time a
Rabin SMG (G , v0) such that α evaluates to true if and only if (G , v0) has
a Nash equilibrium with payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1). The game G is constructed by
induction on the complexity of α; without loss of generality,we assume that
negations are only applied to atoms. If α is of the form “φ is satisfiable” or
“φ is not satisfiable”, then the existence of a suitable game G follows from
Proposition 5.9 or Theorem 5.8, respectively.
Now, let α = α1∧α2 , and assume that we already have constructed suitable
games (G1 , v1) and (G2 , v2), played by the same players 0, 1, . . . , n. The game G
is the disjoint union ofG1 andG2 combinedwith onenew stochastic vertex v0 .
From v0 , the gamemoveswith probability 12 each to v1 or v2 . Obviously, (G , v0)
has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1) if and only if both (G1 , v1) and(G2 , v2) have such an equilibrium.
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Algorithm 5.1. Finding end components in parity SMGs.
Input: parity SMG G = (Π, V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ , (Ωi)i∈Π), x = (xi)i∈Π ∈ {0, 1}Π
Output: ⋃{U ⊆ V ∶ U is an end component of G with payoff x}
output FindEC(V )
procedure FindEC(X)
Z ∶= ∅
compute all end components of G maximal in X
for each such end component U do
P ∶= {i ∈ Π ∶minΩi(χ(U)) ≡ xi mod 2}
if P = ∅ then
(∗ U is an end component with payoff x ∗)
Z ∶= Z ∪ U
else
(∗ U has thewrong payoff ∗)
Y ∶= ⋂i∈P{v ∈ U ∶ Ωi(χ(v)) >minΩi(χ(U))}
Z ∶= Z ∪ FindEC(Y)
end if
end for
return Z
end procedure
Finally, let α = α1 ∨ α2 , and assume that we already have constructed suit-
able games (G1 , v1) and (G2 , v2), again played by the same players 0, 1, . . . , n.
As in the previous case, the game G is the disjoint union of G1 and G2 com-
binedwith one new vertex v0 ,which has transitions to both v1 and v2 . How-
ever, this time v0 is controlled by player 1. Obviously, (G , v0) has a Nash
equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1) if and only if at least one of the games(G1 , v1) and (G2 , v2) has such an equilibrium. □
To solve StrQualNE for parity SMGs,we employ Algorithm 5.1,which com-
putes for a game G with priority functions (Ωi)i∈Π and x ∈ {0, 1}Π the union
of all end components with payoff x. The algorithm is a straightforward
adaptation of the algorithm for computing the union of all accepting end
components in a Streett MDP (Chatterjee et al. 2005). At the heart of the
algorithm lies the procedure FindEC that returns on input X ⊆ V the union
of all end components with payoff x that are contained in X. The procedure
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starts by computing all end components maximal in X. If such an end com-
ponent U has payoff x, all vertices in U can be added to the result of the
procedure. Otherwise, there exists a player i such that either xi = 0 and the
least priority for player i in U is odd or xi = 1 and the least priority for player i
in U is even. Each end component with payoff x inside U must exclude all
vertices with this least priority. Hence,we call the procedure recursively on
the subset of U that results from removing these vertices.
Note that on input X, the total number of recursive calls to the procedure
FindEC is bounded by ∣X ∣. Since, additionally, the set of all end components
maximal in a set X can be computed in polynomial time (see Appendix B),
this proves that Algorithm 5.1 runs in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.12. StrQualNE is in UP ∩ coUP for parity SMGs.
Proof. An unambiguous nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm that
decides StrQualNE for parity SMGs works as follows: On input G , v0 , x, the al-
gorithm starts by guessing, for each player iwith xi = 0, the set Z i of vertices v
with valGi (v) = 0. Then, for each v ∈ V , the guess whether v ∈ Z i or v ∉ Z i is
verified by running the UP algorithm for the respective problem. If some
guess was not correct, the algorithm rejects immediately. Otherwise, it con-
structs the subarena Z ∶= ⋂i∈Π∶x i=0 Z i and uses Algorithm 5.1 to determine the
union T of all end components with payoff x. If v0 ∉ Z, the algorithm rejects
immediately. Otherwise, it computes in polynomial time the value valG(x)(v0)
of the MDP G(x) from v0 . If this value equals 1, the algorithm accepts; other-
wise, it rejects. Analogously, an algorithm for the complement of StrQualNE
accepts if and only if v0 ∉ Z or valG(x)(v0) < 1.
Obviously, both algorithms run in polynomial time. Moreover, on each
input there exists at most one accepting run because the algorithms only ac-
cept if each of the sets Z i has been guessed correctly. Finally, the correctness
of both algorithms follows from Lemma 5.3. □
Recall from Section 2.5 that it is an open questionwhether the qualita-
tive decision problem for parity S2Gs admits a polynomial-time algorithm.
Such an algorithm would allow us compute the domain of the MDP G(x)
efficiently, which would imply that StrQualNE is in P for parity SMGs. In
fact, given a class C of parity S2Gs for which the qualitative decision problem
is in P,we can easily derive a class of parity SMGs for which StrQualNE is in
P. As in Section 3.4, denote by C∗ the class of all parity SMGs such that for
each player i the coalition game Gi is in C.
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Theorem 5.13. Let C be a class of finite parity S2Gs such that the qualitative
decision problem is decidable in P for games in C. Then StrQualNE is in P
for games in C∗.
Proof. Consider the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 5.12. For each
player i, the set Z i can be computed in polynomial time if Gi ∈ C, and there
is no need to guess this set. The resulting deterministic algorithm still runs
in polynomial time. □
By Theorem 2.20, for each d ∈ M,we can decide the qualitative decision
problem for parity S2Gs with at most d priorities in polynomial time. Hence,
it follows from Theorem 5.13 that StrQualNE is decidable in polynomial time
for parity SMGs with at most d priorities. In particular, StrQualNE is in P for
(co-)Büchi SMGs.
Corollary 5.14. For each d ∈ M, StrQualNE is in P for parity SMGs with at
most d priorities.
5.2 The positive-one fragment
In this section,we prove the decidability of the problem OneNE. Formally,
OneNE is the following decision problem:
Given a finite SMG (G , v0) and p ∈ [0, 1], decide whether (G , v0) has a
Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (p, 1, . . . , 1).
Being more general than the qualitative decision problem, OneNE is Pspace-
hard for Muller SMGs. In order to put the problem into Pspace,we describe
a polynomial-space algorithm that, given a Muller SMG G and p ∈ [0, 1],
computes the set of vertices v such that (G , v) has a Nash equilibriumwith
payoff ≥ (p, 1, . . . , 1).
Algorithm 5.2 is a variant of the classical algorithm for computing in a
Markov decision process the set of states fromwhere the optimal probability
of reaching a certain set of target states equals 1 (see Baier & Katoen 2008,
Chapter 10). The general idea of the algorithm is to find a subarena inwhich
the players can ensure to visit an end component with payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1)
or (1, 1, . . . , 1) with probability 1; let us call such an end component good.
Additionally, at every vertex v in this subarena the optimal probability of
reaching an end component with payoff (1, 1, . . . , 1)must be at least as high
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Algorithm 5.2. Solving OneNE for Muller SMGs.
Input:Muller SMG G = (Π, V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ , (Fi)i∈Π), p ∈ [0, 1]
Output: {v ∈ V ∶ (G , v) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (p, 1 . . . , 1)}
compute zv ∶= valG0 (v) for each v ∈ V
X ∶= V
repeat
X ′ ∶= X
(∗ identify good end components ∗)
S ∶= ⋃{U ⊆ X ∶ U is an end component of G ↾ X with payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1)}
T ∶= ⋃{U ⊆ X ∶ U is an end component of G ↾ X with payoff (1, 1, . . . , 1)}
compute pv ∶= supσ Prσv (Reach(T)) in G ↾ X for each v ∈ X
X ∶= {v ∈ X ∶ S ∪ T reachable from v inside G ↾ X} ∩ {v ∈ X ∶ zv ≤ pv }
(∗ compute the largest subarena contained in X ∗)
repeat
X ′′ ∶= X
X ∶= {v ∈ X ∶ v∆ ∩ X ≠ ∅} ∩ {v ∈ X ∶ v ∈ ⋃i∈Π Vi or v∆ ⊆ X}
until X = X ′′
until X = X ′ or X = ∅
(∗ S ∪ T reachable from all vertices in G ↾ X, and valG0 (v) ≤ pv for all v ∈ X ∗)
output {v ∈ X ∶ p ≤ pv }
as the value valG0 (v); otherwise player 0would prefer switching to an optimal
strategy at vertex v . Such a subarena can be found by an iterative process;
in every iteration, the algorithm computes (inside the current subarena) the
union of all good end components and the optimal probability of reaching
an end component where all players win. All vertices fromwhere a good end
component is not reachable or where the latter probability is strictly less
than valG0 (v) are then removed from the current subarena. If the resulting
set X of vertices still forms a subarena,we can output all vertices fromwhere
the optimal probability of reaching an end component where all players
win is at least p; otherwisewe have to continue the process with the largest
subarena contained in X.
Theorem 5.15. OneNE is Pspace-complete for Muller SMGs.
Proof. Hardness follows from Theorem 2.18. To provemembership in Pspace,
we show that Algorithm 5.2 is a polynomial-space algorithm that solves
114
5.2 The positive-one fragment
OneNE for Muller SMGs. First, for each vertex v , its value for player 0 can be
computed in polynomial space sincewe are dealingwithMuller objectives.
Second, the sets S and T can be determined by enumerating all possible
subsets, one at a time, and checkingwhich ones are end components with
the right payoff. Third, the numbers pv can be computed in polynomial time
via linear programming (see Appendix B). Fourth, the sets X, X ′ and X ′′ are
subsets of V and can thus be stored using polynomial space. Finally, the
algorithm terminates because in each iteration of one of the two repeat
loops, the set X becomes smaller until the termination criterion is met.
Now let (G , v0) be an arbitrary Muller SMG, and let p ∈ [0, 1]; we claim
that (G , v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ (p, 1, . . . , 1) if and only if
v0 is output by the algorithm on input G , p.
(⇒) Assume that (G , v0) has a Nash equilibrium σ with payoff ≥ (p, 1, . . . , 1),
and consider the set R ∶= {v ∈ V ∶ Prσv0 (Reach(v)) > 0}. We claim that every
vertex v ∈ R remains inside the set Xmaintained by the algorithm. Since X is
initially set to V , this is clearly true before themain loop has been entered.
Now assume that R ⊆ X; let S and T be defined as in the algorithm, and let xv
be a history ending in v ∈ R that is consistent with σ. By Lemma 2.3 and since
σ has payoff ≥ (0, 1, . . . , 1),we have Prσ[x]v (Reach(S∪ T)) = 1; in particular, S∪ T
is reachable from v inside G ↾ R, and therefore also inside G ↾ X. Moreover,
since σ is a Nash equilibrium,we have
zv = valG0 (v)≤ Prσv0 (Win0 ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) (by Lemma 3.3)= Prσ[x]v (Win0) (by Lemma 2.2)≤ Prσ[x]v (Reach(T)) (by Lemma 2.3)≤ sup{Prσv (Reach(T)) ∶ σ strategy profile of G ↾ R}≤ sup{Prσv (Reach(T)) ∶ σ strategy profile of G ↾ X}= pv .
Finally, no vertex v ∈ R is removed from X in the inner repeat loop because
R is a subarena of G.
It follows that each vertex v ∈ R is still in the set X after completing the
main loop; in particular, this holds for v0 . Moreover, substituting v by v0 and
x by the empty word in the above calculation yields that p ≤ Prσv0 (Win0) ≤ pv0 .
Hence, v0 is in the output of the algorithm.
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(⇐) Assume that v0 is output by the algorithm on input G , p, and let
X , S, T and (pv )v∈V have the same values as when the algorithm terminates.
We claim that supσ Prσv (Reach(S ∪ T)) = 1 for all v ∈ X,where the supremum
ranges over all strategy profiles of G ↾ X. To see this, consider the stationary
strategy profile σ that for each non-stochastic vertex v ∈ X picks a successor
w ∈ v∆∩X uniformly at random. All bottom SCCs of (G ↾ X)σ contain a vertex
of S ∪ T since otherwise thewhole SCCwould have been removed from X by
the algorithm. Hence, S ∪ T is reached almost surely in (G ↾ X)σ.
Since reachability MDPs admit optimal positional strategies (Theo-
rem B.9),we can fix positional strategy profiles σS = (σSi )i∈Π and σT = (σTi )i∈Π
of G ↾ X such that PrσSv (Reach(S ∪ T)) = 1 and PrσTv (Reach(T)) = pv for all
v ∈ X. Moreover, by Lemma 2.4, we can fix pure finite-state strategy pro-
files τS = (τSi )i∈Π and τT = (τTi )i∈Π of G ↾ S and G ↾ T , respectively, such
that PrτSv (⋂i∈Π/{0} Wini) = 1 for all v ∈ S and PrτTv (⋂i∈ΠWini) = 1 for all v ∈ T .
We define a pure finite-state strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π of (G , v0) by setting
σi(xv) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
σTi (v) if v ∈ X / T and pv > 0,
σSi (v) if v ∈ X / S and pv = 0,
τTi (x1v) if v ∈ T ,
τSi (x2v) if v ∈ S and pv = 0,
arbitrary otherwise,
for all xv ∈ V∗Vi and i ∈ Π, where x1 and x2 are the longest suffixes of x
contained in T and S, respectively. We claim that σ fulfils the following three
properties:
1. Prσv0 (xv ⋅ Vω) > 0 only if v ∈ X;
2. Prσv0 (Win0 ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≥ pv if xv is consistent with σ and v ∈ X;
3. Prσv0 (Wini) = 1 for each player i ≠ 0.
It follows from 1., 2. and the definition of X that Prσv0 (Win0 ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) ≥ pv ≥
valG0 (v) for each history xv consistent with σ. Moreover, it follows from 3.
that Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) = 1 ≥ valGi (v) for each player i ≠ 0 and for each
history xv consistent with σ. Hence, by Lemma 3.8, the game (G , v0) has
a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium σ∗ with Prσ∗v0 = Prσv0 . Moreover, since
pv0 ≥ p, it follows from 2. and 3. that σ∗ has payoff ≥ (p, 1, . . . , 1).
To complete the proof, we need to verify properties 1.–3. Property 1. is
immediate from the definition of σ and the fact that X is a subarena of G
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with v0 ∈ X. For 2., assume that xv is a history of (G , v0) consistent with σ
and ending in a vertex v ∈ X. The claim holds trivially if pv = 0. Otherwise,
σ[x] guarantees to reach T with probability pv . But once T has been reached,
σ[x] behaves like τT,which guarantees to fulfil the objective of player 0 almost
surely. Hence, Prσv0 (Win0 ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) = Prσ[x]v (Win0) ≥ Prσ[x]v (Reach(T)) = pv .
In order to prove 3., define Z ∶= {v ∈ X ∶ pv = 0}. By definition, Z is a
subarena of G ↾ X with Z ∩ T = ∅. We claim that Prσv0 (Reach((S ∩ Z) ∪ T)) = 1.
This proves 3. because, once (S∩Z)∪T has been reached, σ behaves either like
τS or like τT,which guarantee to fulfil the objective of each player i ≠ 0 almost
surely. By the definition of σ, we have Prσv0 (Reach(Z) / Reach(S)) = 0 and
therefore Prσv0 (Reach(Z)) = Prσv0 (Reach(S∩Z)). Moreover, if π ∈ Xω / Reach(Z),
then Prσv0 (Reach(T) ∣ π∣k ⋅ Xω) ≥ pπ(k−1) ≥ min{pv ∶ v ∈ X / Z} for all k > 0
and therefore limk→∞ Prσv0 (Reach(T) ∣ π∣k ⋅ Xω) ≠ 0. Using Levy’s zero-one-law
(Theorem A.6),we can conclude that
1 = Prσv0 ({π ∈ Xω ∶ limk→∞ Prσv0 (Reach(T) ∣ π∣k ⋅ Xω) = 1Reach(T)(π)})≤ Prσv0 ({π ∈ Xω ∶ limk→∞ Prσv0 (Reach(T) ∣ π∣k ⋅ Xω) = 0} ∪ Reach(T))≤ Prσv0 (Reach(Z) ∪ Reach(T))= Prσv0 (Reach(Z)) + Prσv0 (Reach(T))= Prσv0 (Reach(S ∩ Z)) + Prσv0 (Reach(T))= Prσv0 (Reach((S ∩ Z) ∪ T)) ,
which proves the claim. □
Note that the Nash equilibrium σ∗ constructed in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.15 is a pure finite-state equilibrium. It follows that, for finite SMGs
with ω-regular objectives, the problem OneNE does not changewhen one
asks for a pure finite-state equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (p, 1, . . . , 1) instead of
an arbitrary equilibriumwith such a payoff.
Of course, Algorithm 5.2 can also be used to solve OneNE for SMGs with
Streett-Rabin or parity objectives in polynomial space. In fact, we can do
better, and the complexity of OneNE is comparable to the complexity of the
problem StrQualNE, discussed in the previous section. In particular,we can
show that OneNE lies inNP for Streett SMGs. In fact, the same upper bound
holds for Streett-Rabin SMGs with a Streett objective for player 0.
Theorem 5.16. OneNE is in NP for Streett-Rabin SMGs with a Streett objec-
tive for player 0.
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Proof. To get a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm for the prob-
lem, it suffices to modify Algorithm 5.2 as follows: Instead of computing
valG0 (v) explicitly,we guess a positional strategy τ of the coalition Π / {0} in
the coalition game G0 and compute zv ∶= 1 − valτ(v). Moreover, instead of
computing the sets S and T explicitly, we guess suitable end components
(at most ∣V ∣ many) and take their union. Clearly, zv ≥ valG0 (v) for all v ∈ V .
It follows that, in every iteration of themain loop, the sets S, T and X are
subsets of the “real” sets S, T and X, and each of the numbers pv is bounded
from above by the “real” value of pv . In particular, if v is in the output of
themodified algorithm on input G , p, then it is also in the output of Algo-
rithm 5.2 on input G , p. On the other hand, if τ is globally optimal (such
a strategy exists by Corollary 2.12), then zv = valG0 (v) for all v ∈ V , and the
modified algorithm outputs the same set as Algorithm 5.2.
Why does the modified algorithm run in polynomial time? Since the
values of a Streett MDP can be computed in polynomial time, so can the
numbers zv ; whether a set U is an end component with payoff (0, 1 . . . , 1) or
payoff (1, . . . , 1) can easily be checked in polynomial time; the set of states
fromwhere S ∪ T is reachable can be computed in polynomial time using
a simple backward search procedure; all other operations are trivial set op-
erations. Finally, the total number of iterations of both repeat loops is at
most 2∣V ∣ + 1 since at least one vertex is removed from the set X in each
iteration but the last one. □
For Streett-Rabin SMGs with a Rabin objective for player 0, the best upper
boundwe can show for the complexity of OneNE is that the problem lies in
the class PNP of problems decidable by a deterministic polynomial-time algo-
rithmwith access to anNP oracle. In particular,we do not knowwhether we
can bound the number of oracle queries by O(log n); this would put OneNE
into PNP[log].
Theorem 5.17. OneNE is in PNP for Streett-Rabin SMGs with a Rabin objec-
tive for player 0.
Proof. Again, the algorithm for proving membership in PNP is virtually iden-
tical to the one for Muller SMGs. The only critical steps are the computation
of the values zv and the computation of the sets S and T in themain loop.
Concerning the values, we can determine them by asking oracle queries
of the form valG0 (v) ≥ x repeatedly and closing in on the value valG0 (v) using
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binary search.² Finally, to compute the sets S and T ,we can ask the oracle
for each v ∈ X whether v lies in an end component of G ↾ X with payoff(0, 1, . . . , 1) or payoff (1, . . . , 1), respectively. □
As for StrQualNE, the problem OneNE is NP-hard or coNP-hard for de-
terministic games with Streett or Rabin objectives, respectively, even if the
number of players is bounded. Moreover, the same lower bounds hold for the
problem OneSPE,wherewe look for a subgame-perfect equilibrium instead
of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 5.18. OneNE and OneSPE are NP-hard for deterministic three-
player Streett games; both problems are coNP-hard for deterministic three-
player Rabin games.
Proof. From (the proofs of ) Theorems 5.6 and 5.8, we know that deciding
whether there exists a Nash (subgame-perfect) equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1)
in a deterministic two-player Streett or Rabin gamewith a trivial objective
for player 1 (meaning that she wins every play) is NP-hard or coNP-hard,
respectively. We reduce from this problem: given a two-player Streett or
Rabin game (G , v0) in which all plays are won by player 1, we construct
a three-player game (G̃ , ṽ0) of the same type such that (G , v0) has a Nash
(subgame-perfect) equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1) if and only if (G̃ , ṽ0) has a
Nash (subgame-perfect) equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (0, 1, 1). The arena of G̃ is
obtained from the arena of G by adding two more vertices: the initial ver-
tex ṽ0 , controlled by player 0, and a new terminal vertex . From ṽ0 , player 0
can either play to  or to v0, in which case the game continues in G. The
objectives for the players are as follows:
• player 0 wins if her objective in G is fulfilled; if the game reaches ,
she loses;
• player 1wins every play of G̃;
• player 2 wins if  is reached; otherwise she loses.
It is easy to see that these objectives can be represented as Streett or Rabin
objectives if the original objectives are of this form. We need to show that(G , v0) has aNash (subgame-perfect) equilibriumwith payoff (0, 1) if and only
if (G̃ , ṽ0) has a Nash (subgame-perfect) equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (0, 1, 1).
² Recall from Chapter 2 that the values of a Rabin-Streett S2G are rational numbers of polyno-
mial bit complexity.
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(⇒) Assume that (σ0 , σ1) is a Nash (subgame-perfect) equilibrium of(G , v0) with payoff (0, 1). We extend σ0 and σ1 to strategies in G̃ by setting
σ0( ∣ ṽ0) = 1, σ0[ṽ0] = σ0 and σ1[ṽ0] = σ1. It is easy to see that, combined
with the empty strategy for player 2, the resulting strategy profile is a Nash
(subgame-perfect) equilibrium of (G̃ , ṽ0)with payoff (0, 1, 1).(⇐) Let σ = (σ0 , σ1 , σ2) be a Nash equilibriumof (G̃ , ṽ0)with payoff ≥ (0, 1, 1).
Note that, since σ gives payoff 1 to player 2, it must hold that σ0( ∣ ṽ0) = 1, and
therefore σ actually gives payoff 0 to player 0. We claim that (σ0[ṽ0], σ1[ṽ0])
is a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff (0, 1). Otherwise, since player 1
wins every play of G, there would exist a strategy τ of player 0 such that(τ, σ1[ṽ0]) gives payoff > 0 to player 0. But then player 0 could improve her
payoff in (G̃ , ṽ0) by playing from ṽ0 to v0 and applying τ afterwards, a con-
tradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium. Finally, if σ is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, then (σ0[ṽ0], σ1[ṽ0]) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , v0)
by the definition of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. □
It follows from Theorems 5.16 and 5.18 that OneNE is NP-complete for
Streett SMGs. For Rabin games, Theorem 5.18 and Proposition 5.9 already
give good evidence that OneNE and OneSPE cannot be put into NP ∪ coNP.
As for StrQualNE and StrQualSPE, we can show the stronger result that
OneNE and OneSPE are, in fact, DP-hard for deterministic Rabin games and
PNP[log]-hard for Rabin SMGs. The proofs are virtually identical to the proofs
of Theorems 5.10 and 5.11 and are left to the reader.
Theorem 5.19. OneNE and OneSPE are DP-hard for deterministic Rabin
games and PNP[log]-hard for Rabin SMGs.
For parity SMGs,we can use Algorithm 5.1 to compute the union of the
relevant end components in polynomial time. Deciding OneNE therefore
reduces to computing the values for player 0.
Theorem 5.20. OneNE is in NP ∩ coNP for SMGs with parity objectives.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from Theorem 5.16. To prove member-
ship in coNP, we modify Algorithm 5.2 as follows: Instead of computing
valG0 (v), we guess a positional strategy τ for player 0 and set zv ∶= valτ(v).
Clearly, zv ≤ valG0 (v) for all v ∈ V . Finally, we switch the output of the algo-
rithm, i.e. instead of outputting the set {v ∈ X ∶ p ≤ pv }, we output the set{v ∈ V ∶ v ∉ X or p > pv } (sincewe seek an algorithm for the complement of
OneNE).
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The reasoning that the algorithm is correct is analogous to the reasoning
in the proof of Theorem 5.16: In every iteration of themain loop, the sets S,
T and X are supersets of the “real” sets S, T and X, and each of the numbers pv
is bounded from below by the “real” value of pv . Hence, if v is in the output of
themodified algorithm on input G , p, then it is certainly not in the output
of Algorithm 5.2 on input G , p. On the other hand, if σ is an optimal strategy
for player 0, then themodified algorithm outputs precisely the complement
of the output of Algorithm 5.2.
The reasoning that the algorithm runs in polynomial time is identical
to the proof of Theorem 5.16, except for the computation of the sets S and T
inside the main loop: we can compute these sets using Algorithm 5.1 in
polynomial time. □
The natural question at this point is whether OneNE can be solved in
polynomial time on classes of games where StrQualNE can, such as SSMGs.
Clearly, if the value of an SS2G can be computed in polynomial time, then
OneNE is also decidable in polynomial time for SSMGs. On the other hand,
we can give a polynomial-time reduction from the quantitative decision
problemfor SS2Gs toOneNE for two-player SSMGs. This shows that lowering
the complexity of OneNE to P would resolve amajor open problem in the
theory of two-player zero-sum stochastic games.
Proposition 5.21. There is a polynomial-time reduction from the quantita-
tive decision problem for SS2Gs to OneNE for two-player SSMGs.
Proof. Let G be an SS2G, v ∈ V , and p ∈ [0, 1]. From G, v and p, we derive
a two-player SSMG G̃ as follows: In G̃, there is a new vertex ṽ , controlled
by player 1, where player 1 can choose either to leave the game, in which
case player 1 receives payoff 1 − p and player 0 receives payoff 1, or to move
to v , from where the play continues in G. Clearly, G̃ can be constructed in
polynomial time from G, v and p. To establish the reduction,we show that
valG(v) ≥ p if and only if (G̃ , ṽ) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (1, 1 − p).
(⇒) Assume that valG(v) ≥ p and therefore valG1 (v) ≤ 1 − p. Consider any
positional strategy profile (σ0 , σ1) of (G̃ , ṽ) where player 1 leaves the game
and player 0 plays an optimal positional strategy in the game (G , v). Clearly,
such a strategy profile has payoff (1, 1 − p). We claim that (σ0 , σ1) is also a
Nash equilibrium: For player 0, it is obvious that no improvement is possible.
For player 1, assume that she has a strategy τ that, together with σ0, gives
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her payoff > 1 − p. Then the residual strategy profile (σ0[ṽ], τ[ṽ])must give
player 1 payoff > 1− p in (G , v). But this is impossible since valG1 (v) ≤ 1− p and
σ0[ṽ] = σ0 is optimal.
(⇐) Assume that (G̃ , ṽ) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ (1, 1 − p), but
valG(v) < p. Then valG1 (v) > 1 − p, and player 1’s best response is to play from ṽ
to v with probability 1 and to apply a strategy that gives her payoff > 1 − p
afterwards. But then player 0 receives payoff < 1, a contradiction. □
5.3 The qualitative fragment for deterministic games
The aim of this section is to prove that the qualitative fragment of NE, in
the following denoted by QualNE, is decidable for deterministic games:
Given a finite deterministic game (G , v0) and x, y ∈ {0, 1}Π, decide
whether (G , v0) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
As a by-product of the proof,we show that pure strategies are as powerful
as arbitrary randomised strategies in this context. Since in a deterministic
game every pure strategy profile has a binary payoff, this implies that the
problem PureNE is decidable for deterministic games as well.
Characterisation of existence
The decidability of QualNE relies on the following characterisation of the
existence of a Nash equilibriumwith a qualitative constraint on the payoff in
deterministic games with prefix-independent objectives,which resembles
Proposition 5.1 for stochastic games. As in Section 5.1, given a deterministic
game G, we denote by Wi the set of all vertices v such that valGi (v) > 0 or,
equivalently, valGi (v) = 1; we call Wi the winning region of player i.
Proposition 5.22. Let (G , v0) be a finite deterministic gamewith prefix-in-
dependent objectives Wini ⊆ Vω, and let x, y ∈ {0, 1}k. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
1. there exists a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y;
2. there exists a strategy profile σ of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y such that
Prσv0 (Reach(Wi) /Wini) = 0 for each player i;
3. there exists a play π of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y such that π ∈Wini
or π ∉ Reach(Wi) for each player i;
4. there exists a pure Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
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If additionally all objectives are ω-regular, then each of the above statements
is equivalent to the following statement:
5. there exists a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x
and ≤ y.
Proof. (1.⇒ 2.) Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
It follows from Lemma 3.3 that Prσv0 (Wini ∣ Reach(Wi)) = 1 and therefore
Prσv0 (Reach(Wi) /Wini) = 0 for each player i.
(2.⇒ 3.) Assume that σ is a strategy profile of (G , v0)with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y
such that Prσv0 (Reach(Wi) /Wini) = 0, i.e. Prσv0 (Wini ∪ Vω / Reach(Wi)) = 1,
for eachplayer i. Let X ⊆ Vω be the set ofplays of (G , v0)withpayoff≥ x and≤ y.
Clearly, Prσv0 (X) = 1. Hence, also Prσv0 (X ∩ ⋂i∈Π(Wini ∪ Vω / Reach(Wi))) = 1.
In particular, there exists a play π with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y such that π ∈Wini
or π ∉ Reach(Wi) for each player i.
(3.⇒4.) Assume that π is a play of (G , v0) with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y such
that π ∈Wini or π ∉ Reach(Wi) for each player i. There exists a pure strategy
profile σ of (G , v0) such that π is the unique play compatiblewith σ. For each
player i and each history xv that is consistent with σ,we either have π ∈Wini
and Prσv0 (Wini ∣ xv ⋅ Vω) = 1 or π ∉ Reach(Wi) and valGi (v) = 0. Hence, by
Lemma 3.7, (G , v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium σ∗ with the same payoff as σ.
In particular, σ∗ has payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
(4.⇒ 1.) Trivial.
In the following, assume that, additionally, all objectives are ω-regular.
(3.⇒ 5.) Assume that π is a play of (G , v0)with payoff x ≤ (zi)i∈Π ≤ y such
that π ∈Wini or π ∉ Reach(Wi) for each player i. Consider the (deterministic)
MDPM that is obtained from G by removing all vertices v such that v ∈ Wi
for some player i with zi = 0 and imposing the objective
Win ∶= ⋂
i∈Πz i=1
Wini ∩ ⋂
i∈Πz i=0
Vω /Wini .
The MDPM is well-defined since its arena is a subarena of G. With each of
the objectives Wini , the objective Win is prefix-independent and ω-regular.
Since π fulfils this objective, player 0 has a winning strategy in (M, v0).
But then, by Corollary 2.13, shemust also have a pure finite-statewinning
strategy. The claim now follows from Lemma 3.8.
(5.⇒ 1.) Trivial. □
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v0
0 (1, 0)
(1, 1)
Figure 5.3. A gamewithonly twopure but infinitelymany randomisedNash equilibria.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 5.22 is that, for deterministic
games with ω-regular objectives, pure finite-state strategies are as pow-
erful as arbitrary randomised strategies as far as the existence of a Nash
equilibriumwith a qualitative constraint on the payoff is concerned.
Corollary 5.23. Let (G , v0) be a finite deterministic gamewith ω-regular ob-
jectives, and let x, y ∈ {0, 1}k. Then (G , v0) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff≥ x and ≤ y if and only if (G , v0) has a pure finite-state Nash equilibriumwith
payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
Proof. The claim follows from Proposition 5.22 and the fact that every game
with ω-regular objectives can be reduced to onewith parity objectives. □
As witnessed by the following simple example, Corollary 5.23 fails if the
thresholds x and y are not binary.
Example 5.24. Consider the deterministic two-player game G depicted in
Figure 5.3. Clearly, there exist precisely two pure Nash equilibria in (G , v0),
onewith payoff (1, 0) and onewith payoff (1, 1). However, for every p ∈ [0, 1]
there exists a randomised Nash equilibrium of (G , v0)with payoff (1, p).
A consequence of Corollary 5.23 is that the problems QualNE, PureNE and
PureFinNE are polynomial-time equivalent for deterministic games with
ω-regular objectives: deciding the existence of a pure (finite-state) Nash
equilibriumwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y for x, y ∈ [0, 1]Π amounts to deciding the
existence a pure (finite-state) Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ ⌈x⌉ and ≤ ⌊y⌋
(ceiling and floor applied componentwise); by Corollary 5.23, such an equilib-
rium exists if and only if there exists an arbitrary (possibly randomised)Nash
equilibriumwith this payoff. Hence, all the complexity bounds we are going
to devise for the problem QualNE also apply to PureNE and PureFinNE.
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Computational complexity
The decidability of QualNE for deterministic games follows from the de-
cidability of StrQualNE: by Corollary 5.23, it suffices to check for each bi-
nary payoff in between the thresholds whether there exists an equilibrium
with this payoff. However, since QualNE is more general than StrQualNE,
the complexity of QualNE is, a priori, higher. For games with Muller or
Streett objectives, this higher generality comes for free, and both problems
have the same complexity.
Theorem 5.25. QualNE is Pspace-complete for deterministic Muller games.
Proof. Hardness follows from Theorem 2.18. To provemembership in Pspace,
consider the polynomial-space algorithm for StrQualNE on the class of
Muller SMGs (Theorem 5.4). To decide QualNE, we just need to call this
algorithm for each binary payoff x ≤ z ≤ y, which can also be done using
polynomial space. If the algorithm accepts for one such payoff, we know
that there exists a suitable Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, by Corollary 5.23,
no such equilibrium exists. □
Theorem 5.26. QualNE is NP-complete for deterministic Streett games.
Proof. NP-hardness follows from Theorem 5.6. Membership in NP follows
from Theorem 5.5with almost the same reasoning as in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.25. Instead of enumerating all binary payoffs x ≤ z ≤ y, the algorithm
just guesses such a payoff in the beginning. □
For deterministic Streett-Rabin games, we can show the same upper
bound as for StrQualNE: the problem lies in PNP[log]. However, we do not
know whether QualNE is complete for this class; we only know that the
problem is DP-hard (see Theorem 5.10).
Theorem 5.27. QualNE is in PNP[log] for deterministic Streett-Rabin games.
Proof. To prove membership in PNP[log], let us describe a polynomial-time
algorithm performing a logarithmic number of queries to an NP oracle for
the problem. We use the same trick as in the proof of Theorem 5.7. Given the
input G , v0 , x, y, denote by R and S the set of players i ∈ Π with a Rabin and
a Streett objective, respectively. The algorithm starts by determining the
number r of pairs (v , i) such that i ∈ R and player i has awinning strategy
from vertex v . Again, it is easy to see that this number can be computed by
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performing only a logarithmic number of queries to an NP oracle. Thenwe
perform onemore query; we askwhether for each player i there exists a set
Z i ⊆ V as well as positional strategies (σi)i∈R and (τi)i∈S ,where σi is a strategy
of player i and τi is a strategy of the coalition Π / {i} in the coalition game Gi ,
a binary payoff z = (zi)i∈Π with x ≤ z ≤ y, and an end component U ⊆ V with
the following properties:
1. ∑i∈R ∣Z i ∣ = r;
2. σi is winning from each vertex v ∈ Z i for each player i ∈ R;
3. τi is winning from each vertex v ∈ V / Z i for each player i ∈ S;
4. U ⊆ ⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(V / Z i);
5. U is reachable from v0 inside ⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(V / Z i);
6. U has payoff z.
This query can be decided by anNP oracle by guessing suitable sets and strate-
gies together with a suitable binary payoff and verifying 1.–7. in polynomial
time. If the answer to the query is yes, the algorithm accepts; otherwise,
it rejects.
Obviously, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. To see that the al-
gorithm is correct, first note that for each player i ∈ R (i ∈ S) the set Z i is
an under- (over-)approximation of thewinning region Wi . In fact, for each
player i ∈ R,we have Z i = Wi . Otherwise, for some player i ∈ R, therewould
exist a vertex v ∈ Wi / Z i . But then, the number of pairs (v , i)with i ∈ R and
v ∈ Wi would be strictly greater than r , a contradiction. Now assume that
the algorithm accepts its input. Then there exists a play π of (G , v0) with
Inf(π) = U that stays inside ⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(V / Wi). In particular, π has payoff z.
By Proposition 5.22, this play can be extended to a pure Nash equilibrium
with the same payoff. On the other hand, if there exists a pure Nash equilib-
riumwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y, then the query will succeed becausewe can
set Z i to Wi , σi to a globally optimal positional strategy of player i for each
player i ∈ R, τi to a globally optimal positional strategy of the coalition Π / {i}
for each player i ∈ S (such strategies exist by Theorem 2.11), z to the payoff of
the equilibrium, and U to the set of vertices visited infinitely often in the
equilibrium; with these choices, all of the above properties are fulfilled. □
An immediate consequence of Theorem5.26 is thatQualNE belongs toNP
for deterministic parity games. However, in many cases,we can do better:
For two payoff vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}Π, denote by dist(x, y) theHamming distance of
x and y, i.e. the number∑i∈Π ∣yi − xi ∣ of non-matching bits. Note that dist(x, y)
126
5.3 The qualitative fragment for deterministic games
is always bounded by the number of players. We show that, if dist(x, y) is
bounded by a constant, then QualNE is in UP ∩ coUP.
Theorem 5.28. QualNE is in UP ∩ coUP for deterministic parity games and
bounded dist(x, y).
Proof. Assume that dist(x, y) is bounded. An unambiguous nondetermin-
istic algorithm for QualNE works as follows: On input G , v0 , x, y, the algo-
rithm starts by guessing the winning region Wi of each player. Then, for
each vertex v and each player i, the guess whether v ∈ Wi or v ∉ Wi is
verified by running the UP algorithm for the respective problem. If one
guess was incorrect, the algorithm rejects immediately. Otherwise, the
algorithm checks for each payoff z ∈ {0, 1}Π with x ≤ z ≤ y whether there
exists awinning play from v0 in the one-player Streett gamewith objective⋂i∈Π∶z i=1Wini ∩⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(Cω /Wini), played on the subarena ⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(V /Wi)
of G. The algorithm accepts if such a play exists for at least one payoff z.
Analogously, a UP algorithm for the complement of QualNE accepts if there
is no such play for all admissible payoffs z.
Clearly, both algorithms run in polynomial time; they are unambiguous
because they only accept if eachwinning region has been guessed correctly.
Finally, their correctness follows from Proposition 5.22. □
If there were to exist a polynomial-time algorithm for the qualitative
decision problem for deterministic parity games, thenwe could compute the
winning region for each player efficiently, and QualNEwould be decidable
in polynomial time for deterministic parity games and bounded dist(x, y).
In general, a polynomial-time algorithm for the qualitative decision problem
on a class C of deterministic two-player zero-sum parity games can be ex-
tended to a polynomial-time algorithm for QualNEwith bounded dist(x, y)
on the class C∗ of all deterministicmultiplayer parity games where for each
player i the coalition game Gi is in C.
Corollary 5.29. Let C be a class of finite deterministic two-player zero-sum
parity games such that the qualitative decision problem is decidable in P for
games in C. Then QualNE is in P for games in C∗ and bounded dist(x, y).
Proof. By Proposition 5.22, we only need to check for every binary payoff
x ≤ z ≤ y,whether G has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff z. By Theorem 5.13,
the latter property can be checked in polynomial time if G ∈ C∗. □
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Instead of assuming that dist(x, y) is bounded by a constant,we can treat
this number as a parameter for the problem QualNE. Theorem 5.13 implies
that QualNE is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to this parameter on
every suitable class C∗, i.e. there exists a deterministic algorithm that decides
QualNE for games in C∗ in time exponential in the size of the parameter but
polynomial in the size of the game. The proof is virtually identical to the
proof of Corollary 5.29.
Corollary 5.30. Let C be a class of finite deterministic two-player zero-sum
parity games such that the qualitative decision problem is decidable in P for
games in C. Then QualNE is fixed-parameter tractablewith respect to the
parameter dist(x, y) for games in C∗.
In particular, it follows from Corollary 5.30 and Theorem 2.19 thatQualNE
is fixed-parameter tractable for deterministic parity games with a bounded
number of priorities.
Corollary 5.31. For each d ∈ M, QualNE is fixed-parameter tractable with
respect to the parameter dist(x, y) for deterministic parity games with at
most d priorities.
Thenatural question at this point iswhetherQualNE is actually decidable
in polynomial time for parity games with a bounded number of priorities.
As witnessed by the following theorem, this is quite unlikely: QualNE is
NP-hard for deterministic co-Büchi games, and the same is true forQualSPE,
the analogous problem for subgame-perfect equilibria.
Theorem 5.32. QualNE and QualSPE are NP-hard for deterministic games
with co-Büchi objectives.
Proof. Again,we reduce from SAT. Given a Boolean formula φ = C1 ∧ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∧ Cm
in conjunctive normal form over propositional variables X1 , . . . , Xn ,where
without loss of generality m ≥ 1 and each clause is nonempty, we build
a game G played by players 0, 1, . . . , n as follows: The game G has vertices
C1 , . . . , Cm , controlled by player 0, and for each clause C and each literal L
that occurs in C a vertex (C , L), controlled by player i if L = X i or L = ¬X i ;
additionally, the game contains a terminal vertex . There are edges from
a clause C j to each vertex (C j , L) such that L occurs in C j and from there
to C( j mod m)+1, and there is an edge from each vertex of the form (C ,¬X) to .
The arena of G is schematically depicted in Figure 5.4. The players’ objectives
are as follows:
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C1
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⋮
L1k
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
Figure 5.4. Reducing SAT to QualNE for deterministic co-Büchi games.
• player 0 wins if  is visited only finitely often (i.e. never);
• player i ≠ 0 wins if each vertex (C , X i) is visited only finitely often.
Clearly, G can be constructed from φ in polynomial time. To establish both
reductions,we prove the equivalence of the following three statements:
1. φ is satisfiable;
2. (G , C1) has a subgame-perfect equilibriumwhere player 0 wins;
3. (G , C1) has a Nash equilibriumwhere player 0 wins.
(1.⇒ 2.) Assume that α∶ {X1 , . . . , Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying assign-
ment for φ. We show that the positional strategy profile σ where at any
time player 0 plays from a clause C to a fixed vertex (C , L) such that L is
mapped to true by α and each player i ≠ 0 plays from ¬X i to  if and only
if α(X i) = true is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of (G , C1) where player 0
wins. First note that the induced play never reaches ; hence player 0 wins.
To show that σ is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, we only need to prove
that σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G , v) for every vertex v . If v = (C ,¬X i) and
α(X i) = true, then player i moves to  immediately. Hence, all players apart
from player 0 win, but player 0 cannot improve her payoff since no clause
vertex is visited. Otherwise, the induced play never reaches , and player 0
wins. Consider any player i whose objective is violated. Hence, a vertex of the
form (C , X i) is visited infinitely often. However, as player 0 plays according
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to the satisfying assignment, no vertex of the form (C ′ ,¬X i) is ever visited.
Hence, player i cannot improve her payoff by playing to .
(2.⇒ 3.) Trivial.
(3.⇒ 1.) Assume that (G , C1) has a,without loss of generality pure, Nash
equilibriumwhere player 0wins. Since player 0wins, the terminal vertex  is
not reached in the induced play π. Moreover,we claim that it is not the case
that both a vertex (C , X i) and a vertex (C ′ ,¬X i) are visited infinitely often
in π. Otherwise, player i would lose, but could improve her payoff by playing
from (C ′ ,¬X i) to , a contradiction. Now consider the variable assignment α
that maps X to true if some vertex (C , X) is visited infinitely often; we claim
that α satisfies the formula. Consider any clause C. By the construction of G,
there exists a literal L in C such that the vertex (C , L) is visited infinitely
often in π. Hence, α maps L to true and satisfies C. □
Theorem 5.32 leaves open the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm
for QualNE on the class of deterministic Büchi games. In fact,we can give a
polynomial-time algorithm that computes, given a deterministic game G
with Büchi objectives given by Fi ⊆ C and thresholds x, y ∈ {0, 1}Π, the set of
vertices fromwhere there exists a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
Algorithm 5.3 is a variant of the classical algorithm for deciding the
existence of a winning play in a deterministic one-player Streett game,
due to Emerson & Lei (1987), andworks as follows: By Proposition 5.22, the
game (G , v) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y if and only if
there exists a play π with this payoff that stays outside the winning re-
gion Wi of each player i with χ(Inf(π)) ∩ Fi = ∅. Clearly, such a play exists
if and only if there exists a payoff z ∈ {0, 1}Π with x ≤ z ≤ y and an end
component U ⊆ ⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(V /Wi) with payoff z that is reachable from v in-
side ⋂i∈Π∶z i=0(V /Wi). The essential part of the algorithm is the procedure
SolveSubgame; on input X, its task is to find any such set contained in X.
At first, SolveSubgame computes all end components of G maximal in X.
For each such end component U, the procedure performs the following steps:
First, the set P of players i such that χ(U) ∩ Fi = ∅ is computed. If this set
contains a player i with xi = 1, there is no hope of finding an end component
with a suitable payoff inside U, and U does not have to be explored further.
Otherwise, the algorithm checks whether U does not intersect with thewin-
ning region of each player i ∈ P. If so,we have found an end component with
a suitable payoff z, namely zi = 1 if and only if i ∈ P. Hence, the procedure
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Algorithm 5.3. Solving QualNE for deterministic Büchi games.
Input: deterministic Büchi game G = (Π, V , (Vi)i∈Π , ∆, χ , (Fi)i∈Π), x, y ∈ {0, 1}Π
Output: {v ∈ V ∶ (G , v) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y}
compute Wi ∶= {v ∈ V ∶ valGi (v) > 0} for each i ∈ Π
X ∶= ⋂i∈Π∶y i=0(V / χ−1(Fi))
output SolveSubgame(X)
procedure SolveSubgame(X)
Z ∶= ∅
compute all end components of G maximal in X
for each such end component U do
P ∶= {i ∈ Π ∶ χ(U) ∩ Fi = ∅}
if i ∉ P for all i with xi = 1 then
Y ∶= U ∩⋂i∈P (V /Wi)
if Y = U then
Z ∶= Z ∪ {v ∈ V ∶ U reachable from v in G ↾ ⋂i∈P (V /Wi)}
else
Z ∶= Z ∪ SolveSubgame(Y)
end if
end if
end for
return Z
end procedure
adds U and all vertices fromwhere U is reachable inside ⋂i∈P (V /Wi) to the
result set. Otherwise, it removes the winning region of each player i ∈ P
from U. The resulting set of vertices may not be strongly connected any
more and fewer objectives may be satisfied; hence, the procedure has to be
called recursively.
As we are not interested in end components that arewinning for some
player i with yi = 0, SolveSubgame is called initially on the subarena of G
that results from removing all vertices v such that χ(v) ∈ Fi for some player i
with yi = 0.
Theorem 5.33. QualNE is decidable in polynomial time for deterministic
Büchi games.
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Proof. We claim that Algorithm 5.3 outputs the set of vertices from where
there is a Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y. Since the number of
recursive calls is bounded by the size of the arena andmaximal end compo-
nents can be computed in polynomial time, the procedure SolveSubgame
runs in polynomial time. For each player i, the set of vertices from where
she has awinning strategy can also be computed in polynomial time (Theo-
rem 2.20). Hence, the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
To prove the correctness of the algorithm, let Z ⊆ V be the output of the
algorithm on input G , x.y. We claim that Z equals the set of vertices v ∈ V
such that (G , v) has a Nash equilibriumwith payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.(⊆)Assume that v ∈ Z. Hence, in some call of theprocedure SolveSubgame,
say on input X, the algorithm finds amaximal end component U of G ↾ X
reachable from v and contained inside ⋂i∈P (V /Wi) such that χ(U) ∩ Fi = ∅
only if xi = 0. Let z ∈ {0, 1}Π be defined by zi = 1 if and only if χ(U) ∩ Fi ≠ ∅;
in particular, x ≤ z. Since U is strongly connected,we can build a play π of(G , v) such that Inf(π) = U and π ∉ Reach(Wi) for each player i with zi = 0.
Since Inf(π) = U, this play has payoff z. By Proposition 5.22, π can be ex-
tended to a pure Nash equilibrium of (G , v)with payoff z. Moreover, since
the algorithmmaintains the invariant that χ(X) ∩ Fi = ∅ for each i ∈ Π with
yi = 0,we have z ≤ y.(⊇) Suppose there exists a (pure) Nash equilibrium of (G , v)with payoff
x ≤ z ≤ y. Hence, by Proposition 5.22, there exists a play π of (G , v) with
payoff z such that π ∉ Reach(Wi) for each player i with zi = 0. Let X be
defined as in the first call of the procedure SolveSubgame. By the definition
of π, the set Inf(π) is contained in amaximal end component U of G ↾ X. Let
P ∶= {i ∈ Π ∶ χ(U)∩Fi = ∅}. IfU is contained in⋂i∈P (V /Wi), then the algorithm
adds v to Z immediately. Otherwise, Inf(π) ⊆ U∩⋂i∈P (V /Wi) = Y , and Inf(π) is
contained in a maximal end component of G ↾ Y . Hence, the procedure
will eventually find a maximal end component U of G ↾ X such that U is
contained in ⋂i∈P (V /Wi) and Inf(π) ⊆ U. In particular, P ⊆ {i ∈ Π ∶ zi = 0},
and U is reachable from v inside G ↾ ⋂i∈P (V /Wi). Hence, v is added to Z. □
Remark. By combining the proofs of Corollary 5.29 and Theorem 5.33,we can
show that QualNE is, in fact, decidable in polynomial time for deterministic
games with an arbitrary number of Büchi objectives and a bounded number
of co-Büchi objectives (or even a bounded number of parity objectives with a
bounded number of priorities).
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Table 5.1. The complexity of StrQualNE, OneNE and QualNE.
StrQualNE OneNE QualNE (det. games)
SSMGs P-complete NP ∩ coNP P-complete
Büchi P-complete NP ∩ coNP P-complete
co-Büchi P-complete NP ∩ coNP NP-complete
Parity[d] P-complete NP ∩ coNP NP-complete
Parity UP ∩ coUP NP ∩ coNP NP-complete
Streett NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete
Rabin PNP[log]-complete PNP PNP[log]PNP[log]-hard DP-hard
Muller Pspace-complete Pspace-complete Pspace-complete
5.4 Summary of results
Our main results on the complexity of StrQualNE and OneNE for SMGs
as well as QualNE for deterministic games are summarised in Table 5.1;
similarly to Section 2.5, Parity[d] denotes the class of all parity SMGs whose
priority functions refer to at most d priorities. All lower bounds also hold
for the corresponding problems for subgame-perfect equilibria, and the
upper bounds for games with Rabin objectives also hold for games with
Streett-Rabin objectives.
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Conclusion
In this final chapter,we sum up themain results of this work and list some
open problems. Finally,we discuss several perspectives for futurework.
6.1 Summary and open problems
In this work,we have analysed the existence and computational complex-
ity of game-theoretic equilibrium concepts in the context of turn-based
stochastic games played on graphs.
In Chapter 3, we proved that every finite stochastic game with prefix-
independent objectives has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (Theo-
rem 3.9); if each player has an ω-regular objective, there also exists a Nash
equilibriuminpurefinite-state strategies (Theorem 3.10). The corresponding
statements about subgame-perfect equilibria are only true for deterministic
games (Theorems 3.15 and 3.16); there exists a stochastic gamewith Büchi
objectives that has no subgame-perfect equilibrium (Proposition 3.18).
In Chapter 4, we studied the different decision problems associated to
a solution concept and a strategy type in their full generality. On the posi-
tive side,we proved the problems PosNE, PosSPE, StatNE and StatSPE to be
decidable; the former two problems are NP-complete,while the latter two
problems are contained in Pspace and hard for both NP and SqrtSum. What
remains open is the precise complexity of StatNE and StatSPE. Given that
135
6 Conclusion
these problems are intimately connected to the square-root sum problem
and the existential theory of the reals, such bounds seem hard to come by.
Problem 6.1. What is the precise complexity of StatNE and StatSPE?
We continued our analysis by proving that even the qualitative fragments
of all other decision problems (NE, SPE, PureNE, PureSPE, FinNE, FinSPE,
PureFinNE and PureFinSPE) are undecidable for SSMGs with a bounded
number of players (Theorems 4.10 and 4.13). These results leave open the de-
cidability of these problems for games with a small number of players. In par-
ticular, it is conceivable thatNE or PureNE is decidable for two-player SSMGs,
or even for two-player SMGs with ω-regular objectives. In fact, it follows
from the decidability of OneNE (Theorem 5.15) that for two-player SMGs
with ω-regular objectives the qualitative fragments of NE and PureNE coincide
and are indeed decidable.
Problem 6.2. Is NE decidable for two-player SSMGs? Is NE decidable for
two-player SMGs with ω-regular objectives?
Problem 6.3. Is PureNE decidable for two-player SSMGs? Is PureNE decid-
able for two-player SMGs with ω-regular objectives?
In Chapter 5, we looked at several restrictions of the original decision
problems. In particular,we proved that the problems StrQualNE and OneNE
are decidable for SMGs with ω-regular objectives and that QualNE is decid-
able for deterministic games with ω-regular objectives. There are several
open questions regarding these results. For instance, the precise complexity
ofOneNE for Streett-Rabin SMGs with a Rabin objective for player 0 remains
open: while we could prove membership in PNP (Theorem 5.17), we could
only show that this problem is hard for PNP[log] (Theorem 5.19).
Problem 6.4. What is the precise complexity of OneNE for Streett-Rabin
SMGs with a Rabin objective for player 0?
A similar open problem is to determine the precise complexity ofQualNE
for deterministic Streett-Rabin games; for this problem,we provedmember-
ship in PNP[log] (Theorem 5.27) but hardness only for DP (Theorem 5.10).
Problem 6.5. What is the precise complexity of QualNE for deterministic
Streett-Rabin games?
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More fundamentally, although we could establish the decidability of
QualNE for deterministic games with ω-regular objectives, the decidabil-
ity of NE (where arbitrary rational payoff thresholds are allowed) for these
games remains open.
Problem 6.6. Is NE decidable for deterministic simple reachability games?
Is NE decidable for deterministic games with ω-regular objectives?
The decidability of QualNE for deterministic games relies on Lemma 3.7,
which gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium with a certain payoff, and the fact that pure strategies
are sufficient to realise any binary payoff. To decide NE,we cannot employ
Lemma 3.7 because pure strategies are not sufficient to realise any non-
binary payoff. However, almost pure strategies,which require randomisation
only for finitelymany histories, do suffice for this purpose. We conjecture
that Lemma 3.7 can be extended to almost pure strategies, which would
yield a positive answer to Problem 6.6.
Another fundamental open question about the decision problems we
studied in Chapter 5 is whether these problems are decidable when one
looks for a subgame-perfect equilibrium instead of a Nash equilibrium.
Problem 6.7. Is StrQualSPE decidable for SSMGs? Is StrQualSPE decidable
for SMGs with ω-regular objectives?
Problem 6.8. IsOneSPE decidable for SSMGs? IsOneSPE decidable for SMGs
with ω-regular objectives?
Problem 6.9. Is QualSPE decidable for deterministic SSMGs? Is QualSPE
decidable for deterministic games with ω-regular objectives?
The only nontrivial decidable decision problem about subgame-perfect
equilibria in infinite-duration games we are aware of is PureSPE for deter-
ministic games with ω-regular objectives (Ummels 2005, 2006). However,
the best known algorithm for this problem requires exponential time, even
for games with Büchi objectives, for which the NP lower bound of Theo-
rem 5.32 does not apply. A related open question is whether pure strategies
are sufficient to realise any subgame-perfect equilibriumwith a binary pay-
off in deterministic games with ω-regular objectives (as for Nash equilibria).
Since PureSPE is decidable for these games, a positive answer to this question
would imply the decidability of QualSPE for these games.
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6.2 Perspectives
Broadly speaking, this work can be extended along two axes: one canmodify
the gamemodel, or one can modify the solution concept.
Different gamemodels
A possible extension to the gamemodel is to add nondeterminism,which can
be used to model behaviour that is neither controllable nor describable by a
probability distribution. The easiest way to incorporate nondeterminism in
themodel is to add another type of vertices: vertices of this additional type
are neither stochastic nor controlled by a player; when a play arrives at such
a vertex, a successor is chosen nondeterministically. Formally, these vertices
can be assigned to a Byzantine player, whose strategy is unknown. A Nash
equilibriumof such a gamewould be a profile of strategies for the remaining
players that is a Nash equilibrium (in the classical sense) for every strategy
of the Byzantine player. We conjecture that many of the decidability results
of Chapter 5 carry over to this setting, albeit with higher complexity.
We already pointed out in Chapter 2 that our model lacks concurrency.
In a concurrent game, whenever the play reaches a vertex, all players si-
multaneously choose an action; the chosen profile of actions determines
a probability distribution on successor vertices. The arguments for the de-
cidability of PosNE and StatNE for SMGs also prove the decidability of these
problems for concurrent SMGs. On the other hand, problems that are already
undecidable for turn-based SMGs are also undecidable for concurrent SMGs.
In fact, it is easy to extend our undecidability proof for NE to prove that even
the existence of any Nash equilibrium is undecidable for concurrent SMGs.
(Note that a concurrent SMGmay fail to have an equilibrium.) On the other
hand, Fisman et al. (2010) proved that PureNE is decidable for deterministic
concurrent games with ω-regular objectives (see also Bouyer et al. 2010b).
Recently,much effort has been invested into extending the algorithmic
results on two-player zero-sum games with finitelymany states to games
with a countably infinite number of states. In particular, games that are
played on the configuration graphs of pushdown automata, so-called push-
down games, have been studied thoroughly. Walukiewicz (2001) showed that
deciding the winner of a deterministic two-player zero-sum parity push-
down game is Exptime-complete, which gives hope that the decidability
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results for deterministic games in Chapter 5 can be extended to pushdown
games. For stochastic pushdown games, however,most problems are un-
decidable, even for MDPs (Etessami & Yannakakis 2005). Hence, in order to
obtain decidability results, one has to consider more restricted classes such
as one-exit recursive stochastic games (Etessami & Yannakakis 2005) or one-counter
stochastic games (Brázdil et al. 2010).
An extensionwhose semantics are actually given by concurrent games
with uncountablymany states is themodel of a timed game. In such a game,
a set of clocks is used tomeasure real time: states and transitions have guards,
which specify for which clock values resting in a state or taking a transition
is legal, and clocks can be reset along transitions. For non-stochastic timed
games, preliminary results on the complexity of computing Nash equilibria
were recently obtained by Bouyer et al. (2010a,b).
As pointed out in Chapter 1, in the original stochastic gamemodel, in-
troduced by Shapley (1953), the objective of a player is not given by a set of
plays, but by rewards that are assigned to states or transitions. There are
severalways to obtain a payoff from the infinite stream of rewards a player
receives; popular payoff functions include the discounted sum of the accu-
mulated rewards (with respect to some discount factor λ < 1), their limit
average and their total sum (which can be infinite). An SSMG can be viewed
as a limit-average game,where non-zero rewards occur only on terminal
vertices, or as a total-reward game (by introducing intermediate vertices on
transitions to terminal vertices). Hence, all our lower bounds for SSMGs also
apply to games with limit-average or total-reward objectives; we conjecture
that similar bounds hold for discounted games.
Different solution concepts
After Nash (1950) introduced his equilibrium concept, a plethora of other
solution concepts have been introduced to mitigate the drawbacks of this
solution concept (such as the requirement for coordination). Formally, a so-
lution concept assigns to a game a set of strategy profiles, each of which
is a solution of the game. We say that a solution concept C is stronger (weaker)
than a solution concept D if on every game the set of all C solutions is a
subset (superset) of the set of all D solutions. In the literature, both solution
concepts stronger and solution concepts weaker thanNash equilibriumhave
been explored: prominent examples in the former category are strong and
139
6 Conclusion
subgame-perfect equilibria; examples in the latter category are correlated
equilibria and rationalisability (see Osborne & Rubinstein 1994).
In a Nash equilibrium, no player can gain from switching to a different
strategy. It is natural to relax this requirement by allowing players to gain
a small amount from deviating. Formally, for ε > 0, a strategy profile is
an ε-equilibrium if each player cannot increase her probability of winning
by more than ε when switching to a different strategy. ε-Equilibria are a
suitable alternative toNash equilibriawhen the latter solution concept is too
strong. For instance, in concurrent games, the existence of ε-Nash equilibria
is usually the best one can hope for (see Section 1.1). Our undecidability proof
for Nash equilibria relies heavily on the fact that profitable deviations are
forbidden in Nash equilibria. Hence, it is conceivable that problems such as
NE and PureNE become decidablewhenwe take ε-equilibria into account.
As argued by Abraham et al. (2006), of particular relevance for distributed
computing are equilibria inwhich a deviation of up to a certain number k of
players does not increase these players’ payoffs and inwhich a deviation of up
to a possibly different number t of players does not decrease the payoff of the
other players; such an equilibrium is called (k, t)-robust. By definition, every
Nash equilibrium is (1, 0)-robust, and a (k, t)-robust equilibrium is also a
Nash equilibrium as long as k ≥ 1. It seems that most of our proofs do not ex-
tend to, for instance, (2, 0)-robust equilibria or (1, 1)-robust equilibria. From
an optimistic point of view, this might enablemore decidability results.
Another refinement of Nash equilibrium,which can be used for assume-
guarantee reasoning, has been introduced by Chatterjee et al. (2006) under
the name secure equilibria. Intuitively, such an equilibrium captures rational
behaviour if a player is not only interested in maximising her own payoff
but also in decreasing the other players’ payoffs. More precisely, a Nash
equilibrium is secure if each player can only decrease another player’s payoff
by decreasing her own payoff. As for ε-equilibria and (k, t)-robust equilibria,
we do not knowwhether our results carry over to this equilibrium notion.
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Preliminaries
In this appendix,we review concepts from probability and complexity theory
that are used in this work. For a thorough introduction to these topics,
we recommend the textbooks (Billingsley 1995) and (Papadimitriou 1994),
respectively.
A.1 Probability theory
Let Ω be an arbitrary nonempty set, called the sample space. An algebra over Ω
is a collection F ⊆ P(Ω),whose elements are called events, that contains Ω
and is closed under complementation and taking finite unions:
• Ω ∈ F ;
• if X ∈ F, then Ω / X ∈ F ;
• if X , Y ∈ F, then X ∪ Y ∈ F.
A σ-algebra is an algebra F ⊆ P(Ω) that is also closed under taking countable
unions:
• if X0 , X1 , . . . ∈ F, then ⋃n∈M Xn ∈ F.
Given an arbitrary collection F ⊆ P(Ω),we denote by σ(F) the σ-algebra gen-
erated by F. Formally, σ(F) is the intersection of all σ-algebras that contain F.
If F is an algebra, then σ(F) can alternatively be characterised as the least
monotone class that contains F. Formally,we say that a collectionM ⊆ P(Ω)
is monotone if it is closed under taking limits of chains:
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• If X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈M, then ⋃n∈M Xn ∈M;
• If X0 ⊇ X1 ⊇ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈M, then ⋂n∈M Xn ∈M.
Obviously, any σ-algebra is monotone.
Theorem A.1 (Monotone class theorem). LetF be an algebra, and letM be a
monotone collection of subsets ofΩ. IfF ⊆M, then σ(F) ⊆M. In particular,
σ(F) is the smallest monotone class that contains F.
Given an algebra F ⊆ P(Ω), a function P∶F → [0, 1] is a probabilitymeasure
on F if it satisfies the following properties:
• P(∅) = 0;
• P(Ω) = 1;
• if X0 , X1 , . . . ∈ F is a sequence of pairwise disjoint sets with ⋃n∈M Xn ∈ F,
then P(⋃n∈M Xn) = ∑n∈M P(Xn).
If P(X) = 1,we say that the event X happens almost surely. The following
laws are proved easily from the axioms.
Proposition A.2. LetF be an algebrawith X , Y ∈ F, and let P be a probability
measure on F.
1. P(Ω / X) = 1 − P(X);
2. P(X ∪ Y) = P(X) + P(Y) if X ∩ Y = ∅;
3. P(Y) = P(X) + P(Y / X) ≥ P(X) if X ⊆ Y;
4. P(X ∩ Y) = P(X) if P(Y) = 1.
Moreover, probabilitymeasures are continuous from below and above.
Proposition A.3. Let P be a probabilitymeasure on an algebra F.
1. If X0 ⊆ X1 ⊆ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈ F and ⋃n∈M Xn ∈ F, then P(⋃n∈M Xn) = limn P(Xn);
2. if X0 ⊇ X1 ⊇ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∈ F and ⋂n∈M Xn ∈ F, then P(⋂n∈M Xn) = limn P(Xn).
For an arbitrary sequence X0 , X1 , . . . ∈ F of events, define
lim inf n Xn ∶=⋃
n∈M⋂k≥n Xk and
lim supn Xn ∶=⋂
n∈M⋃k≥n Xk .
The set lim inf n Xn consists of all elements that occur in all but finitelymany
of the sets Xn , and lim supn Xn consists of all elements that occur in infinitely
many of the sets Xn .
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Proposition A.4. Let P be a probability measure on a σ-algebra F, and let
X0 , X1 , . . . ∈ F. Then P(lim inf n Xn) ≤ lim inf n P(Xn) ≤ lim supn P(Xn) ≤
P(lim supn Xn).
How canwe set up a probabilitymeasure? In applications, it is often eas-
ier to define a probabilitymeasure on an algebra rather than on a σ-algebra.
However, an algebramight be too small, andwewould like to assign a proba-
bility tomore events, e.g. to all sets in the generated σ-algebra. The following
theorem allows us to do just that; in fact, the extendedmeasure is unique.
Theorem A.5 (Carathéodory’s extension theorem). LetF be an algebra, and
let P be a probabilitymeasure on F. Then there exists a unique probability
measure P∗ on σ(F) such that P∗(X) = P(X) for all X ∈ F.
Conditional probabilities
Let P be a probability measure on an algebra F. Given events X , Y ∈ F, we
define the conditional probability of Y given X as
P(Y ∣ X) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
P(X ∩ Y) / P(X) if P(X) > 0,
1 otherwise.
From the definition, the identity P(X ∩ Y) = P(X) ⋅ P(Y ∣ X) follows immedi-
ately. Note that, unless P(X) = 0, the function P(⋅ ∣ X) that maps Y ∈ F to
P(Y ∣ X) is also a probabilitymeasure on F.
Random variables
Given a σ-algebra F over a set Ω, a (discrete) random variable is a mapping
Θ∶Ω → A into a countable set A such that
Θ−1(a) ∶= {x ∈ Ω ∶ Θ(x) = a} ∈ F
for all a ∈ A. It is customary in probability theory to omit the argument
in expressions involving a random variable. For example,we usually write
P(Θ = a) instead of P({x ∈ Ω ∶ Θ(x) = a}).
Probabilitymeasures on infinite sequences
The sample space that arises when one deals with stochastic games is
the space Aω of infinite sequences over a countable set A. The relevant
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σ-algebra F is generated by the basic cylinder sets: these are sets of the
form x ⋅ Aω, where x ∈ A∗, i.e. they consist of all infinite prolongations of
a finite sequence x. More generally, a cylinder set is a finite, disjoint union of
basic cylinder sets. The class C of all cylinder sets forms an algebra, andwe
can apply Carathéodory’s extension theorem to extend a probabilitymeasure
on C to a probabilitymeasure onF = σ(C). The σ-algebraF is called the Borel
σ-algebra, andwe call a set X ∈ F a Borel set.
The following theorem is a reformulation of Levy’s zero-one law in the spe-
cial case of the Borel σ-algebra over infinite sequences.¹ Intuitively, the the-
orem states that the conditional probabilities of an event X given the basic
cylinder sets induced by longer and longer prefixes of an infinite sequence α
approach either 1 or 0, depending onwhether α ∈ X or not. More precisely,
this convergence happens almost surely. We denote by 1X ∶ Aω → {0, 1} the
indicator function of X ⊆ Aω, defined by 1X (α) = 1 if and only if α ∈ X.
Theorem A.6 (Levy’s zero-one law). Let F be the Borel σ-algebra over Aω,
and let P be a probabilitymeasure on F. Then
P({α ∈ Aω ∶ limk P(X ∣ α(0) . . . α(k − 1) ⋅ Aω) = 1X (α)}) = 1
for all X ∈ F.
A.2 Computational complexity
We assume that the reader is familiar with (non-)deterministic Turing ma-
chines and the classes P, NP, coNP and Pspace. In the following,we give a
brief description of the other complexity classes that play a role in this work.
Decision classes
Between P and NP lies the class UP of languages decidable by an unambiguous
nondeterministic Turingmachine, i.e. a nondeterministicmachine that has
at most one accepting run on every input. As for NP, it is neither known nor
believed that UP is closed under complementation. Hence,we define coUP
to be the class of problems whose complement is in UP. Obviously,we have
P ⊆ UP ⊆ NP and P ⊆ coUP ⊆ coNP; in the absence of a proof that P ≠ NP,
neither of these inclusions is known to be proper.
¹ For the general formulation, see (Durret 2010, Chapter 5).
144
A.2 Computational complexity
Above NP and coNP lies the class DP of all languages L of the form
L = L1 ∩ L2 for L1 ∈ NP and L2 ∈ coNP, and its dual, the class coDP of all
languages L of the form L = L1 ∪ L2 for L1 ∈ NP and L2 ∈ coNP. The canonical
complete problemforDP is SAT-UNSAT, the problemof deciding, given a pair(φ, ψ) of two Boolean formulae (in conjunctive normal form),whether φ is
satisfiable and ψ is unsatisfiable. Hence, a pair (φ, ψ) belongs to SAT-UNSAT if
and only if φ ∈ SAT and ψ ∉ SAT. Any DP-complete problem is both NP-hard
and coNP-hard. Hence, it is believed that NP ∪ coNP is properly contained
in DP (since otherwise NPwould equal coNP).
Theorem A.7. SAT-UNSAT is DP-complete.
The remaining decision classes that play a role in this work are defined
via oraclemachines: An oraclemachine is a Turing machine that is equipped
with one extra working tape, called the oracle tape. The semantics of the
machine are definedwith respect to a certain fixed language L, e.g. L = SAT.
At any time of its computation, themachine can “ask” the oraclewhether
the inscription of the oracle tape belongs to L or not. The omniscient oracle
will return the answer immediately, and themachinemay continuewith its
computation depending on the answer. For a complexity class C,we denote
by PC and NPC the classes of languages that are decidable by a deterministic,
respectively non-deterministic, polynomial-time oraclemachinewith an
oracle for a language L ∈ C. Finally, coNPC is the class of all languages whose
complements are in NPC.
The polynomial hierarchy (PH) consists of the classes ΣPk , ΠPk and ∆Pk ,where
k ∈ M, defined inductively by setting ΣP0 = ΠP0 = ∆P0 = P and
ΣPk+1 = NPΣPk ,
ΠPk+1 = coNPΣPk ,
∆Pk+1 = PΣPk
for all k ∈ M. Note that ΣP1 = NP, ΠP1 = coNP and ∆P1 = P. Regarding inclusions,
it is obvious that ∆Pk ⊆ ΣPk ⊆ ∆Pk+1 and ∆Pk ⊆ ΠPk ⊆ ∆Pk+1 for each k ∈ M. Moreover,
it is easy to see that PH ⊆ Pspace.
Of particular relevance to this work is the class ∆P2 = PNP, which can
alternatively be characterised as the class of languages decidable by a deter-
ministic polynomial-time oraclemachine with an oracle for SAT, and its
subclass PNP[log], the class of languages that are decidable by a deterministic
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polynomial-time oraclemachine that, on inputs of length n,may perform
at most O(log n) queries to an oracle for SAT. Since any problem in DP can
be decidedwith just two queries to an oracle for SAT,we have DP ⊆ PNP[log].
Figure A.1 visualises the decision classes considered in this work and
their relationships to each other.
Function classes
In complexity theory, a function problem is not merely the problem of comput-
ing the output of a function but,more generally, the problem of computing,
given a binary relation R, for every input x an output y such that (x, y) ∈ R,
if such an output exists; if no such output exists, the input x should be
rejected.
The classical example of a function problem is FSAT, the problem of com-
puting for a Boolean formula φ a satisfying assignment. In this case, the
underlying relation is polynomial-time decidable: given a formula φ and an
assignment α,we can decide in polynomial timewhether α satisfies φ. Such
function problems make up the class FNP. Formally, a function problem
“given x, compute y such that (x, y) ∈ R” is in FNP if the relation R is polyno-
mially balanced and decidable by a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm.
(A relation R is polynomially balanced if there exists k ∈ M such that ∣y ∣ ≤ ∣x∣k
for all (x, y) ∈ R).
The class FP ⊆ FNP consist of all those problems in FNP forwhich a correct
output can be computed in (deterministic) polynomial time. The problem
FSAT turns out to be complete for FNP (via a suitable notion of polynomial
reduction), and it is easy to see that a polynomial-time algorithm for SAT
could be extended to a polynomial-time algorithm for FSAT. Hence, P = NP
if and only if FP = FNP.
Theorem A.8. FP = FNP if and only if P = NP
146
A.2 Computational complexity
P
UP coUP
NP coNP
DP coDP
PNP[log]
∆P2 = PNP
ΣP2 ΠP2
⋮ ⋮PH
Pspace
Figure A.1. A hierarchy of complexity classes.
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AppendixB
Markov Chains and
Markov Decision Processes
In this appendix,we reviewMarkov chains and Markov decision processes.
In particular,we discuss how to compute the (optimal) probabilities of ful-
filling a given objective in thesemodels. More details (including proofs) can
be found in (Baier & Katoen 2008; Puterman 1994).
B.1 Markov chains
In a Markov chain, the system evolves solely through stochastic transitions.
Moreover, the probability that the systemmoves to a certain successor state
does only depend on the current state. Formally, a (time-homogenous)
Markov chain (MC)M consists of:
• a nonempty, countable set S of states,
• a transition function δ∶ S → D(S), and
• a colouring function χ∶ S → C into a set C of colours.
We denote by δ(t ∣ s) the probability that Mmoves from state s to state t,
i.e. δ(t ∣ s) = δ(s)(t). The transition graph ofM is the directed graph (S, E)with(s, t) ∈ E if and only if δ(t ∣ s) > 0.
Given an initial state s ∈ S,we define a probabilitymeasure on the Borel
σ-algebra over Sω as follows: the probability of a basic cylinder set s0 . . . sk ⋅ Sω
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equals the product∏kj=1 δ(s j ∣ s j−1) if s = s0; basic cylinder sets that start in a
state different from s have probability 0. By Carathéodory’s extension theo-
rem (Theorem A.5), this definition induces a unique probabilitymeasure on
the Borel σ-algebra over Sω; we denote this measure by PrMs . Finally,we ob-
tain a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra over Cω by viewing the
colouring function χ as a continuous function Sω → Cω. We abuse notation
and denote this measure also by PrMs .
Remark. More generally, a Markov chain is a sequence (Θn)n∈M of discrete
random variables into S such that the probability of being in a state t at
time k + 1 only depends on the probabilities of being in states s ∈ S at time k:
Pr(Θk+1 = t ∣ Θk = sk , Θk−1 = sk−1 , . . . , Θ0 = s0) = Pr(Θk+1 = t ∣ Θk = sk)
for all k ∈ M and s0 , . . . , sk , t ∈ S. This definition is more general since the
probabilities Pr(Θk+1 = t ∣ Θk = s)may depend on k. If these probabilities do
not depend on k, the Markov chain is called time-homogenous, inwhich case
Pr(Θk+1 = t ∣ Θk = s) = δ(t ∣ s) for all k ∈ M and s, t ∈ S.
Reachability objectives
The basic probabilities that we wish to compute are the probabilities
PrMs (Reach(F)) of reaching a designated subset F ⊆ S of states. In terms
of basic cylinder sets,we have
PrMs (Reach(F)) = ∑
xt∈(S/F)∗FPr
Ms (xt ⋅ Sω) .
Moreover, given a set Z ⊆ S of states such that PrMs (Reach(F)) = 0 for all s ∈ Z,
the probabilities xs ∶= PrMs (Reach(F)) satisfy the following equations:
xs = 1 if s ∈ F;
xs = 0 if s ∈ Z;
xs =∑
t∈S δ(t ∣ s) ⋅ xt if s ∈ S / (F ∪ Z).
(B.1)
In fact, the probabilities PrMs (Reach(F)) form the least solution of (B.1).
Theorem B.1. LetM be aMarkov chain, and let F , Z ⊆ S be sets of states such
that PrMs (Reach(F)) = 0 for all s ∈ Z. If (xs)s∈S ∈ [0, 1]S is a solution of (B.1),
then xs ≥ PrMs (Reach(F)) for all s ∈ S.
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By Theorem B.1 (taking Z = ∅), the probabilities PrMs (Reach(F)) can be
computed in polynomial time by solving the following linear programme:
Minimise ∑s∈S xs subject to
xs ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S,
xs = 1 for all s ∈ F,
xs =∑
t∈S δ(t ∣ s) ⋅ xt for all s ∈ S / F.
Corollary B.2. Given a finite MCM (with rational transition probabilities)
and a set F ⊆ S, the probabilities PrMs (Reach(F)) can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
In practice, there is an easier way to compute reachability properties,
which is supported by the following theorem.
Theorem B.3. Let M be a finite MC, and let F ⊆ S. If Z equals the set of all
s ∈ S such thatPrMs (Reach(F)) = 0, then the probabilities xs ∶= PrMs (Reach(F))
are the only solution of (B.1).
Since PrMs (Reach(F)) = 0 if and only if there is no path from s to F in the
transition graph ofM, the set Z in Theorem B.3 can be computed in linear
time. To determine PrMs (Reach(F)) for each s ∈ S, we can then solve (B.1)
using Gaussian elimination.
Infinitary objectives
The central notion for the verification of objectives that speak about the
infinite behaviour of a Markov chain is that of a bottom strongly connected
component (bottom SCC, BSCC). A BSCC of a Markov chainM is amaximal
subset T of states that is strongly connected (i.e. in the subgraph of the
transition graph induced by T every state has a path to every other state)
and that has no transitions leading outside T , i.e. δ(s ∣ t) = 0 for all t ∈ T and
s ∈ S / T . The importance of BSCCs stems from the following fact.
Lemma B.4. LetM be a finite MC. Then PrMs ({π ∈ Sω ∶ Inf(π) is a BSCC}) = 1
for all s ∈ S.
By Lemma B.4, to compute the probabilities of fulfilling a givenMuller
objective, it suffices to compute the probabilities of reaching a bottom SCC
that corresponds to an accepting set.
151
B Markov Chains and Markov Decision Processes
Theorem B.5. Let M be a finite Markov chain, and let F ⊆ P(C). Then
PrMs (Muller(F)) = PrMs (Reach(U)) for all s ∈ S, where U is the union of all
BSCCs T ofM such that χ(T) ∈ F.
Since all SCCs of a finite graph can be identified in linear time, e.g. using
Tarjan’s algorithm (see Cormen et al. 2009), it follows from Theorem B.5
and Corollary B.2 that the probabilities of fulfilling a given Streett, Rabin or
Muller objective can be computed in polynomial time.
Corollary B.6. Given a finite MCM (with rational transition probabilities)
and a Streett, Rabin or Muller objective Win, the probabilities PrMs (Win) can
be computed in polynomial time.
B.2 Markov decision processes
Markov decision processes extend Markov chains with controlled states.
Formally, a Markov decision process (MDP)M consists of:
• a nonempty, countable set S of states,
• a subset S0 ⊆ S of controlled states,
• a transition relation ∆ ⊆ S × ([0, 1] ∪ {}) × S, and
• a colouring function χ∶ S → C into a set C of colours.
We require that a transition is labelledwith  if and only if it originates in a
controlled state, and that transition probabilities are unique: if s ∈ S / S0 and
t ∈ S, then there exists precisely one p ∈ [0, 1]with (s, p, t) ∈ ∆; let us denote
this probability by ∆(t ∣ s). Naturally,we assume that for each s ∈ S / S0 the
probabilities on outgoing transitions sum up to 1: ∑t∈S ∆(t ∣ s) = 1. For the
sake of simplicity,we require additionally that for each s ∈ S0 there exists at
least one state t with (s, , t) ∈ ∆.
For a state s ∈ S,we denote by s∆ the set of all states t ∈ S such that there
exists 0 ≠ p ∈ [0, 1] ∪ {}with (s, p, t) ∈ ∆. The transition graph of anMDPM is
the directed graph (S, E),where (s, t) ∈ E if and only if t ∈ s∆.
Remark. In the literature, MDPs are often defined using actions: in each state,
the controller chooses an action,which determines a probability distribution
on successor states. The two definitions are essentially equivalent: On the
one hand,we can view states as actions. On the other hand,we can simulate
actions by alternating between controlled and non-controlled states.
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The behaviour of the controller is described by a strategy (other names in
the literature include policy and scheduler). Formally, a (randomised) strategy
inM is a mapping σ∶ S∗S0 → D(S) that assigns to each finite sequence of
states that ends in a controlled state a probability distribution on states such
that σ(t ∣ xs) ∶= σ(xs)(t) > 0 only if (s, , t) ∈ ∆. We extend σ to a mapping
S+ → D(S) by setting σ(t ∣ xs) ∶= ∆(t ∣ s) for all x ∈ S∗, s ∈ S / S0 and t ∈ S.
As for SMGs (see Section 2.2), we call a strategy σ pure (or deterministic) if
σ(t ∣ xs) ∈ {0, 1} for all xs ∈ S∗S0 and t ∈ S, andwe call σ stationary if σ(xs) = σ(s)
for all xs ∈ S∗S0. Finally,we say that a strategy is positional if it is both pure
and stationary.
Given a strategy σ and an initial state s,we define a probabilitymeasure
on the Borel σ-algebra over Sω as for SMGs: the probability of a basic cylinder
set s0 . . . sk ⋅ Sω equals the product∏kj=1 σ(s j ∣ s0 . . . s j−1) if s = s0; basic cylinder
sets that start in a different state than s have probability 0. By Carathéodory’s
extension theorem (Theorem A.5), this definition induces a unique probabil-
itymeasure on the Borel σ-algebra over Sω; we denote both this measure
and the corresponding measure on the Borel σ-algebra over Cω (defined via
the colouring χ) by Prσs .
The central problem in the analysis ofMarkov decision processes is com-
puting the optimal probabilities of fulfilling a certain objective. Formally,
given an MDPM, a state s and an objective Win (over states or colours),
wewant to compute supσ Prσs (Win). Note that this supremum ranges over
all strategies inM and that an optimal strategy does not need to exist.
Reachability objectives
For reachability objectives, the optimal probabilities can again be charac-
terised as the least solution of a system of equations.
Theorem B.7. LetM be a Markov decision process, and let F ⊆ S. The opti-
mal probabilities supσ Prσs (Reach(F)) form the least solution (over [0, 1]S) of
the following system of equations:
xs = 1 if s ∈ F;
xs =max{xt ∶ t ∈ s∆} if s ∈ S0 / F;
xs =∑
t∈S∆(t ∣ s) ⋅ xt if s ∈ S / (F ∪ S0).
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By replacing equations containing max with suitable inequalities,we ob-
tain the following linear programme,whose optimal solution is the vector
of optimal reachability probabilities:
Minimise ∑s∈S xs subject to
xs ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S,
xs = 1 for all s ∈ F,
xs ≥ xt for all (s, , t) ∈ ∆,
xs =∑
t∈S∆(t ∣ s) ⋅ xt for all s ∈ S / (F ∪ S0).
Corollary B.8. Given a finite MDPM (with rational transition probabilities)
and a set F ⊆ S, the optimal probabilities supσ Prσs (Reach(F)) can be computed
in polynomial time.
Do optimal strategies exist in MDPs with reachability objectives? For
finite MDPs, the answer is positive. In fact, there always exists a globally op-
timal positional strategy. However, infinite MDPs with reachability objectives
do, in general, not admit optimal strategies (see Example 2.8).
Theorem B.9. LetM be a finite MDP, and let F ⊆ S. There exists a positional
strategy τ inM such that Prτs (Reach(F)) = supσ Prσs (Reach(F)) for all s ∈ S.
Infinitary objectives
For computing the optimal probability of fulfilling an infinitary objective,
end components take the role that BSCCs play for Markov chains. Formally,
a sub-MDP of anMDPM is a subset T ⊆ S of states such that:
• T ≠ ∅,
• s∆ ∩ T ≠ ∅ for all s ∈ T , and
• s∆ ⊆ T for all s ∈ T / S0.
A set T ⊆ S is an end component ofM if T is a sub-MDP ofM that is strongly
connected (with respect to the transition graph ofM). Finally,we say that
an end component T ofM is maximal in a set U ⊆ S if there exists no end
component T ′ ofM such that T ⊊ T ′ ⊆ U.
Algorithm B.1 is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing all end com-
ponents maximal in a given set U (for a finite MDPM). The core of the
algorithm is the procedure FindMEC,which on input X ⊆ S computes all end
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Algorithm B.1. Finding maximal end components.
Input:MDPM = (S, S0 , ∆, χ), U ⊆ S
Output: {T ⊆ S ∶ T is an end component ofMmaximal in U}
output FindMEC(U)
procedure FindMEC(X)
Z ∶= ∅
compute all nontrivial SCCs of (X , {(s, t) ∶ t ∈ s∆})
for each such SCC T do
C ∶= {s ∈ T / S0 ∶ s∆ ⊈ T}
if C = ∅ then
Z ∶= Z ∪ {T}
else
Z ∶= Z ∪ FindMEC(T / C)
end if
end for
return Z
end procedure
components ofMmaximal in X. The procedure first computes all nontrivial
SCCs in the transition graph ofM restricted to X (i.e. all maximal strongly
connected subsets of X that contain at least one edge). If such an SCC T
is a sub-MDP, then T is also amaximal end component and can be added
to the output of the algorithm. Otherwise, in order to find amaximal end
component inside T ,we can remove all non-controlled states s with s∆ ⊈ T
from T . The resulting set might not be strongly connected anymore; hence,
the procedure has to be called recursively on this set.
The termination of Algorithm B.1 is guaranteed by the fact that the proce-
dure FindMEC on input X calls itself only on proper subsets of X. Moreover,
since recursive calls are limited to disjoint subsets, the total number of recur-
sive calls is bounded by the number of states. For identifying all nontrivial
SCCs of a directed graph, we can again employ Tarjan’s linear-time algo-
rithm. Hence, Algorithm B.1 computes all end components maximal in U in
quadratic time.
Theorem B.10. Given a finite MDPM and a set U ⊆ S, the set of all end
components ofMmaximal in U can be computed in quadratic time.
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The fundamental fact about end components in finite MDPs is that, un-
der any strategy, the set of states visited infinitely often is almost surely an
end component.
Lemma B.11. Let M be a finite MDP, and let σ be a strategy inM. Then
Prσs ({π ∈ Sω ∶ Inf(π) is an end component}) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
Moreover,we can build a strategy σ that,when started in an end compo-
nent T , visits almost surely all (and only) states in T infinitely often. There
are twoways to construct such a strategy: First, the stationary strategy that
moves from a state s ∈ T∩S0 to each state t ∈ s∆∩T with the same probability
does the job. Second, it is not very hard to construct a pure strategy that
achieves the same task.
Lemma B.12. LetM be a finite MDP, and let T be an end component ofM.
There exists both a stationary strategy σ and a pure strategy σ such that
Prσs ({π ∈ Sω ∶ Inf(π) = T}) = 1 for all s ∈ T .
By LemmasB.11 and B.12, computing the optimal probabilities of fulfilling
a givenMuller objective reduces to computing the optimal probabilities of
reaching an accepting end component.
Theorem B.13. LetM be a finite Markov decision process, and let F ⊆ P(C).
Then supσ Prσs (Muller(F)) = supσ Prσs (Reach(U)) for all s ∈ S,where U is the
union of all end components T ofM such that χ(T) ∈ F.
Given a family F ⊆ P(C) of accepting sets, in order to compute the union
of all accepting components,we employ Algorithm B.1 to compute, for each
F ∈ F, all end components maximal in χ−1(F). If such an end component T
contains all colours c ∈ F, we can include T in the union of all accepting
end component; otherwise, there is no hope of finding an accepting end
component inside T (at least with respect to the accepting set F). In fact,
the same idea can be used to compute the union of all accepting end com-
ponents with respect to a Rabin objective. Finally, for Streett objectives,
Chatterjee et al. (2005) gave an algorithm for computing the union of all
accepting end components,which employs Algorithm B.1 as a subroutine
(see Algorithm 5.1).
Corollary B.14. Given a finite MDPM (with rational transition probabili-
ties) and a Streett, Rabin or Muller objective Win, the optimal probabilities
supσ Prσs (Win) can be computed in polynomial time.
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Notation
Note: See referenced pages for formal definitions.
(σ−i , τ) strategy profile σ with strategy for player i replaced by τ 37[0, 1] closed interval from 0 to 1 31∣x∣ length of x 31≺ proper prefix relation 31⪯ prefix relation 31⊢ successor relation 88
A∗ finite sequences over A 31
A+ non-empty finite sequences over A 31
Aω infinite sequences over A 31
α∣k prefix of length k of α 31
Bnd(U) boundary of value class U 52
Bu¨chi(F) infinite sequences hitting F infinitely often 34
C set of colours 32
χ colouring function 32
coBu¨chi(F) infinite sequences staying in F from some point onwards 34C∗ class of SMGs derived from class C of S2Gs 70
∆ transition relation 32
δ(q) enabled transitions in state q 88
∆(w ∣ v) transition probability 32
dist(x, y) Hamming distance of x and y 126D(A) probability distributions over A 31
ε empty word 31G(x) MDP induced byMuller SMG G and payoff x 101G[x] residual game after history x 40
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Notation
Gσ−i MDP induced by strategy profile σ and player i 39, 40Gσ Markov chain induced by strategy profile σ 39, 40Gi coalition game against player i 43G ↾ U restriction of G to subarena U 41G S2G G with boundary states made absorbing 52
Inf(α) elements occurring infinitely often in α 31
limn Xn limit of chain (Xn)n∈M 57
Muller(F) infinite sequences fulfillingMuller objective F 35
M natural numbers 31
Parity(Ω) infinite sequences fulfilling parity objective Ω 34
Parity[d] Parity SMGs or S2Gs with at most d priorities 49, 133
Π set of players 32
Prσv0 probabilitymeasure induced by strategy profile σ and initial
vertex v0 38P(A) power set of A 31
Rabin(Ω) infinite sequences fulfilling Rabin objective Ω 35
Reach(F) infinite sequences hitting F 34
e real numbers 31
R ordered field of real numbers 82
Safe(F) infinite sequences staying in F 34
σ(w ∣ xv) transition probability with strategy σ 37
σ[x] residual strategy after history x 40
σ(w ∣ xv) transition probability with strategy profile σ 37
σ[x] residual strategy profile after history x 40
Streett(Ω) infinite sequences fulfilling Streett objective Ω 35
V set of vertices 32
Vi set of vertices controlled by player i 32
valG(v) value of S2G G from v 43
valτ(v) value of strategy τ from v 42
valGi (v) value of SMG G for player i from v 42
v∆ ∆-successors of v 32
Wi winning region for player i 100, 122
Wini objective for player i 33
x−1X residual language of X with respect to prefix x 31
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Index
accepting set 35
action 33, 152
algebra 141
arena 32
subarena 41
Büchi objective 34
Bach or Stravinsky 16
basic cylinder set 144
best response 55
Borel set 144
Borel σ-algebra 144
bottom strongly connected component
(bottom SCC, BSCC) 151
BSCC, see bottom strongly connected
component
Carathéodory’s extension theorem 143
Church’s problem 19
co-Büchi objective 34
co-UP 144
coalition game 43
colour 32, 149, 152
colouring function 32, 149, 152
computation 88
partial 88
concurrent game 33, 138
conditional probability 143
configuration 88
initial 88
successor 88
counter machine, see two-counter
machine
cylinder set 144
basic 144
dining philosophers problem 21
stochastic 22
DP 145
end component 41, 154
accepting 156
maximal 41, 154
winning 42
ε-equilibrium 19, 140
event 141
almost sure 142
existential theory of the reals 82
extensive-form game 17
FinNE 74
FinSPE 74
FNP 69, 146
halting problem 89
Hamming distance 126
history 33
compatiblewith a strategy 37
compatiblewith a strategy profile 37
consistent with a strategy profile 38
deviation 60
of an initialised SMG 33
Levy’s zero-one law 144
Markov chain (MC) 33, 149, 150
time-homogenous 150
Markov decision process (MDP) 33, 152
matching pennies 17, 18
matrix game 15
MC, seeMarkov chain
MDP, seeMarkov decision process
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Index
memory structure 39
minimax theorem 17
monotone class 141
monotone class theorem 142
Muller objective 35
Nash equilibrium 16, 17, 55; see also
strategy profile
Nash’s theorem 17
NE 73
non-halting problem 89
nondeterminism 138
objective 32
Büchi 34
co-Büchi 34
Muller 35
ω-regular 35
parity 34
prefix-independent 35
Rabin 35
reachability 34
safety 34
simple reachability 35
Streett 35
OneNE 113
OneSPE 119
parity objective 34
partial computation 88
payoff
discounted 19, 139
limit-average 19, 139
of a play 19, 33, 139
of a strategy profile 38
of an end component 42
total 19, 139
PCTL, see probabilistic computation tree
logic
play 33
compatiblewith a strategy 37
compatiblewith a strategy profile 37
of an initialised SMG 33
player 31
Byzantine 138
PNP 118, 145
PNP[log] 105, 145
polynomial hierarchy 145
positive-one fragment 99, 113
PosNE 74
PosSPE 74
priority 34
priority function 34
probabilistic computation tree logic
(PCTL) 95
probability distribution 31
probabilitymeasure 142
PureFinNE 74
PureFinSPE 74
PureNE 74
PureSPE 74
pushdown game 138
qualitative decision problem 47
qualitative fragment 74, 122
strictly 99
QualNE 122
QualSPE 128
quantitative decision problem 47
Rabin objective 35
Rabin pair 35
random variable 143
reachability objective 34
simple 35
residual game 40
reward 18, 139
robust equilibrium 140
safety objective 34
sample space 141
SAT-UNSAT 145
secure equilibrium 140
Shapley game 18
σ-algebra 141
Borel 144
generated 141
simple stochasticmultiplayer game
(SSMG) 37; see also stochastic
multiplayer game
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Index
simple stochastic two-player zero-sum
game (SS2G) 37; see also stochastic
two-player zero-sum game
SMG, see stochasticmultiplayer game
solution concept 139
SPE 73
SqrtSum 84
square root sum problem 84
SSMG, see simple stochasticmultiplayer
game
SS2G, see simple stochastic two-player
zero-sum game
state 32, 88, 149, 152; see also vertex
controlled 152
initial 88, 149, 153
StatNE 74
StatSPE 74
stochastic dining philosophers
problem 22
stochasticmultiplayer game (SMG) 33
deterministic 34
finite 33
initialised 33
simple 37
stochastic two-player zero-sum game
(S2G) 34; see also stochastic
multiplayer game
determined 43
simple 37
strategy 15, 37, 40, 153
deterministic 37, 153
ε-optimal 42
finite-state 39
globally ε-optimal 42
globally optimal 42
mixed 17
optimal 42
positional 25, 39, 153
pure 19, 37, 40, 153
randomised 19, 37, 40, 153
residual 40
residually optimal 42
stationary 19, 39, 40, 153
strongly optimal 42
threat 59
winning 42
with memory 39, 40
strategy profile 37
deterministic 37
finite-state 39
positional 39
pure 37
randomised 37
residual 40
safe 91
stable 91
stationary 39
with memory 39
Streett objective 35
Streett pair 35
strictly qualitative fragment 99
StrQualNE 99
StrQualSPE 103
sub-MDP 154
subarena 41
subgame-perfect equilibrium 58; see also
strategy profile
support 83
S2G, see stochastic two-player zero-sum
game
timed game 139
transition function 149
transition graph
of a Markov chain 149
of anMDP 152
transition probability 32, 152
transition relation 32, 88, 152
two-counter machine 88
deterministic 88
UP 144
value
for a player 42
of a strategy 42
of an S2G 43
value class 52
positive 52
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Index
vertex 32
controlled 32
initial 33
stochastic 32
terminal 35
winning condition, see objective
winning region 122
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